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ABSTRACT 
 
This study explores the claim that Great Power Wars are a necessary condition for successful 
hegemonic ascent in the modern world-system, primarily from the standpoint of World-
Systems Analysis. This study advances the conception of hegemony primarily in economic 
and state terms, and it was investigated, by way of a historical case study, how the Thirty 
Years’ War (1618-1648) impacted the economic domains of agro-industrial production, 
commerce, and finance of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, and its main rival for 
systemic leadership, Hapsburg Spain.  
 
The variables utilised in the study were Great Power War, and the ‘material base’ of the state 
involved (both independent), the three abovementioned economic domains (intervening), 
and hegemony or defeat (dependent). The case study was primarily descriptive and 
explanatory, with the use of process-tracing in its compilation, and a method of within-case 
structured, focused comparison was utilised with the aim of tentatively producing 
standardised, generalised knowledge concerning the wider link between Great Power War 
and hegemony beyond the Dutch case.  
 
The findings of the study, although derived from only one historical case of hegemonic 
ascent in the modern world-system, strongly support the argument that Great Power War is 
necessary to secure the hegemony of the leading insular core state, which is physically 
removed from the fighting during the conflict, since the full mobilisation of its economy is 
effected, while the economies of most other core states are impaired, especially the main 
continental rival for hegemony. However, the ascending hegemon must also possess the 
requisite favourable ‘material base’. Further research on this topic is called for, given the 
potential destructiveness of a future Great Power War, and its role in establishing hegemony 
in the modern world-system. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
Hierdie studie ondersoek die bewering dat Groot Moontheid Oorloë ‘n noodsaaklike vereiste 
is vir suksesvolle hegemoniese bestyging in die moderne wêreld-sisteem, hoofsaaklik vanaf 
die standpunt van Wêreld-Sisteem Analise. Hierdie studie bevorder die konsepsie van 
hegemonie hoofsaaklik in ekonomiese en staat terme, en dit het ondersoek, deur middel van 
‘n historiese gevallestudie, hoe die Dertig Jaar Oorlog (1618-1648) ingewerk het op die 
ekonomiese arenas van agri-industriële produksie, handel, and finansies van die Verenigde 
Provinsies van Nederland, en hul mededinger vir sistemiese leierskap, Spanje. 
 
Die veranderlikes wat in die studie ingespan was, was Groot Moontheid Oorlog, en die 
‘materiële basis’ van die state in kwessie (onafhanlik), die drie bogenoemde ekonomiese 
arenas (albei tussenkomend), en hegemonie of nederlaag (afhanklik). Die gevallestudie was 
hoofsaaklik beskrywend en verduidelikend, en proses-nasporing (oftewel ‘process-tracing’) is 
in die samestelling daarvan benut, en ‘n metode van  gestruktureerde, gefokusde vergelyking 
(oftewel ‘structured, focused comparison’) is gebruik binne die gevallestudie met die doel 
om tentatiewe gestandardiseerde en veralgemeende kennis te genereer wat bydra tot die 
verduideliking van die wyer skakel tussen Groot Moontheid Oorlog en hegemonie buite die 
geval van die Verenigde Provinsies.  
 
Die bevindinge van die studie, hoewel gegenereer aan die hand van slegs een historiese geval 
van hegemoniese bestyging in the moderne wêreld-sisteem, het sterk steun verleen aan die 
argument dat Groot Moontheid Oorloë nodig is om die hegemonie van die vernaamste 
insulêre kern staat te bewerkstellig, wat fisies verwyderd van die gevegte is tydends die oorlog, 
aangesien die volle mobilisasie van die ekonomie van hierdie staat bewerkstellig word, terwyl 
die ekonomieë van die meerderheid van die ander kernstate benadeel word, veral die 
vernaamste kontinentale mededinger om hegemonie. Die opkomende hegemoon moet egter 
ook oor die vereiste gunstige ‘materiële basis’ beskik. Verdere navorsing in hierdie veld word 
benodig, gegewe die waarskynlike vernietiging wat gesaai kan word deur ‘n toekomstige 
Groot Moontheid Oorlog, en die rol daarvan in die daarstelling van hegemonie in die 
moderne wêreld-sisteem. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE 
The modern – that is, capitalist – world-system, that first emerged in Europe in the ‘long’ 
sixteenth century, and that has since expanded to incorporate the globe in its entirety, is 
marked by certain secular trends and cyclical rhythms, one of which is known as the 
hegemonic sequence (Wallerstein, 2000a:253,257; Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995:411). 
This hegemonic sequence consists of a “fluid continuum” which, at the one end, represents 
a roughly even balance between the great core states that populate the world-system at any 
given time, with all being approximately equal in strength, i.e. there is a multicentric power 
distribution (Wallerstein, 2000a:255). In the middle of this continuum, the great core 
powers find themselves grouped together in roughly two camps, with some important players 
as yet undecided or uncommitted, but with neither camp being clearly superior to the other, 
to the extent that it can “impose its will on others.” At the other end of this continuum, one 
finds that a single great core power has achieved hegemony in the world-system, that is, it has 
amassed disproportionate amounts of political, military, and economic power for a 
prolonged (yet finite) period of time, i.e. there is a unicentric power distribution (Chase-
Dunn and Grimes, 1995:412). Hegemony has thus far been achieved by only three core 
states since the emergence of the modern world-system – the Dutch Republic of the United 
Provinces in the seventeenth century, the United Kingdom in the nineteenth, and the 
United States in the twentieth (Wallerstein, 2000a:256). Importantly however, both ends of 
the hegemonic sequence represent rare, unstable, and temporary situations that eventually 
give way to the “great middle” of the continuum (Wallerstein, 2000a:255). This is an 
important observation since the third and most recent hegemon mentioned above – the 
United States – that for a great part of the previous century enjoyed the peak of its 
hegemony, has already entered its period of hegemonic decline (Wallerstein, 2000a:387).  
In fact, the hegemony of the United States has been declining for quite some time, 
essentially since 1970, although its period of hegemony could arguably be extended to the 
end of the “Great American Peace,” and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, around 1990 
(Wallerstein, 2002a:60; Wallerstein, 2000a:387,392). No doubt American hegemony was 
more extensive than any of its predecessors, and that the United States continues to possess 
the most powerful military on earth – what Wallerstein (2002a:66) calls its “only card” – yet 
it has declined to the point where it can be argued that the world-system has now moved 
“beyond any semblance of U.S. hegemony,” with the United States “no longer even a 
superpower at all” (Wallerstein, 2008a; Wallerstein, 2008b). With this in mind, it becomes 
apparent that the world-system finds itself moving once again, and with increasing rapidity, 
away from the one end of the hegemonic continuum to the other – to a multipolar 
international order, albeit with the US remaining a strong player, but now “merely a partner 
with other power centers” (Wallerstein, 2008d). Indeed, as Wallerstein (2008b) contends, the 
“end of Act I of the new world geopolitical order” has arrived, and the states that will 
dominate the world stage in the coming decades are now clearly identifiable. 
However, in the wake of US hegemonic decline, if historical experience is any indication, 
an “erosion of the alliance network which the hegemonic power had created patiently” is 
inevitable, and will be followed by a major restructuring of the interstate system along new 
patterns of alliances (Wallerstein, 2000a:259). In this tumultuous phase (the “most terrible 
of all” for the declining hegemon), on the back of what may be termed the law of uneven 
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development – which posits that “a differential growth in state power [and, particularly, in 
economic power], creates disequilibrium in the system as the actual distribution of power no 
longer matches the authority structure” – new contenders for hegemonic succession are 
emerging, around which the reshuffling international alliances may, as has been the trend 
since the sixteenth century, eventually form more or less two camps, dividing the interstate 
system once more, and returning the continuum to its centre (Wallerstein, 2000a:409; 
Kauppi, 1991:106). However, before a hegemonic successor to the United States can emerge, 
it should be noted, as Goldstein (emphasis added, 1988:366) observes, that hegemony “has 
come about only as a result of hegemonic war.” Indeed, as Wallerstein (2000a:258) concurs, 
“in each case [of hegemony in the modern world-system], the hegemony has been secured by 
a thirty-year-long world war.” Known by various names, these ‘hegemonic’ or ‘world’ wars 
will be referred to as ‘Great Power Wars’ throughout this study since, by definition, they 
involve the participation of “almost all of the major military powers [that is, Great Powers]” 
of the world-system at the time (Wallerstein, 2000a:258).  
Given thus that hegemony in the modern world-system has always been preceded by a 
Great Power War, which acts to re-establish “international equilibrium by bringing back 
into line the hierarchy of prestige with the hierarchy of power [here one can include 
economic power],” and that Great Power Wars are ‘total’ in terms of “intensity, duration, 
and geographic scope,” the question may be raised as to whether, in the course of the 
hegemonic sequence, the world will again witness a Great Power War before a new hegemon 
can emerge at the head of the world-system (Kauppi, 1991:108). Given the contemporary 
existence of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, if such a Great Power War is indeed 
to occur at some point in the future, its effects will no doubt be totally devastating, and it is 
questionable whether there can indeed be any ‘winner’ at all. Clearly then, an investigation 
into the link between Great Power War and hegemony is pertinent since, as various experts 
have claimed, hegemony can only be established through the waging of such a total war. 
This study will be dedicated to the investigation of the role that Great Power War plays in 
establishing or ‘creating’ hegemony, particularly so that it may be possible for future research 
to examine the likely nature, and the major participants, of hegemonic rivalry in the twenty-
first century, and to anticipate if, and how, Great Power War will feature in a fourth cycle of 
the hegemonic sequence.  
 
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
In order to clarify the link between Great Power War and hegemony, it is first necessary to 
arrive at a clearer conception of what it means for any single state to be considered 
‘hegemonic’. Although this concept will be elaborated upon in greater detail at a later point 
in this chapter, at this stage it is useful to regard what Wallerstein (2000a:255) terms the 
foundation “of such power [that is, hegemonic power].” Since both Wallerstein and 
proponents of World-Systems Analysis in general tend to place the greatest emphasis on 
economic relationships in order to account for the underlying nature of the world-system, 
and to explain its features, it makes sense that Wallerstein’s (2000a:255) conception of 
hegemony and hegemonic power should sprout from an economic advantage of one core 
state over all others (Shannon, 1989:138). Indeed, for any core state to be considered 
hegemonic, the enterprises domiciled within that state must first attain (simultaneous) 
economic advantages over their foreign counterparts in three major arenas or domains of 
economic activity: agro-industrial production (particularly the production of consumer and 
capital goods requiring the use of advanced technologies and techniques), commerce 
(especially long-distance oceanic trade in the abovementioned consumer and capital goods), 
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and finance (including the provision of financial services). However, since the spheres of 
politics and economics are inseparable in World-Systems Analysis, the success of the 
particular core state’s enterprises (that could not have been effected without strong state 
support in the first place) then so benefits the parent state that it is able to pull ahead in the 
ongoing rivalry between the core states. However, as Wallerstein (2000a:255) is eager to 
remind, hegemony refers to periods during which that “power differential is really great,” 
but that differential never becomes so large that it confers to the hegemonic state the power 
to do anything it wants. Indeed, as Wallerstein (2000a:255) emphasises, “omnipotence does 
not exist within the interstate system.” 
Returning to the advantage of the core state’s enterprises in the three economic arenas, 
Wallerstein (2000a:255) iterates that the edge in efficiency of which is being spoken is “so 
great that these enterprises can not only outbid enterprises domiciled in other great powers 
in the world market in general, but quite specifically in very many instances within the home 
markets of the rival powers themselves.” This edge is made possible by what Wallerstein 
(1996:229; 2002b:18) terms the creation of “quasi-monopolies in world production,” 
specifically in the leading sectors (or industries) of the time. These quasi-monopolies are 
“extremely profitable,” not only to the companies involved, but also to the parent state and 
much of its population, who access these profits in various ways, such as through taxation, 
wages, and investments (Wallerstein, 1998:38). In this way, Wallerstein (2002b:12) contends, 
economic strength is “translated into political/military and cultural strength.” 
Regarding the three economic arenas, Wallerstein (2000a:257) specifically points out that 
the rising hegemonic state’s enterprises first gain their edge in agro-industrial production, 
then in commerce, and lastly in finance. During the phase of hegemonic decline, the edge is 
lost in this sequence as well. However, hegemony only “refers to that short interval in which 
there is simultaneous advantage in all three economic domains” (Wallerstein, 2000a:257). As 
such, true hegemony is not gained until the state in question is the leader in world finance, 
while it is lost as soon as other states are able to catch up to, and emulate, the technologies 
and techniques of production utilised by its enterprises operating in the agro-industrial 
arena. 
With regards to this study, if it is the case that Great Power War is essential to the 
establishment of hegemony, as various authors claim, and as will be maintained here, on the 
one hand; and if the foundation of hegemony consists of the attainment of advantages by one 
core state’s enterprises over their rivals in the three economic domains mentioned above, on 
the other hand; then the link between Great Power War and hegemony could be 
conceptualised in the following way: a specific core state is able to ascend to hegemony in 
the modern world-system as a result of Great Power War, since that conflict benefits the 
industries operating within that state by conferring upon them an advantage in the three 
economic domains of agro-industrial production, commerce, and finance, while harming the 
industries of rival states, particularly the rival for hegemony. Since economic strength is 
translated into political/military and cultural strength, the core state that is benefitted by 
Great Power War in the three economic arenas is then able to emerge as hegemon at the 
conclusion of the conflict.  
Each of the hegemons mentioned earlier in this chapter faced a main rival and competitor 
during their ascent, a rival that Wallerstein (2002b:12) argues has always been a “land-based 
power, [that] went the route of attempting to transform the world-system into a world-
empire.” These differed from the states that eventually emerged hegemonic, since the latter 
were “sea/air power[s], [that] with the aid of the erstwhile hegemonic power … sought to 
maintain the looser complex of economic, political, and cultural structures that define a 
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capitalist world-economy” (Wallerstein, 2002b:12). These pairings of sea/air powers on the 
one hand, and land-based rivals eventually attempting to transform the world-system into a 
world-empire on the other, are as follows: United Provinces of the Netherlands – Habsburg 
Spain; the United Kingdom – Monarchic, Revolutionary and Napoleonic France; and the 
United States – Imperial and National Socialist (Nazi) Germany (Wallerstein, 2000a:258). 
Since Great Power War can thus be argued to have brought about hegemony for particular 
core states (and without which they might not have attained hegemony at all), the pertinent 
question then, and the main problem to be investigated in this study, is thus how Great 
Power War benefits one hegemonic contender with regards to the three economic domains, 
while harming the performance of the enterprises of its main rival in the same economic 
domains. This will be the central problem that will be addressed in this study, and from 
which it is hoped that future research may derive insights regarding hegemonic rivalry and 
the prospects for Great Power War in the twenty-first century. 
 
1.3 INITIAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Before proceeding with a clarification of the individual facets of the study, such as the 
specific objectives, and the methodology to be employed, it is beneficial to elaborate further 
on the theoretical framework that informs the study. Specifically, as mentioned above, the 
broader theoretical framework within which this study is located is that of World-Systems 
Analysis. This “protest against the ways in which social scientific enquiry was structured for 
all of us at its inception in the middle of the nineteenth century” can trace its roots back to 
the work of sociologists, especially Immanuel Wallerstein, in the early 1970s (Wallerstein, 
2000a:129; Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995:387; Bradshaw and Lynn, 1994:439). It has 
become a transdisciplinary, or more accurately, a unidisciplinary, undertaking that eschews 
artificial boundaries between ‘disciplines’ such as economics and sociology, the roots of 
which, as the comment above indicated, can be traced back to the nineteenth century 
(Sanderson, 2005:185; Wallerstein, 2000a:129-130). In fact, World-Systems Analysis strongly 
regards the four ‘disciplines’ of anthropology, political science, economics, and sociology 
(and indeed the social sciences as a whole) as a single discipline. As Wallerstein (2000a:134) 
maintains, “the three presumed arenas of collective human action – the economic, the 
political, and the social or sociocultural – are not autonomous arenas of social action,” and 
“there is a single ‘set of rules’ or a single ‘set of constraints’ within which these various 
structures operate.” Additionally, history must also be included with the (unified) social 
sciences, since “the modern world can only be understood in its historical context” 
(Wallerstein, 2000a:135; Wallerstein, 2000b:34; Sanderson, 2005:184). This, Wallerstein 
(2000b:33-34) argues, constitutes the foundation of historical social science, since “all useful 
descriptions of social reality are necessarily simultaneously ‘historical’ … and ‘social 
scientific’.” Indeed, by specifically taking into account the longue durée, World-Systems 
Analysis has become a historically-grounded (as opposed to ahistorical), and thus a 
particularly rugged, perspective on what is conventionally termed the International Political 
Economy (IPE). 
As mentioned above, World-Systems Analysis as a perspective (or indeed, a paradigm) can 
be traced back most directly to the work of Immanuel Wallerstein –also its central and most 
prominent proponent (see for instance Wallerstein {1974}), who was the first to employ the 
perspective in an attempt to understand the “origins and the interactions of what were 
typically called the first, second, and third worlds and their roles in the rise to dominance of 
capitalism and industrialization,” and whose work constitutes the foundation upon which 
this study will be built (Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995:389-390; Hall, 1996:441,443). Some 
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of the main features of the modern world-system are discussed elsewhere in this chapter, but 
one of the most notable is the hegemonic sequence, whereby states ascend to hegemony but 
eventually decline, as part of the oscillation between the centralisation and decentralisation 
of political organisation within the world-system (Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995:411). This 
oscillation has been significantly influenced by capitalism, which has had specific 
consequences, such as the prevention of the formation of a world-empire.  
However, the key aspect of this hegemonic sequence that is of importance to this study is 
the occurrence of global war at some point in the transition between the hegemony of one 
state and that of another. One of the most important consequences of such a Great Power 
War is the way in which it ratifies the global power hierarchy that exists at the conclusion of 
the war (Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995:412).  This study thus attempts to shed light on the 
hegemonic sequence of World-Systems Analysis, by exploring the impact of Great Power 
War on one historical hegemon (the Dutch Republic) and its main rival for hegemony 
(Hapsburg Spain), and the choice of this hegemon will motivated in a later section in this 
chapter. An expanded discussion of the theoretical elements of this study, including the 
major criticisms lodged against World-Systems Analysis, and the literature review, can be 
located in the second chapter. 
 
1.4 HYPOTHESIS, OBJECTIVES OF STUDY, AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Essentially, the hypothesis employed in this study, simply stated, is that Great Power Wars 
not only facilitate the rise of hegemons, but are in fact necessary for them to do so. This 
hypothesis can be expanded and clarified by identifying the variables involved. To this end, 
the (first) independent variable can be identified as Great Power War, since the argument 
has been advanced by various scholars that hegemony can only come about as a result of 
such a conflict, and that it secures or encrusts that resultant hegemony in the world-system. 
The dependent variable is, of course, hegemony in the modern world-system, a concept that 
has already been briefly explored, and is returned to later in this chapter. However, since the 
emergence or foundation of hegemony can be attributed to the lead of a particular core 
state’s enterprises in the three economic domains of agro-industrial production, commerce, 
and finance, these domains constitute the intervening variable of the hypothesis, since they 
act as the essential link or mechanism between the independent and dependent variables.  
Additionally, this study will also consider what Flint and Shelley (1996:489) call 
‘locational factors’ (a country’s material, or resource, base and its geopolitical foundation), 
alongside levels of technology (especially as manifested in leading sectors), forms of social 
organisation, and the extent of capitalist economic development1 (along with the capitalist 
advantages thus conferred to enterprises) existing within the particular rivals for hegemonic 
succession prior to the eruption of the Great Power War, since these also impact their likely 
success or failure during a Great Power War. To this end, these (endogenous) locational, 
economic, and political factors will also be included as a (second) independent variable, 
termed the ‘material base’ for the sake of brevity. As will be seen in chapter two, the 
inclusion of these endogenous factors will go far to address serious criticisms of World-
Systems Analysis concerning its structural determinism and overemphasis on exogenous 
factors to account for the location, and internal features, of the states within the hierarchy of 
the modern world-system. 
 
                                                 
1
 Included here are Wallerstein’s (1980) conceptions of state strength, and Wallerstein’s (1980) and Cox’s 
(1983; 1987) contributions in terms of historic or hegemonic blocs within states. This will be elaborated 
upon especially in chapter two. 
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Stated more elaborately, the causal hypothesis employed here is as follows: 
Great Power Wars, interacting with the material base existing prior to the conflict, benefit 
the enterprises of one hegemonic contender (the predominant sea/air power) with respect to 
the three economic domains of agro-industrial production, commerce, and finance, while 
harming the enterprises of its main rival (the predominant land power), while the 
subsequent economic advantage of the enterprises of the hegemonic rival that was benefitted 
by the conflict, is so large that it confers disproportionate military and political advantages 
upon the parent state, thus establishing its hegemony. 
 
Thus, Great Power Wars have different impacts on the economic domains of different core 
powers, thus leading to different outcomes with regards to the hegemonic rivalry. A large part 
of the reason for this difference comes down to the existence (or lack) of a strong material 
base prior to the eruption of the conflict. For instance, if one hegemonic contender is richly 
endowed with strategic natural resources, such as iron and coal, while its principle rival is 
poorly so endowed, then it stands to reason that the former will have an advantage over the 
latter in any conflict that requires the use of these resources. Moreover, if the enterprises of 
one hegemonic contender are more competitive than those of the main rival, then it would 
make sense if the enterprises of the former are better able to exploit the opportunities offered 
by the conflict. In this manner, the two independent variables interact, and both are 
required in order to establish the sizable lead in the three economic domains that constitute 
the foundation of hegemony. 
With the hypothesis thus established, it is possible to regard the objectives of the study in 
more detail. This study aims to investigate, and illuminate as far as possible, in general 
terms, the manner in which Great Power War, and the material/geopolitical bases existing 
prior to those Wars, interact in conferring advantage to the enterprises of one hegemonic 
contender in the three identified economic arenas, while disadvantaging the enterprises of 
that state’s main rival. Once this link has been investigated, the manner in which Great 
Power Wars allow hegemonic ascent, via the three economic arenas, should be much better 
understood. 
In support of these core objectives, a series of research questions can be formulated, some 
of which will be employed in a very specific manner later in the study. Although elaborated 
upon in a later section of this chapter, a method of ‘structured, focused comparison’ will be 
employed in this study (in a within-case context) – a method which, at its core, consists of 
asking a series of general questions (reflecting the research objective) of the findings of the 
research (here to be collected in a historical case study), so as to guide and standardise data 
collection, while permitting systematic comparison and cumulation of findings (George and 
Bennett, 2004:68). As such, the research questions stated below (and identified as such), will 
be explicitly posed and answered later in this study (in chapter four). 
 
With regards to the primary objective of the study, and for use in the structured, focused 
comparison, the following research questions will be posed: 
 
1. What was the eventual hegemon’s position in the world-system prior to the outbreak of the 
Great Power War? 
2. Which state was the eventual hegemon’s main rival during the War, and what was the 
position of that rival in the world-system prior to the outbreak of the War? 
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3. How did the Great Power War impact the economic domain of agricultural production 
(and thus the position of the enterprises operating in that domain) of both the eventual 
hegemon and its main rival? 
4. How did the Great Power War impact the economic domain of industrial production (and 
thus the position of the enterprises operating in that domain) of both the eventual hegemon 
and its main rival, and what was the role of the leading sectors of the epoch? 
5. How did the Great Power War impact the economic domain of commerce (and thus the 
position of the enterprises operating in that domain) of both the eventual hegemon and its 
main rival, and how did sea power factor into the conflict? 
6. How did the Great Power War impact the economic domain of finance (and thus the 
position of the enterprises operating in that domain) of both the eventual hegemon and its 
main rival? 
7. How did the material base – i.e. locational factors (geopolitical setting and natural 
resources), and the relative strength of the capitalist economy and state – of the eventual 
hegemon compare to its main rival, and what effects did these have upon the War effort of 
each? 
8. What were the major consequences of the Great Power War, and how did the hegemon 
restructure the international system at the conclusion of the conflict, in other words, how did 
it secure its hegemony, and what was the settlement through which it did so? 
 
1.5 SCOPE OF STUDY 
With regards to the completion of the objective of the study, as outlined above, it is necessary 
to reiterate that, according to World-Systems Analysis, only three states have managed to 
achieve hegemony since the emergence of the modern world-system in the sixteenth century. 
Ideally, in order to examine the causal mechanism between Great Power War and hegemony 
to the fullest extent, the ascent of each of these three hegemonic states – the United 
Provinces, the United Kingdom, and the United States – should be investigated 
comparatively. However, given the practical implications of the space required to do justice 
to such an undertaking, only the ascent of the first of these hegemons – the Dutch Republic 
– and its main rival – Hapsburg Spain – can be investigated here. As such, functionally, the 
scope of the study will be limited to an investigation of the impact of the Thirty Years’ War, 
as the first Great Power War of the modern world-system, upon the three abovementioned 
economic arenas of the Dutch Republic and Hapsburg Spain. It is thus apparent that the 
temporal scope of the study is mainly limited to the early era of the modern world-system, 
that is, the seventeenth century, with a background discussion of relevant events in the ‘long 
sixteenth century’; while the geographical scope will be restricted primarily to Europe, the 
Baltic, the Mediterranean, and the European colonies in peripheral America, in other words 
the world-system of the seventeenth century. The case study will thus have to be elaborate 
and requires detailed descriptive foundations in order to allow for sufficiently meaningful 
findings. 
In addition to the impact of the War on the three key economic arenas, other factors will 
also be considered, such as the locational factors and material bases of the states under 
investigation, the relationships between those states and their enterprises and state strength 
(in Wallerstein’s {1980} understanding of the term), and population movements, which often 
favour emerging hegemons. The case study will open with an investigation into the 
emergence of the particular hegemonic rivalry in question, and apart from the central 
investigation of the War and its impact on the three economic arenas, brief observations 
regarding the now-hegemonic state’s role in shaping the post-War world order will also be 
 8 
made. As such, the scope of the study will, in fact, cover a longer period than the Great 
Power War (the Thirty Years’ War) mentioned above. The aim is to make possible the 
production of empirically richer findings than would otherwise be the case. 
 
1.6 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The study will be empirical, and will use the world-system as the unit of analysis, since the 
changing distribution of power within that system is the focal point of the investigation. 
Indeed, as Hall (1996:441) remarks, Wallerstein has always argued that the world-system in 
its entirety “is the fundamental unit of analysis within which all other social processes and 
structures should be analyzed.” Due to the study’s focus on the early era of the modern 
world-system, which is often neglected in contemporary mainstream discourse in favour of a 
discussion of American hegemony, it will be historical in nature, since the emergence of the 
hegemon at the end of the Great Power War under study took place at a specific point in the 
past, in an era spanning several decades, from as far back as the late sixteenth century to the 
middle of the seventeenth century.  
As a consequence of the employment of a case study, the study uses the logic of analytic 
induction (Neuman, 2003:33). Similar to most case study research, the study will be 
qualitative in nature which, as Neuman (2003:139) points out, often relies on interpretive or 
critical social science. This is indeed the case here since, as mentioned earlier, Wallerstein 
(2000a:129) essentially considers World-Systems Analysis to be a protest against the ways in 
which social scientific inquiry has ‘traditionally’ been structured (from the nineteenth 
century), and it is thus an appropriate example of critical social science.  
The study, as a consequence of the examination of a complex and expansive subject, will 
contain descriptive and explanatory elements. In the investigation of the historical case 
study, the core of the research will be descriptive (in the account of the Great Power War, its 
run-up, and the period immediately following) and explanatory (in the discussion of the 
impact of the Great Power War on the three economic domains of the ascending hegemon 
and its chief rival).  
Although this study will by necessity be unable to include more than one case study, it will 
nevertheless adapt features from the method of structured, focused comparison, which is 
particularly suited to case study research. Here, this method will be used primarily for 
within-case comparison between the impact of the Thirty Years’ War on the Dutch Republic 
and Hapsburg Spain. The method is structured, in that general questions “are asked of each 
case under study [here only one case, but within that case are two states being compared to 
establish why one ascended to hegemony while the other did not] to guide and standardize 
data collection,” while it is focused in that it investigates only “certain aspects of the 
historical cases examined” (George and Bennett, 2004:67). One of the primary benefits of 
this method of enquiry is that it allows the study of “historical experience in ways that would 
yield useful generic knowledge.” After the ‘universe’ to be studied, that is, the specific class 
of events or instances of a phenomenon has been identified – here hegemonic ascent – and a 
suitably defined research objective has been formulated – here the investigation of the 
impact of Great Power War on (Dutch) hegemonic ascent, specifically via the three key 
economic arenas – variables of theoretical interest are to be formulated, as has been done 
earlier in this chapter (George and Bennett, 2004:69). Following on these steps, and the 
subsequent research, a set of standardised, general questions is to be asked of the case/s 
under study. These questions have also been outlined earlier in this chapter, in an attempt to 
implement as closely as possible the method of structured, focused comparison. It is also 
hoped that such a method will facilitate the future production of a study that will be able to 
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investigate British and American hegemonic ascent alongside that of the Dutch, and this is 
an endeavour that I aim to carry out personally. 
Additionally, the method of process-tracing is also employed in this study. This method, 
according to George and Bennett (2004:206), is used to “identify the intervening causal 
process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or 
variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.” This method is especially useful in 
theory testing or theory development, making it particularly relevant to this study, since it 
attempts to “specify the causal process that leads from the independent variables associated 
with the theory [Great Power War] to variance in the outcomes [either hegemony or defeat]” 
(George and Bennett, 2004:209). This also constitutes one of the primary strengths of this 
study, in that it attempts to shed light on the causal process between Great Power War and 
hegemony, which has not enjoyed sufficiently intensive examination in existing literature. In 
particular, the ‘analytic explanation’ variety of process-tracing will be employed, since it 
“converts a historical narrative into an analytical causal explanation couched in explicit 
theoretical forms” (George and Bennett, 2004:211). As an additional benefit, process-tracing 
makes it possible to develop an “appropriate, though necessarily circumscribed, covering law 
[a ‘statement of regularity between a set of events’]” for each step in the causal sequence, 
which aids in specifying the causal relation or connection between terms (George and 
Bennett, 2004:225,227). 
The use of the process-tracing method in this study is indeed already visible in this 
chapter, since an attempt has been made to clarify the causal process between Great Power 
War and hegemony – by way of considering the impact of Great Power Warfare on the three 
economic domains that constitute the foundation of hegemony in the modern world-system. 
Since two independent variables have been suggested in this chapter, the form of process-
tracing to be employed here may be further defined as ‘convergent colligation’, since the 
outcome to be explained flows from “the convergence of several conditions, independent 
variables, or causal chains” (George and Bennett, 2004:229). Thus to reiterate, this study will 
employ a method of structured, focused comparison, as well as process-tracing, with the 
latter specifically belonging to the analytic explanation variety, here making use of 
convergent colligation. To this end, secondary sources, consisting of books and articles from 
journals and selected online sources, will be employed. Moreover, the historical narrative 
will be used in the discussion of the Dutch case study. 
 
1.7 LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
With regards to the limitations of this study, perhaps the most significant is the fact that it is 
unable, in the context of a Master’s thesis, to present a complete historical comparison, 
which would have made possible speculation about hegemonic rivalry in the current 
century. Practicality however demands that, instead of attempting to provide a superficial 
and fleeting survey of all three cases of hegemonic ascent, it will be more fruitful to provide 
an in-depth investigation of one, and then to speculate about possible similarities to, and 
links with, the other two cases, and to produce a study in future that can incorporate all 
three cases comparatively. However, even one case study should be sufficient to illustrate 
whether the claims made by Wallerstein and Goldstein, as mentioned above, are valid, and 
whether Great Power War is a necessary condition for hegemony to be established in the 
modern world-system. Elsewhere2 I have argued in greater detail that there is indeed a strong 
                                                 
2 Apart from the investigation in this study, I have examined in detail the role of the Great Power War in 
both British and American hegemonic ascent. This research may be accessed online at 
http://andresiebrits.weebly.com/works1.html 
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correlation between Dutch, British, and American ascent in terms of the impact of Great 
Power War, and as such, the opportunity will be taken here to investigate in detail the 
impact of the Thirty Years’ War on Dutch hegemonic ascent. Although this is certainly a 
limitation as far as generalisable results are concerned, it will have to suffice. 
In addition, World-Systems Analysis, which constitutes the theoretical framework 
encapsulating the study, has proven, as a form of critical social science, to be “highly 
controversial” (Shannon, 1989:137). As such, numerous criticisms of Wallerstein’s work (and 
the work of other authors) regarding World-Systems Analysis have been lodged, of which that 
of Skocpol (1994) is but one example. This study, by operating within this framework and by 
relying on its assumptions, will therefore necessarily also be subject to the same criticisms. As 
such, the most serious of these criticisms and concerns will be highlighted and discussed in 
chapter two, and where possible, suggestions for addressing these will also be made. 
However, an in-depth critical evaluation of the entirety of World-Systems Analysis will not, 
and cannot, be provided, since such an endeavour would fall outside the scope of this study, 
since it could, in fact, occupy an entire study itself. Instead, an awareness of the main 
criticisms of World-Systems Analysis will be lodged, alongside the recognition that this 
approach also possesses numerous strengths, such as its emphasis on the longue durée. 
Indeed, many of the staunchest critics of World-Systems Analysis (and Wallerstein), such as 
Skocpol (1994:69), have conceded that Wallerstein “has had the unparalleled boldness of 
vision to raise all the important issues.” As such, this study treats World-Systems Analysis as 
an imperfect approach, albeit one that comes nearest to producing what Shannon (1989:166) 
calls a “theory of history.”  
It should also be recognised here that this study deals with a topic that is complex, and 
which, true to World-Systems Analysis, incorporates a variety of traditional ‘disciplines’, most 
notably political science, history, and economics. Add to this the limitation of only including 
one of the three historical case studies, and the realisation emerges that it is beyond the 
reach of this study to produce ‘all the answers’ and, as such, it rather constitutes an attempt 
to advance knowledge regarding a very specific and small, yet highly significant, aspect of a 
much larger theoretical body (specifically the link between Great Power War and 
hegemony). 
Methodologically, George and Bennett (2004:222) point out that process-tracing is also 
not without its limitations. For instance, process-tracing can only provide “a strong basis for 
causal inference … if it can establish an uninterrupted causal path linking the putative 
causes to the observed effects, at the appropriate level(s) of analysis as specified by the theory 
testing.” Moreover, if “evidence on whether a certain step in the putative causal path 
conformed to expectations is simply unobtainable,” then the “inferential and explanatory 
value of a causal path is weakened.” Thirdly, there may be more than one hypothesised 
causal mechanism “consistent with any given set of process-tracing evidence.”  
Regarding the first concern, the speculated causal path stated earlier in this chapter 
already provides a sound point of departure, making it possible to evaluate the hypothesis 
proffered in this study by examining the evidence collected during research. Here, the 
method of structured, focused comparison is a particularly useful tool. As Mouton 
(2001:151) observes, one of the frequent limitations of case study research is that results 
often lack generalisability. Although this study cannot produce truly generalisable data from 
all three case studies, a sufficiently detailed investigation of Dutch ascent, and the role 
played by Great Power War therein, should produce some useful results, and should provide 
at least a cursory indication of those results that might be suited to generalisation.   
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With regards to the second concern, the case under study has been the subject of a 
respectable body of literature, particularly in the fields of history and political science, while 
the outcome of the Great Power War is also well known and researched. Evidence that Great 
Power War benefitted the agricultural producers of one hegemonic contender, while 
harming those of another, for example, can be readily obtained from this literature. However, 
it behoves this study to not merely accept these existing conclusions, but to produce its own 
account of the Great Power War and its effects, as guided by the goals, hypothesis, and 
research questions outlined in this chapter. It is for this reason that an expansive discussion 
regarding the Great Power War of the seventeenth century will be included in this study, and 
so that those elements of import (such as the War’s impact upon the three economic arenas 
of the states in question) may be highlighted.  
Regarding the third concern, about multiple competing causal mechanisms, only one 
such mechanism between the rise of hegemons on the one hand, and Great Power Warfare 
on the other, has suggested itself here, and this study is specifically limited to its 
investigation. It is indeed up to future researchers to suggest alternative causal mechanisms, 
and to critique the findings presented here. 
With regards to the delimitations of the study, these have already been touched upon 
earlier in this chapter, in the section concerning the scope of the study. Firstly, the study is 
restricted to an investigation of one historical case study, spanning the fifteenth to 
seventeenth centuries. It is centred on the ascent of the first hegemonic state in the modern 
world-system, and this state has been clearly identified in world-systems literature, such as 
Wallerstein (2000a:256), as being the Dutch Republic of the United Provinces. However, 
concomitant to the objectives of this study, a single aspect of the hegemonic ascent of this 
state will be the central focus of the case study, namely the manner in which Great Power 
War facilitated that ascent, and particularly the way in which it affected the enterprises 
operating in the economic domains of agro-industrial production, commerce, and finance, 
which together constitute the foundation of hegemony in the world-system. In addition, in 
order to provide more meaningful results, the impact of the Great Power War on the main 
rival of the ascending hegemonic state will also be investigated. This rival has also been 
clearly identified in the literature, for example Wallerstein (2000a:258), as being Hapsburg 
Spain.  
In terms of subject matter, the study is principally concerned with the testing of 
International Relations theory, and to this end political, economic, and military history will 
be particularly relevant. It can also be noted that world-systems literature will form the core 
of the material with which will be engaged throughout this study, but literature from various 
approaches to International Relations theory will be included. 
Geographically, the study is delimited to the world-system, which has progressively 
expanded to incorporate the entire globe. Since this study will focus on the less frequently 
discussed early period of the modern world-system, its geographical scope, as mentioned 
earlier, will be delimited primarily to western and central Europe and the bodies of water 
surrounding them, as well as the Americas (which were primarily under Spanish control), 
since these areas witnessed much of the early bulk trade in commodities, a defining 
characteristic of the world-economy. Clearly then, this study is ambitious in its design and 
objectives, but throughout the focus will remain on Great Power War and its role in 
facilitating or establishing hegemony within the modern world-system. 
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1.8 CENTRAL CONCEPTS 
For the sake of clarity, it is necessary to elaborate sufficiently on the key terms that will be 
used throughout this study. Some of these have already been briefly discussed above, but can 
benefit from further clarification.  
 
1.8.1 Modern World-System  
In order to clarify the concept of the modern world-system, some of its main features will be 
highlighted here. However, an extensive discussion would be out of place here, and as such 
only a few of the most important points will be touched upon. According to Chase-Dunn 
and Grimes (1995:338), the modern world-system can be understood as: 
 
a set of nested and overlapping interaction networks that link all units of social analyses – individuals, 
households, neighbourhoods, firms, towns and cities, classes and regions, national states and societies, 
transnational actors, international regions, and global structures. 
 
Moreover, within its boundaries the modern world-system contains a single division of 
labour, and those boundaries have progressively expanded to include the entire globe since 
the mid-nineteenth century (Wallerstein, 2002b:14). The two main features of the world-
system are, on the one hand, the global spread of the capitalist mode of production since the 
‘long’ sixteenth century, predicated on the endless accumulation of capital, and on the 
other, the existence of states as the only viable units of sovereignty (Wallerstein, 2000a:254). 
Within this system there exists a definite hierarchy between core and peripheral states, with 
the semi-periphery in-between (Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995:389). The relationship 
between the core and periphery is characterised by exploitation and unequal exchange, and 
for the most part states maintain their positions within this hierarchy (Chase-Dunn and 
Grimes, 1995:396). However, there are notable exceptions, and some instances of upward or 
downward mobility have occurred, such as the rise of the United States from periphery to 
core between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries.  
The modern world-system is characterised, as has been discussed in the opening section of 
this chapter, by certain trends and cycles, one of which is the hegemonic sequence (Chase-
Dunn and Grimes, 1995:411). The hegemonic sequence is, as noted, of particular relevance 
to this study. Additional details regarding these cycles, and an expanded discussion regarding 
World-Systems Analysis will be provided in chapter two. 
 
1.8.2 Great Power War 
One of the earliest descriptions of what can be termed Great Power War, as it is used in this 
study, was provided by the Greek historian Thucydides (1951) in his history of the war 
between Athens and Sparta, and is recounted by Gilpin (1989:15). According to Gilpin 
(1989:15), Thucydides argued that fundamental changes in the international system (such as 
the disproportionate growth in a subordinate state’s power) were the basic causes of 
hegemonic or great wars. These changes would serve to undermine the position of the 
existing hegemon, while slowly eroding the hierarchy that existed internationally. This would 
eventually lead to a struggle between the two most powerful states, with other states choosing 
sides, leading to a bipolarisation of the system. Eventually, in an environment of mutual 
distrust and suspicion, small (political) events would have the power to finally trigger war, 
although these were never the underlying (or ‘true’) causes of the conflict (Gilpin, 1989:21). 
At stake in such a war is the leadership and overall structure of the post-war international 
system, with major political, economic, and ideological issues to be settled (Gilpin, 1991:32; 
Gilpin, 1989:30). Thucydides, according to Gilpin (1989:17), furthermore asserted that 
 13 
human nature is unchanging, and that consequently this ‘cycle’ would repeat itself 
indefinitely (Gilpin, 1989:17).  
As identified by Gilpin (1989:16), this theory of hegemonic war contains three 
propositions, which are echoed in this study. Firstly, hegemonic or Great Power War is 
distinct from other wars in that its causes are broad changes in the international system 
(including economic, strategic, and political). Secondly, relations among states constitute a 
system, which today exists as the modern world-system discussed above. Thirdly, Great Power 
War transforms the structure of the international system, and consequently the hierarchy 
among states within that system. 
In Wallerstein’s view (2000a:258), these global wars are primarily land-based conflicts (but 
include significant fighting at sea as well), which include almost all of the Great Powers of 
the time, and involve tremendous destruction of land and population. As Kauppi (1991:108) 
adds, these Wars are total “in terms of intensity, duration, and geographic scope.” At the 
War’s end however, there occurs a major restructuring of the interstate system, which is 
consistent with Thucydides’ view. The main difference between the views of Thucydides and 
Wallerstein is that Wallerstein limits his study (and his understanding of these ‘world wars’) 
to the modern era (that of the existence of a capitalist world-economy), and thus he excludes 
instances such as the war between Athens and Sparta. This study will also echo this 
delimitation. Accordingly, World-Systems Analysis identifies three instances of Great Power 
Warfare: the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), the Wars of the French Revolution and 
Napoleon (1792-1815), and World Wars I and II (parts of the same conflict, 1914-1945). 
As an additional point, the discussion in this section serves as a suitable example of how 
various approaches to International Relations can be reconciled in this study, since the 
arguments of Gilpin (a neo-Realist) as outlined above, fit well with those of Wallerstein (a 
structuralist/neo-Marxist), and it may be argued that Wallerstein’s conception of how the 
interstate system operates is very close to classical Realism. As such, throughout this study, 
elements from various approaches to International Relations theory will be utilised to 
compliment the World-Systems Analysis framework. 
 
1.8.3 Hegemony 
According to Wallerstein (2000a:255), hegemony refers to: 
 
that situation in which the ongoing rivalry between the so-called ‘great powers’ is so unbalanced that 
one power can largely impose its rules and its wishes (at very least by effective veto power) in the 
economic, political, military, diplomatic, and even cultural arenas. 
 
As indicated in the opening section of this chapter, only three core states have managed to 
achieve hegemony within the modern world-system in its roughly 500 years of existence – the 
Dutch Republic of the United Provinces, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
(Wallerstein, 2000a:256). At the peak of their hegemony, Wallerstein (2000a:255) argues, the 
lead of these states in the economic domains of agro-industrial production, commerce, and 
finance was in fact so great that their enterprises were able to outbid those of rival countries, 
even within those rival countries themselves. This edge in efficiency also serves to turn allied 
powers into what Wallerstein calls “de facto client states,” but it is important to emphasise 
that the hegemon is never in a position to act with a free hand. This is due to two 
particularities of the world-system, namely the interstate system and the capitalist mode of 
production. Indeed, all historical attempts to turn the world-system into a world-empire 
(such as those of Habsburg Spain, France, and Germany) have been thwarted through the 
“balance of power,” whereby the states that are in danger of losing their independence work 
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together to defeat the aggressor (Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995:411; Wallerstein, 
2000a:255).  
On a related point, as Chase-Dunn and Hall (1994:274) argue, the hegemon itself never 
attempts to transform the world-system into a world-empire since the use of direct 
political/military power is not necessary with a capitalist mode of accumulation (as opposed 
to a tributary mode of accumulation). Indeed, commodity production and the sale of 
commodities is the primary mechanism of capitalist accumulation, and since the hegemon 
enjoys strong advantages in these fields over the other core states, as well as those in the semi-
periphery and the periphery, it is less inclined to attempt empire formation, and instead the 
hegemon actively preserves the interstate system because “this form of polity is more 
compatible with the interests of capitalists as a class than world empire would be” (Chase-
Dunn and Hall, 1994:275). However, this certainly does not preclude the use of coercion, or 
political and military power, by the hegemon. 
In all, the rise to hegemony is one of the most engaging aspects of World-Systems Analysis, 
and it is significant because of the worldwide influence of the hegemon. In order to 
understand how it has been possible for the few privileged states mentioned above to achieve 
hegemony, it is necessary to study those events that have helped these states along their path 
to the top of the world. Since Thucydides believed that this sequence of rising and falling 
hegemons would repeat itself indefinitely, the realisation that Great Power War has 
accompanied the rise of each hegemon bids us to expand our understanding of this 
particular feature of hegemony. 
 
1.8.4 Core 
Essentially, within the modern world-system hierarchy, states find themselves in one of three 
groups. Core states are powerful, wealthy, technologically advanced societies, which enjoy 
high standards of living (Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995:389; Shannon, 1989:73). These are 
the states that are conventionally referred to as ‘developed’ countries – the so-called ‘First 
World’. According to World-Systems Analysis, these countries exploit the periphery and 
semi-periphery either overtly or covertly for their own advantage, and reproduce the 
international power hierarchy through subtle means, such as through market mechanisms 
and the net transfer of value via unequal exchange (Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995:396). 
Thus, in general terms, the core can be said to have more economic, political, and military 
power than the periphery (Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995:397). Also, hegemons must 
necessarily come from this grouping, since states in the periphery and semi-periphery lack 
the economic and military strength to successfully compete with the predominant land 
power of the time, which seeks to establish a world-empire. 
 
1.8.5 Periphery  
The second group to which states can belong is referred to as the periphery. This can be 
considered to be the category of ‘less developed’ states, or the so-called ‘Third World’ 
(Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995:389-390). These states are seen as being weak and poor, and 
they are often (but not universally) considered to be passive victims of core exploitation. 
These countries have at various points in time been (forcibly) incorporated into the world-
system, as it spread outward from Europe to cover the globe, in order to produce raw 
materials and low-wage commodities for the core.  
Historically, workers in peripheral states have been subjected to forms of extreme 
exploitation, more so than workers in the core, as is evidenced by the practice of slavery and 
other forms of coerced labour, such as serfdom, debt bondage, and the exploitation of peons 
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on sugar plantations in much of the Americas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
(Wallerstein, 1988:241-253). Even today, the power of employers over their workers remains 
much higher in the periphery than in the core, and various forms and combinations of 
sharecropping, cash-rent tenancy and wage labour can be found in peripheral states. 
 
1.8.6 Semi-Periphery 
Semi-peripheral states are located somewhere between the core and the periphery, and they 
contain features of both (Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995:389). These states have a much 
larger capitalist class and commercial and industrial sectors than can be found in the 
periphery, but the middle class is smaller and overall development is lower than that of core 
countries (Shannon, 1989:72-73). Although the semi-periphery is also exploited by the core, 
it in turn exploits the periphery. Semi-peripheral states are thus located in intermediate 
positions within the larger structure of the world-system. 
Before turning to the next section of this chapter, it should however be noted that the use 
of the above concepts of core, periphery, and semi-periphery, to organise states into the 
world-system hierarchy, has been the subject of much debate and criticism (for instance 
Sanderson {2005}). This criticism will be discussed in the next chapter, but since these 
concepts figure centrally in world-systems literature, they have been included and clarified 
here. 
 
1.9 IMPACT OF STUDY 
The primary expected impact of the research conducted in this study concerns the additional 
light that it will attempt to shed on the causal process between Great Power War and 
hegemony. For instance, as was indicated at the beginning of this chapter, several experts on 
World-Systems Analysis, most notably Wallerstein himself, have claimed that hegemony can 
come about only as a result of Great Power Wars, and that those Wars act to secure that 
hegemony. However, the existing literature lacks a sufficiently rigorous exanimation into this 
purported link, and references to this connection are generally only implicitly suggested. For 
instance, even though Wallerstein’s monumental and groundbreaking studies concerning 
the modern world-system (1974; 1980; 1988) provide a richly detailed discussion of the 
struggles between the individual hegemon-rival pairs – such as Britain and France – often 
referring to how the Great Power War of the time either benefitted or harmed these states 
with regards to their economic arenas, a study has yet to be produced that focuses exclusively 
on Great Power War in the modern world-system as its central subject, or that argues that the 
various Great Power Wars have proved essential to the rise to hegemony – while generating 
generalisable data. In short, it is this gap that this study will attempt to fill, although as 
argued above, it will be left to future research to produce a single study that is able to 
comparatively investigate the three instances of hegemonic ascent. 
It should also be repeated here that this study will work with the assumptions of World-
Systems Analysis, and will only highlight the most pressing critiques of the approach, instead 
of attempting to produce a rigorous theoretical critique. This has been done often elsewhere, 
and many authors have attempted to point out the weaknesses of World-Systems Analysis, 
while offering alternatives or ways in which these could be ameliorated. This study will thus 
be dedicated to clarifying the purported link between Great Power Warfare and hegemony, 
while making theoretical connections to the existing theories on this topic. Ultimately, it is 
hoped that the findings of this study may help, in future, to illuminate the ways in which 
Great Power War may still act as a viable mechanism (if at all) for bringing the ‘hierarchy of 
prestige’ in the interstate system into line with the new ‘hierarchy of power’ that is likely 
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develop in the twenty-first century, while considering the feasibility of alternative 
mechanisms for achieving the same end, as suggested by relevant literature on the topic. 
 
1.10 STRUCTURE OF STUDY 
This study encompasses four chapters. Of these, one will be dedicated to the literature review 
and one to the historical case under study, and these will constitute the core of the study. 
However, equally important will be the final chapter, which will present the findings of the 
empirical research regarding the role of the Thirty Years’ War, as a Great Power War, in the 
ascent of the Dutch Republic to hegemony.  
 
The individual chapters of the study are outlined below: 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter contains the introduction and general background to the study. The problem 
statement, objectives, research design, methodology, and central concepts used, are outlined, 
and an introduction to the theoretical framework provided. 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
The second chapter provides an in-depth overview of the relevant literature, and discusses 
the pertinent theories in the domain of the study. It also locates the study within the world-
economy approach to International Relations (IR), while a detailed elaboration on the 
structural realism and long cycle approaches (or research schools) is also provided. In the 
final instance, the work of selected scholars who do not fall clearly within any one school, 
but who nevertheless contribute to the understanding of the war/hegemony question, is also 
discussed. The ultimate goal of this chapter is to lay the theoretical foundation for the 
remainder of the study, and when the findings of the empirical research are discussed in 
chapter four, the IR theories discussed in chapter two will be returned to, and the 
implications of the findings for those theories will be discussed. 
 
Chapter 3: The Thirty Years’ War and the Rise of the Dutch Republic 
The third chapter of this study presents the historical case study that will be examined to 
clarify the link between Great Power War and hegemony. Here, a background to the 
independence struggle of the Dutch will be provided, after which the Thirty Years’ War will 
be investigated as a Great Power War. The discussion regarding the Great Power War will be 
mainly descriptive, and will introduce the discussion regarding Dutch ascent according to 
the world-economy perspective, which will be mainly explanatory. The three economic 
domains outlined in this chapter will form the core of the discussion, since they have been 
suggested here as the essential link between Great Power War and hegemony. To conclude, 
the settlement to the Great Power War (centred on the Peace of Westphalia), and the 
consequences thereof, will also be investigated.  
 
Chapter 4: Conclusion  
The fourth and final chapter of this study will present the findings of the aforementioned 
case study. In this chapter, the structured elements of this study come to the fore particularly 
strongly, as guided by the series of general questions, reflecting the research objective and 
outlined in this (first) chapter, which will be asked of the case under study in chapter three. 
Following this, the relevance and implications of the findings for theories of International 
Relations will be discussed, linking up with the discussion concerning the theoretical 
 17 
framework in chapter two. Finally, future research directions will be suggested and 
discussed, after which the study will reach its conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Due to the complex nature of the social phenomena under investigation in this study, as 
highlighted in the previous chapter, it is necessary to provide a clear theoretical framework 
that will allow the study to be accurately placed within the broader academic context, and 
that will draw from the insights of various approaches, since no single one can provide all the 
answers to the issues investigated here. It is to this goal that the current chapter is dedicated. 
Since the 1970s, three ‘schools’ or approaches have emerged in the debate surrounding 
the link between Great Power War and hegemony. Although these schools have been 
labelled differently by different authors, their fundamental assumptions have remained more 
or less constant, which makes it possible to reach general conclusions regarding the wider 
academic debate around Great Power War and hegemony. 
After a brief overview of the different theoretical schools, the contributions of the most 
notable authors within each will be discussed below. Following this, the most pressing 
criticisms of World-Systems Analysis will be presented, and the utility and relevance of this 
approach as the core of the theoretical framework of this study will be defended. Finally, 
those elements from the different schools that will be utilised in the following chapter, 
which investigates the ascent of the Dutch Republic, will be highlighted in order to create 
the framework within which the empirical research of the study will be conducted.  The 
broad outline provided by this overview will be used as a guide to structure and focus the 
theoretical debates as they pertain to the relationship between Great Power War and 
hegemony. 
 
2.2 BROAD THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
In order to organise and make sense of the debates surrounding the relationship between 
Great Power War and hegemony, they must be contextualised and placed within the broader 
theoretical approaches to the study of International Relations. The work of two authors will 
be used in this regard, namely Thompson (1988) and Goldstein (1988). Both of these 
authors attempted to place the debates surrounding structural change, and the 
war/hegemony question, into distinct categories in order to highlight the differences and 
similarities between the main arguments. These categories will be identified, and then 
discussed individually, in an attempt to place this study within the broader theoretical 
framework. 
Thompson (1988:33) created three models of structural change, and built upon earlier 
work done by Rosenau (1982), and Holsti (1985). In order to clarify where his three models 
of structural change fit into the broader International Relations theory framework, 
Thompson investigated Rosenau’s main approaches to studying world affairs (1988:23). 
Rosenau identified three approaches: the state-centric approach, the global-centric approach 
and, fitting in-between, the multicentric approach.  
The state-centric approach can be equated with classical realism, where the interstate 
system is characterised by its anarchic and fragmented nature, where the state is considered 
to be the predominant actor, and where the time frames utilised in the study of specific 
events are of limited duration (Thompson, 1988:23). In contrast, the global-centric approach 
represents an interstate system that is highly integrated, and characterised by a world 
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capitalist economy and a clear division of labour. In this approach, much longer time frames 
are utilised in an effort to account for the long-term development of the global political 
economy. Here, the central focus does not fall upon states, but rather on production, trade, 
and the distribution of goods (Thompson, 1988:24). Finally, the multicentric approach 
places its emphasis on “interdependence, change, and complexity” (Thompson, 1988:23). In 
this approach, both state and non-state actors are important, and recurring patterns form one 
of the central themes. As a consequence, quantitative analysis is often employed in an effort 
to identify and understand these patterns.  
Thompson (1988:25) also investigated the theoretical perspectives identified by Holsti, 
and found that they closely resemble the approaches set out by Rosenau. Holsti’s analysis of 
contemporary International Relations literature also resulted in the identification of three 
distinct perspectives, namely the classical, the neo-Marxist, and the global society. Once 
again, the classical perspective can be said to emphasise states and the anarchic international 
system, while the central focus falls upon war and the pursuit of security and order 
(Thompson, 1988:26). The neo-Marxist approach focuses on inequality in the international 
system, while class, the world capitalist system, and the division of labour form important 
elements in understanding this inequality. The final, global society, approach has as its focus 
global change and transformation, while the key feature of the international system is its 
complexity. This approach also utilises variable units of analysis. Works representative of 
each approach are those of Morgenthau (1973) - classical; Wallerstein (1974) - neo-Marxist; 
and Modelski (1972) - global society. 
Building upon these frameworks, Thompson (1988:36) identifies three models of 
structural change, which explore the linkages between structural change and war from the 
broader theoretical traditions identified by Rosenau and Holsti (see Table 2.1). Since these 
three models help to organise the main scholarly contributions to the subject of war and 
structural change (which leads to hegemony), they will be highlighted here in order to help 
provide the broader theoretical framework for this study. They can be identified as the 
structural realism (classical), long cycle (global society), and world-economy (neo-Marxist) 
models (Thompson, 1988:33). The basic features of each of these models will be discussed 
below, in order to clarify the main debates. 
 
Another author who has attempted to structure the war/hegemony debate is Goldstein 
(1988). Goldstein (1988:99) notes that the war/hegemony debate can be traced back to the 
work of Quincy Wright in the 1940s. Wright’s work (1942) has resulted in three strands of 
research, one of which leads up to the contemporary debate surrounding war and hegemony. 
The main focus of Wright’s research falls on what he called “fluctuations in the intensity of 
war” (quoted in Goldstein, 1988:101). He found that concentrations of warfare seemed to 
occur around every fifty years, with every second concentration being more severe. Due to 
the limited scope of this study however, the details of the early debates will not be discussed 
here. 
One of the strands of research which originated from Wright’s work is the debate on 
“cycles of war and hegemony” (Goldstein, 1988:111). This strand is the basis of the 
contemporary debate around the issue. In this approach the focus did not fall on fifty-year 
cycles, but rather on one-hundred year cycles, following from Wright’s observation that every 
second fifty-year cycle culminated in the most severe wars, namely Great Power Wars. 
Naturally, depending upon the general framework of International Relations theory used by 
individual authors, different conceptions of what constitutes hegemony, hegemonic war, and 
so forth will lead to different interpretations (Goldstein, 1988:112). This reveals the 
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Table 2.1. A Comparison of Thompson's Three Models of Structural Change 
 
Source: Thompson (1988:33). 
 
importance of understanding the broad approaches identified by Thompson (from the work 
by Rosenau, and Holsti), and it is no surprise that each of these approaches have different 
understandings of the cycles of war and hegemony. 
 
Figure 2.1. Goldstein's Three Research Schools in the Current War/Hegemony Debate 
 
Source: Goldstein (1988:124). 
 
Goldstein (1988:123) also finds that in the current debate around Great Power War and 
hegemony, three theoretical groupings or research schools can be identified. Unsurprisingly, 
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they correspond closely with Thompson’s three models of structural change. Goldstein 
identifies the first school as the leadership cycle school, led by Modelski. The second school 
is the world-system school, led by Wallerstein, which approaches the war/hegemony debate 
from a Marxist perspective. The final school, led by Organski and Gilpin, is known as the 
power transition school.  
These schools differ in their interpretations, as well as in their findings. For instance, the 
concept of hegemony has different meanings depending on the school, and while some 
authors emphasise military and political predominance when referring to hegemony, others 
(such as Wallerstein) emphasise economic predominance (Goldstein, 1988:125). Different 
schools also recognise the existence of different hegemons, and consequently place emphasis 
on different wars. These differences will be discussed when each individual school is 
reviewed in the next section.  
 
2.3 THE THREE RESEARCH SCHOOLS 
This study follows Thompson’s (1988:33) classification of the three models of structural 
change (they will also be referred to here as research schools or approaches). The main 
features and arguments of each school will be identified, followed by a brief discussion of the 
work and main contributions of the most notable authors belonging to that school. In 
essence, this represents a synthesis of Thompson’s and Goldstein’s classifications. Following 
the discussion of the three research schools, the contributions of other authors to the Great 
Power War/hegemony question, who cannot be clearly placed within one of the identified 
schools, will be noted. 
 
2.3.1 The structural realism school 
As noted by Thompson (1988:36-37), there are considerable difficulties encountered when 
attempting to give a broad overview of the literature that can be said to belong to this school. 
This is due mainly to the large degree of divergence within the literature, and the 
‘polarization’ of the interests of authors in this school. For instance, many authors within the 
structural realism school have shown little interest in global warfare. Others again ignore the 
international political economy to focus intensively on issues of ‘classical’ war and peace. 
However, Thompson identifies the work of Robert Gilpin as being the most representative of 
the structural realism approach, and the features of Gilpin’s argument will be discussed 
shortly. 
Goldstein (1988:123) summarises it well when he argues that the foundation of the realist 
approach can be condensed to the search for “timeless laws of national behaviour” and 
accordingly, there exists a strong focus on national power and balance-of-power politics 
within this school. As such, this school regards hegemony primarily in terms of political-
military predominance (Goldstein, 1988:125). Goldstein (1988:141) traces the origins of the 
school back to the approach taken by Organski (1958), according to whom a state’s relative 
power position affects the likelihood of war. Doran and Parsons (1980) continued within 
Organski’s tradition (and added a cyclical element that was not present in Organski’s work), 
and noted that all the major powers after 1815 have passed “through a cycle indexed by 
relative capability” (quoted in Goldstein, 1988:142). This cycle revealed how states gained 
and lost their share of world political-military power over time, and Doran and Parsons 
found that extensive wars were most likely to occur at points when the rate of growth (or 
decline) in this cycle of world power shifted suddenly, in other words when changes were 
rapid and “disruptive of past trends.” 
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The time frame used by Doran and Parsons (1980) reflect the tendency for this school to 
limit its temporal scope to the relatively recent past, namely the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, and Thompson (1988:34) concludes that, in general, the authors of this school are 
unwilling to apply their framework to periods before the nineteenth century (Gilpin is a 
notable exception). As will be seen later, this contrasts markedly with the other two schools. 
Furthermore, the structural realism school emphasises subsystemic units of analysis, 
specifically the hegemonic state, and while certain wars are regarded as ‘watersheds’, in 
general very little attention is given to the consequences of those wars (Thompson, 1988:33-
34). 
 
2.3.1.1 Gilpin 
Robert Gilpin (1981:x) primarily uses rational-choice theory that builds upon the 
assumption that individual behaviour is determined by rationality. Gilpin maintains that this 
‘rational actor’ model (originating in the field of economics) can be applied to politics 
(Goldstein, 1988:143). For Gilpin (1981:xi), the purposes and natures of social institutions 
are determined by self-interest, as well as by the relative power of the individual members of 
those institutions. A political institution (such as the interstate system) thus reflects the 
interests of its most powerful members, until the relative power of the members changes. 
Gilpin (1981:xii) furthermore follows in the tradition of Kenneth Waltz (1979). For Waltz, 
the interstate system is composed of individual states, and due to the fact that they have only 
limited control over its operation, these states must conform to the “logic of a competitive, 
anarchic system of interacting states” (Gilpin, 1981:xii). From this, Gilpin proceeds to build 
his main argument. 
Despite the growing belief that increased interdependence among states in the interstate 
system has worked to foster peaceful cooperation, and that economic and welfare goals have 
consequently replaced security concerns as the top priority of states, Gilpin (1981:7) argues 
that the fundamental nature of international relations has not been altered, and that states 
are still engaged in an age-old struggle for wealth and power. For this reason, Gilpin 
considers lessons learned in the pre-modern world as valid, and places particular emphasis 
on the history of the Peloponnesian War, as related by Thucydides in the fifth century B.C. 
(1951). 
As mentioned above, Gilpin (1981:9), in his argument accounting for structural change, 
maintains that the interstate system at any given time reflects the interests of the most 
powerful members of the system. This status quo does not remain constant however, due to 
technological, economic, and other developments, which over time alter the balance of 
power within the system. This disequilibrium between the growing power of some states, and 
the declining power of others (whose interests are still encrusted in the interstate system), 
results in a need for change – which is brought about by the waging of hegemonic war. 
These changes then result in the redistribution of benefits and costs to members of the 
system (Gilpin, 1981:10). It is for this reason that Gilpin’s focus falls on the interstate system 
as a whole, and on the efforts by individual states to alter that system for their own benefit.  
For Goldstein (1988:143), Gilpin’s theory fits well into the power transition school, since 
the disequilibrium arising from differential rates of economic, technological, and military 
growth are corrected by periodic hegemonic wars. This also correlates with the “power cycle” 
– the rise and fall of a state’s relative capabilities – as identified by Doran and Parsons 
(Goldstein, 1988:141). It can also be noted that the work of Paul Kennedy (1988) relates 
closely to this point regarding differential rates of growth, and will be returned to later in this 
chapter. 
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Thompson (1988:40) considers the fundamental problem of international change in 
Gilpin’s view to be that, as the distribution of power in the interstate system changes, 
disequilibrium and crisis is to be expected, until the system’s structure is brought back “into 
realignment with the new distribution of military, economic, and technological 
capabilities.” Hegemonic war is the primary means by which this disequilibrium and crisis is 
resolved (Thompson, 1988:41). These hegemonic (or Great Power) wars have as the primary 
issue at stake, the nature and governance of the interstate system, and as a result they are 
intense conflicts which act as the confrontation between the (declining) dominant power 
and the (rising) challenger, and their respective allies. The treaties which are negotiated at 
the conclusion of these Great Power Wars then represent the new status quo, and act as 
‘constitutions’ for the interstate system (Gilpin, 1981:36).  
As mentioned before, Gilpin (1981:200) does not restrict his inquiry to the modern (post 
1500) world, and he classifies the Peloponnesian War and the Second Punic War as 
hegemonic wars. In the modern era, the Thirty Years’ War, the wars of Louis XIV, the wars of 
the French Revolution and Napoleon, and World Wars I and II meet Gilpin’s criteria.  
After these decisive wars, the new hegemonic power becomes a champion of free trade and 
supplies the economic rules of the system, while providing investment capital and an 
international currency, and protecting property rights on a global scale (Thompson, 
1988:44). However, this is not done out of altruism, but because the hegemonic power, 
which has the most technologically advanced and efficient economy, stands to benefit most 
from such an arrangement. Self-interest is thus once again the guiding principle for states, 
according to this school. 
 
2.3.1.2 Mearsheimer 
John Mearsheimer (2004) is another author who openly casts himself in the realist tradition 
(specifically ‘offensive realism’). Although not identified as such by either Thompson or 
Goldstein, in this study Mearsheimer will be placed within the structural realism school. 
Mearsheimer follows in the tradition of Hans Morgenthau (1973), and argues that the 
structure of the interstate system accounts for the aggressive actions of states toward each 
other (2004:184). Mearsheimer identifies three features, very much representative of the 
realist perspective, as being responsible for this, namely the ‘anarchy’ of the interstate system 
(the lack of a central rule-making authority), the fact that states always possess some form of 
offensive military capability, and the ever-present uncertainty about the intentions of other 
states. For Mearsheimer (2004:184), hegemony is the ultimate guarantee of a state’s survival, 
since no other state could “seriously threaten such a mighty power.”  
However, Mearsheimer sees hegemony in a much more limited light than many other 
authors, including Wallerstein (2000a:185). For Mearsheimer, this stems from the difficulty 
for any state to project its power over the world’s oceans, even with a powerful navy. No state, 
hegemonic or otherwise, can have the same dominance in other areas of the world that it 
enjoys in its own region. As a consequence, Mearsheimer argues that the only kind of 
hegemony to which any state can aspire is regional hegemony (2004:186-7). If a state 
manages to be the only regional hegemon in the world, it occupies the highest position 
available in the interstate system. Maintaining regional hegemony, while preventing other 
states from becoming hegemons in their own regions, is the task with which hegemons are 
faced. For Mearsheimer, the hegemon therefore becomes an ‘offshore balancer’. 
Mearsheimer further identifies the United States as the only regional hegemon in modern 
history, although other states, such as Germany and Japan, have sought regional hegemony 
but ultimately failed to achieve it (2004:186). This represents a marked difference in 
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interpretation, especially in contrast to Wallerstein (2000a:256). In the next chapter however, 
it will be argued that Dutch hegemony can be interpreted as regional in nature, given that 
the early modern world-system was primarily centred on Europe and the American periphery 
(primarily the Spanish colonies). 
Naturally, Mearsheimer’s argument is embedded in the realist tradition, which places 
military-political power above economic power, which is so vital in the world-economy 
school. In fact, for Mearsheimer, hegemony means that a state is so powerful that no other 
state can challenge it militarily, and that in effect, the hegemon dominates all the other 
states in the system (2004:185). Furthermore, Mearsheimer clearly states that, in his view, 
“security also trumps wealth when those two goals conflict” (2004:192). The wider academic 
tradition within which authors find themselves thus has a significant influence on the 
approach taken, and the conclusions reached, when investigating the link between Great 
Power War and hegemony. 
For Mearsheimer, the structure of the interstate system is what compels states to strive for 
hegemony (2004:196). It is thus not a consequence of agro-industrial efficiency, commercial 
or financial domination, but very clearly the result of a (military) decision that states make to 
enhance their chances for survival in an anarchic and uncertain world. 
 
2.3.2 The long cycle school 
According to Thompson (1988:32-33), the long cycle and world-economy approaches share a 
greater resemblance to each other than to the structural realism approach. For instance, both 
the long cycle and world-economy schools trace the beginning of the modern system back to 
the late fifteenth century, and as a consequence these schools utilise a much longer time 
frame than structural realism. However, all schools share some points of convergence, such 
as the importance of intermittent power concentration and the structural hierarchy that 
flows from this. 
At this juncture, recall Wright’s observations regarding fifty-year war cycles (Goldstein, 
1988:111). This formed the basis of the research strand that led to the current debate around 
the war/hegemony issue. Following this formulation of fifty-year war cycles, where every 
second war concentration was more severe, other authors such as Toynbee (1954), 
reformulated this into a scheme of one-hundred-year war cycles. Dehio (1962) also 
contributed to such a reformulation, following his research on the efforts of Continental 
European states to gain hegemony, and his contributions will be discussed separately below. 
This scheme of one-hundred-year war cycles forms the foundation of the long cycle school, 
and especially Modelski’s work, which will also be reviewed below. 
Thompson (1988:44-45) points out that, in the past, the long cycle approach has been 
wrongfully depicted as being neo-realist in orientation. For Thompson, this flawed 
categorisation stems from Modelski’s emphasis on the military power of the major states in 
the interstate system. Some confusion has also stemmed from the scattered papers that have 
been written on this perspective. However, as both Thompson (1988:26) and Goldstein 
(1988:123) point out, the work done by Modelski has become the main body that represents 
this approach and, accordingly, an in-depth analysis of Modelski’s work is required in order 
to gain a clear understanding of the long cycle approach.  
 
2.3.2.1 Dehio 
As Goldstein (1988:111-112) notes, the German historian Ludwig Dehio was one of the first 
authors to write about the recurrent attempts of certain European powers to achieve world 
domination (depending of course on what constituted ‘the world’ at the time). Although he 
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cannot be strictly categorised as belonging to the long cycle school, and is indeed placed in 
the realist tradition by Goldstein (1988:124) as depicted in Figure 2.1 (on page 20), due to 
his emphasis on politico-military predominance, in this study his work is placed in the long 
cycle school due to his contributions to the development of this approach, especially with 
regards to the role of sea power. It should be clearly noted however that Dehio was writing as 
a historian, not as a political scientist, and he never assigned a cyclical component to this 
recurrent drive for domination. Yet, his work is insightful as it shed new light on the 
relationship between war and hegemony. 
Dehio (1962:5) placed his primary emphasis on states. Throughout European history there 
have been recurrent attempts by Continental powers to achieve politico-military 
predominance in the world, yet in each instance that attempt was thwarted by an island 
power (at the head of a “grand coalition”) (Goldstein, 1988:112; Dehio, 1959:17). For Dehio 
(1962:25), this distinction between Continental and island (or insular) powers is significant, 
since this feature of their geography placed states on different paths of development. In 
short, insular powers are either partially or totally surrounded by water (such as the Dutch 
Republic and Great Britain respectively) or, as in the case of the United States, happen to be 
a continent-sized power also isolated by water.   
These insular powers differed on several counts from Continental ones, such as France, 
which was forced, due to its long frontiers with other Continental States, to give priority to 
the development of its army instead of its navy, although it borders both the Mediterranean 
and the Atlantic, with access to the North Sea via the English Channel. In essence, while 
Continental states tended to feature absolute monarchies, strong bureaucracies, grand 
foreign policy strategies, and perhaps most significantly, raised large armies to achieve 
greatness, insular powers were in many ways characterised by the opposite features (Dehio, 
1962:70). In insular states, the monarchy was generally kept in check, and government by the 
people was emphasised over government by the bureaucracy since, as Garst (1985:479) notes, 
decentralised and indirect methods of revenue extraction were generally more efficient than 
those found in absolute monarchies with their associated direct taxation (often exempting 
the wealthy), which in turn allowed insular states to consistently finance “the naval buildup 
necessary for world-wide commercial expansion.” 
The cause of this dichotomy between land and sea powers (apart from the obvious role of 
geography) is well summarised in the work of Fox (1971), who explored the underlying cause 
of the European maritime-Continental dualism, which features centrally in Dehio’s 
arguments. Essentially, to trace the roots of the dichotomy, Fox investigated the towns of 
early modern Europe, and concluded that although all towns engaged to some extent in the 
exchange and distribution of goods, there was a clear distinction between those that were 
oriented primarily to local trade or barter, and those that were involved primarily in the long-
distance trade of commodities (Rasler and Thompson, 1989:36). As a consequence, two 
categories of towns can be identified – agrarian towns were those specialising in the 
circulation of produce at the local level, and were most likely to be found on the flanks of 
the central corridor formed by the urban trade route that connected Italy and the 
Mediterranean with the North Sea and Baltic; and commercial towns, which were located 
near, and consequently integrated into, the larger trade network that ran through the 
“heartland of the old Western Empire” (Rasler and Thompson, 1989:30,36-37).  
The political units of early modern Europe were, in turn, influenced by the class of town 
which predominated within them. This is not to say that pure categories of commercial and 
agricultural political units ever existed, but it can aid in explaining the dominant character 
of European states in the early modern world, in that, as Rasler and Thompson (1989:37) 
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observe, agriculturally dominated units were “apt to encompass large conglomerations of a 
number of small, largely self-sufficient economic units,” and in order to maintain political 
cohesion between those units, “a political system evolves that emphasises military force, an 
administrative chain of command, and a marked propensity for concern with territorial 
control and expansion.” Meanwhile, since commercially dominated units are more 
interdependent given the network of urban trading centres to which they belong, “the 
interest in territorial jurisdiction is minimal,” while the involvement of wealthy merchants in 
this long-distance trade network means that “the dominant political emphasis is more likely 
to favor negotiation and consensus, both within the commercial city [and the government of 
the political unit to which it belongs, hence the diminished power of the monarchy] and 
between the various cities in the larger network” (Rasler and Thompson, 1989:38).  
The differences in character between these agriculturally and commercially oriented units 
mean that “agricultural units [are] predispose[d] … toward continuing conflict with other 
agricultural units as well as with the commercial units,” and that the wealth of the 
commercial units “poses a constant temptation for nearby agricultural societies” (Rasler and 
Thompson, 1989:38). Following from Fox’s agrarian-commercial dichotomy, a number of 
comparative statements about the “structures and behaviors associated with preindustrial 
societies in which one or the other type of town predominates” can be posited, as is done in 
Table 2.2. Although Rasler and Thompson (1989:38) caution against creating ideal type 
dichotomies that “risk exaggerating the types of abstract characteristics that must ultimately 
be applied to the real world,” Fox’s work nevertheless helps to expand the understanding of 
the underlying cause of the maritime-Continental dichotomy that forms the foundation of 
the work of scholars such as Dehio, and which features centrally in this study.    
 
Table 2.2. Fox’s Societal Dichotomy 
 
Source: Rasler and Thompson (1989:37). 
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Turning to Dehio once again, he concludes that since insular powers developed strong 
navies, they could act as intermediaries between different regions and cultures of the world 
(Dehio, 1962:25). This, for instance, allowed the British to acquire their formidable overseas 
empire, while the Continental powers were more preoccupied with battling each other for 
dominance of the European continent (Dehio, 1962:15). In times of war, this global reach 
was used to the great advantage of the insular powers (who acted to maintain the balance of 
power), since they could rely on the territories outside of the European continent for 
assistance in the fight against the Continental powers seeking supremacy (Dehio, 1962:264). 
Insular powers, particularly Britain, could also use their naval strength to ‘quarantine’ the 
European continent with the aim of preventing any Continental power from breaking out 
onto the world stage during their quests for supremacy (Dehio, 1962:85). Naval blockades, 
and the ability to land troops at any location on the Continent’s coast, were also significant 
advantages for insular powers during times of war (Dehio, 1962:168). 
For Dehio (1962:55) the great wars of European history can be condensed into a 
confrontation between two ways of life (which have their roots in Fox’s societal dichotomy as 
discussed above). On one end lay the Continental powers, characterised by the rigid 
authority of the military and the bureaucracy, and by strict rule that was imposed from above 
(Dehio, 1962:136). In the insular powers, on the other end of the spectrum, faith and 
tradition were elastic and fluid, and there existed space for new innovations without risk of 
chaos (Dehio, 1962:135). In fact, Dehio (1962:272) goes so far as to say that the insular 
powers were endowed with the free spirit of humanity, which was protected by a “shield of 
insularity.” Insular powers, like the Dutch Republic, were furthermore marked by general 
religious tolerance, unlike the Continental powers, and cultural life in insular powers was 
marked by a flourishing of art and science. This confrontation, Rasler and Thompson 
(1989:28) maintain, has taken place “in iterative fashion over the past 500 years because their 
interests [those of the insular, commercial, sea powers on the one hand, and those of the 
Continental powers on the other] have diverged on how best to organize and manage the 
global political system and world economy” – the very issues that are decided in a Great 
Power War.  
Among the insular powers, Dehio (1962:25,49-50,55,239) counts Venice (as the 
prototype), the Dutch Republic, Britain, and the United States. Dehio remarks however, that 
the Dutch still had to focus some of their attention on defending a land frontier, and that 
consequently their advantage was less marked. This ‘amphibious’ setting in which the Dutch 
found themselves nevertheless proved to be vital in the long struggle for independence from 
Spain, since they were better able to resist Spanish advances (and those of France in 1672). 
Dehio (1962:51) also remarks that although the Portuguese were the first to initiate long-
distance oceanic trade with Asia, their glory was “as fleeting as a meteor,” since they lacked 
an insular position, and were eventually absorbed by Spain in 1580. 
Among the Continental powers that launched bids for world domination are Spain (under 
Charles and Philip), France (under Louis XIV and later Napoleon), and Germany (during 
World War I and II). In each Great Power War a single ocean battle crippled the 
Continental powers’ attempts to expand beyond the Continent, and forced them to turn 
inwards, placing them on the path to eventual defeat (Dehio, 1962:78). Goldstein (1988:113-
4) summarises these turning points as the defeat of the Spanish Armada (1588), the defeat of 
the French fleet of Louis XIV (1692), the defeat of the French fleet at Aboukir (1798), and a 
further defeat of the French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar (1805). In the case of the 
German attempt to invade Britain in World War II however, the decisive battle took place 
primarily in the air (the Battle of Britain). Indeed, this fact has led Dehio (1962:281) to 
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remark that with the dawning of the aircraft, “the sea has begun to lose its importance as a 
protective belt.” This reflects the contemporary need for both a strong navy and air force 
during wartime, as shown by the British in World War II.  
 
2.3.2.2 Modelski 
George Modelski, whose work is highly representative of the long cycle school, follows 
Toynbee’s reformulation of Wright’s fifty-year war cycles (Goldstein, 1988:126). Modelski 
(1978) traces the origins of the modern global political system to around 1500. However, in 
his work, Modelski has stressed that global political processes are autonomous from 
economic processes, which distinguishes this approach from that of the world-economy 
school, and which explains why Modelski has been depicted in a neo-Realist light, as 
mentioned earlier. 
For Modelski, ‘world powers’ are those states which “monopolize the function of order-
keeping in the global system” (Goldstein, 1988:126). However, Modelski prefers to use the 
term ‘world leaders’ when referring to these states which, although carrying the same 
fundamental meaning as Wallerstein’s preferred moniker hegemon, is intended to emphasise 
cooperative instead of exploitative aspects of the relationship between the leader and the 
other states in the interstate system, which places Modelski in the liberal tradition (Modelski 
and Thompson, 1988:3).  
Modelski identifies four states that have occupied this world leadership role since 1500, 
namely Portugal, the Dutch Republic, Britain, and the United States (Goldstein, 1988:126). 
Each of these powers remained dominant for roughly a century, forming part of the 
‘leadership cycle’. A fundamental difference between the approaches taken by Dehio and 
Modelski is where the focus of each lies – for Dehio it is with the states that failed in their 
bids for supremacy, while Modelski stresses those powers that were successful. However, 
Modelski shares with Dehio one of the key features of the long cycle approach – a respect for 
sea power. Here, Modelski follows in the tradition of Alfred Mahan (1890), who wrote about 
the topic of sea power at the end of the nineteenth century (Modelski and Thompson, 
1988:4). 
For Modelski, it is this facet of world leadership, namely naval strength, which forms the 
cornerstone of the explanation of why certain states, and not others, have managed to 
become ‘world leaders’. The reason for this, simply and eloquently stated, is because “there 
can be no global system without global reach” (Modelski and Thompson, 1988:3). Having a 
strong command of the sea is thus an inescapable requirement for a state to carry, or 
‘project’, its power over long distances and large areas. Since the only states capable of 
exercising this global reach are those possessing superior navies, the study of sea power (the 
use and command of the sea) must form an integral part of the endeavour to understand how 
world leadership (and hegemony) comes about. 
Modelski and Thompson (1988:11-12) identify four reasons why sea power proved to be 
the crucial ingredient in creating (and preserving) world order. The first reason is because 
states with powerful navies are able to contain or destroy the navies of their opponents, 
severely limiting the reach of the latter. Secondly, navies protect the home bases of states 
possessing them, while enabling direct attacks on the territories of their opponents. This ties 
in directly with Dehio’s argument that Continental powers were at a disadvantage against 
insular powers. Thirdly, powerful navies protect lines of communications and trade, while 
disrupting those of enemy states. Lastly, navies help to cement coalitions and to protect links 
between allied states. This was particularly clear in World War II, when the oceanic ‘lifeline’ 
between Britain and the United States helped the former to resist German attacks. 
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Modelski and Thompson (1988:17) make the proposition that those countries which rise 
to world leadership are those which acquire preponderant naval strength in the course of 
global (Great Power) war. For this reason, Modelski classifies all global wars as naval wars 
(Modelski and Thompson, 1988:18-19). The reason for this is because these wars were 
contests for world leadership and, as previously mentioned, there can be no world leadership 
without sea power. The five contests which Modelski classifies as global wars are the Italian 
and Indian Ocean Wars, the Dutch and Spanish Wars, the Wars of Louis XIV, the 
Napoleonic Wars, and the First and Second World Wars. Like Dehio, Modelski identifies 
crucial ocean battles in each war (see Table 2.3). Although not ending the fighting directly, 
these battles created the “preconditions of final victory” (Modelski and Thompson, 
1988:22). Furthermore, no power could launch a successful bid for world supremacy if it did 
not control the oceans, which leads Modelski to also classify all global wars as “containment 
wars.” Naturally, as Table 2.4 demonstrates, the world leaders identified by Modelski 
(1988:133) have also been the major naval innovators of the modern world. 
 
Table 2.3. Modelski’s Global Wars and their Key Sea Battles3 
 
Source: Modelski and Thompson (1988:21). 
 
Another concept central to Modelski’s argument is that of long cycles (Modelski and 
Thompson, 1988:97). These long cycles of world leadership refer to the fluctuations in the 
concentration of global reach capabilities, which as seen above, refer specifically to naval 
capabilities. Between the bouts of global war mentioned above, there occur fluctuations in 
the concentration of naval power. During global wars, naval capabilities become highly 
                                                 
3 Although not explicitly identified as such by either Modelski or Wallerstein, the Spanish-Ottoman Wars 
of the sixteenth century, which culminated in the sea battle of Lepanto (1571), can be regarded as an 
integral part of the Dutch-Spanish, English-Spanish, and French-Spanish Wars of the same era. 
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Table 2.4. Naval Innovations by Various World Powers 
 
Source: Modelski and Thompson (1988:25). 
 
concentrated, and this concentration lasts for a finite amount of time after the war, providing 
the state with the highest concentration the foundation for executing its world leadership. 
However, as time progresses, naval capabilities become increasingly deconcentrated, as the 
dominant naval power begins to shift its priorities away from maintaining its navy. This 
opens up space for future challengers to expand their navies. Then, when the next global war 
erupts, one state succeeds in obtaining a superior navy to its adversaries, which lays the 
foundation for the next post-war international order. 
For Modelski, this naval-power concentration is a useful measuring tool to identify the 
state that can be classified as the world leader at any one time. Specifically, states qualify as 
world powers when they possess 50% or more of the total naval capabilities in the world 
(Modelski and Thompson, 1988:105). This constitutes what Modelski calls a “monopoly of 
seapower” and according to him, four states have held this position since 1500, namely 
Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States (Modelski and Thompson, 
1988:133). This reinforces Modelski’s view that these four powers can be classified as world 
leaders, and that sea power is one of the key ingredients of world leadership. 
Modelski and Thompson (1988:248) also support Dehio’s argument that Continental 
states struggled to create powerful navies due to the fact that they had to concentrate their 
resources on the army. The reason for this was because Continental states had to prioritise 
the defence of their borders, and were constantly jostling with their powerful neighbours. 
Island states (or insular states on the fringes of the European continent), did not have to 
divide their focus or resources between the army and the navy, and could therefore gain a 
significant advantage over their Continental rivals, whose sailors lacked sufficient experience 
and sustained momentum and support to allow them to compete on the same level as the 
insular powers. 
Finally, in order to understand what underpins the long cycle of world leadership, 
Modelski turns to long waves (Goldstein, 1988:129). Goldstein (1988:6-7) identifies a long 
wave as an economic cycle lasting around fifty years (recall Wright’s fifty year cycles in the 
concentration of wars). Long waves, also known as Kondratieff waves, are composed of 
alternating economic phases, an expansion phase (or upswing), and a stagnation phase 
(downswing). Goldstein notes that the cycle repeats roughly every fifty years, and that it is 
synchronous across borders, which is indicative of a systemic-level phenomenon. The 
leadership cycle of one hundred years was thought to be connected with pairs of long waves, 
with innovation acting as the driving force (Goldstein, 1988:129).  
Originally, Modelski tied each one of the four phases of the leadership cycle to either an 
upswing or downswing in the long wave, with global war occurring on the first upswing, the 
establishment of world power on the first downswing, delegitimisation occurring on the 
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Table 2.5. Years During Which a Single State Possessed 50% or More of the World’s Naval 
Capabilities4 
 
Source: Modelski and Thompson (1988:105) 
 
second upswing, and deconcentration taking place on the second downswing. However, 
Modelski later moved away from the close linkage between the leadership cycle and the long 
wave, citing that due to fundamental dissynchronisation these phenomena should be treated 
as separate albeit related processes (Goldstein, 1988:133).  
 
2.3.2.3 Thompson 
William Thompson, whose contributions regarding the classification of approaches to 
structural change have been heavily relied upon in this study, can also been said to belong to 
the long cycle school (Thompson, 1988:xxii). He also contributed, along with Modelski, to 
the study of sea power in global politics, and as a result there is great agreement between the 
works of these two authors.  
Thompson (1988:7) sets out by identifying global wars as those contests deciding “who 
will provide systemic leadership, whose rules will govern, whose policies will shape systemic 
allocation processes, and whose sense of vision or order will prevail.” Thompson (1988:123) 
then highlights the economic aspects of both his and Modelski’s work. Thompson explains 
that hegemonic powers tend to have the lead economies of the time. This means that the 
location of the ‘active zone’ in the world-economy gives a good indication as to which 
country will likely be the next hegemon. In short, this active zone is comprised of an area 
that utilises advanced agriculture and intensive food production, and that has a high 
concentration of leading sectors (innovative new industries). The active zone is also heavily 
engaged in world trade, and is a major source of foreign investment. For long cycle theorists 
however, it is not a matter of economic centrality coming first (like the world-economy 
school), or political and military centrality (like the structural realism school). Here, both are 
seen as mutually reinforcing, as the political role of world leadership requires a material 
                                                 
4 Spain is also listed as one of the states with a monopoly of sea power, between 1594 and 1597. As will be 
argued in the next chapter, Spain was the dominant power in Europe during the second half of the 
sixteenth century, but it was never a true maritime power. This is reinforced by the brevity of the Spanish 
monopoly of sea power, lasting a total of three years. 
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base, and conversely, political and military leadership creates the framework for economic 
transactions, and act in defence of economic interests (Thompson, 1988:122). 
Thompson (1988:133-135) emphasises the concept of the leading sector, since the 
industries which encompass this sector are one of the keys to achieving hegemony. 
Thompson explains that different sectors of the economy grow at different rates, yet some 
sectors, at critical points in time, introduce major technological breakthroughs that have 
important implications for the growth of the economy as a whole. Thompson builds upon 
the study done by Rostow (1978) in this regard, which leads him to identify the following 
leading sectors since the eighteenth century: cotton textiles, iron, railways, steel, chemicals, 
electricity, and motor vehicles. When a country has a higher concentration of the leading 
sectors of the time, its economy benefits greatly; some of the possible implications for the 
national economy include lower prices and transport costs, population relocations, increased 
exports and employment, and spin-offs for other sectors of the economy. An excellent 
example would be the introduction of the railway and its related innovations, which certainly 
involved all of the implications mentioned above. 
Thompson, together with Reuveny (2008), also utilise the concept of leading sectors to 
account for what they regard as the growing economic gap between the developed North 
(core states) and the developing South (semi-peripheral and peripheral states) in the world-
economy. Since “intermittent upsurges in radical technology [are] generated principally in 
the system’s lead economy [thus enabling that state to become hegemonic],” and since these 
“growth impulses diffuse outwards from the centre of the North unevenly,” it stands to 
reason that the economies of the North are the “primary beneficiaries of these periodic 
extensions of the technological frontier” (Reuveny and Thompson, 2008:579). Indeed, when 
considering the issue of Southern development, Reuveny and Thompson (2008:587) find 
that “the North-South arena is not necessarily static, but there seem to be limitations in 
diffusing technology. The international political economic structure seems stacked against a 
substantial or near-future diminishment of the North-South gap” (emphasis added). Thus, 
while the core states benefit from the “diffusion of ideas, technologies, and know-how” 
brought about by new leading sectors, the periphery remains the recipient of older ‘past-
prime’ technology (Reuveny and Thompson, 2008:600). While this may seem to confirm 
arguments that the periphery does experience “real development,” (such as that of 
Sanderson {2005:197}), Reuveny and Thompson (emphasis added, 2008:583) soberly 
conclude that:  
 
the Southern problem is more one of avoiding falling further behind than it is of catching up or evading 
exploitation. If the South is generally unable to adopt or adapt to successive technological 
breakthroughs, it will likely fall further behind a frontier that is intermittently advanced in the North. 
Some Southern catch-up may be feasible in terms of earlier technological waves, but it is likely to 
remain too many waves behind to make much progress vis-à-vis convergence. 
 
Since most of the gains in new technology are concentrated in the “pioneer economy” of 
the time, it is able to benefit disproportionately, at least until other core states “improve on 
the initial innovations [or] … simply copy [them]” (Reuveny and Thompson, 2008:582). 
Moreover, these authors argue that these “ascent and decline patterns in relative 
technological gains, with late developers challenging early developers” constitute “both an 
economic foundation and substantial motivation for the world wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-
1945 [although, as this study will maintain, the same could be said for the Thirty Years’ 
War]” (emphasis added, 2008:582). A clear link can thus be said to exist between leading 
 33 
sectors, Great Power War, and hegemony, and this link will be explored in the following 
chapter of this study. Indeed, as Reuveny and Thompson (2008:584) succinctly argue:  
 
The key to global ascent is the successful monopolization of radical innovations in leading sectors of 
commerce and industry … [while] the introduction of leading sectors leads to the growth of the 
pioneering lead economy and, in turn, the growth of the lead economy stimulates world growth. The 
monopoly profits [then] finance the buildup of the leader’s military capabilities of global reach. [Thus, 
that] state emerges as the principle winner or systemic leader [during a Great Power War] thanks in 
large part to its lead in technological innovation. 
 
Thus, the concept of the leading sector, and more broadly technological innovation, can 
certainly help to illuminate why some states ascended to hegemony, while others did not, 
and these are also closely related to Wallerstein’s own arguments concerning hegemony. 
Moreover, as the comment above reveals, in order to construct and maintain a superior navy, 
which is vital for global reach and world leadership, a state must possess an economy that is 
vibrant enough to support such an enterprise. Even though neither Rostow nor Thompson 
discusses the concepts of leading sectors and a lead economy in the period before the 
industrial revolution, it does not preclude the usefulness of applying the concept to earlier 
eras. For instance, shipbuilding and its related innovations can be considered to be a leading 
sector in the era of Dutch ascent, as identified by Bousquet (1980) (Goldstein, 1988:139). An 
investigation of this is thus warranted in the relevant section of this study. 
A further account of Great Power War’s impact on the lead economy is also provided by 
Thompson (1988:149), who explains that wars of such a scale have tended to do much more 
damage to the economies of the losing side, since much of the fighting has taken place there. 
Another factor, which is more beneficial to the lead economy than to its competitors, is the 
war-induced demand for goods, which the lead economy (with its more efficient industries 
and leading sectors) is better able to supply. As the comment above also revealed, states that 
ascend to hegemony after Great Power Wars were in fact already in a strong position before 
the Wars broke out, and that their relative power was thus enhanced and their leadership 
solidified by the Wars. In essence, the War therefore helps to push the near-hegemonic state 
over the top into full hegemony (Thompson, 1988:165). Thus, understanding processes such 
as changes in relative power before the outbreak of Great Power Wars is crucial when 
attempting to account for a state’s ascension to hegemony, and reveals the motivation for the 
inclusion of a second independent variable (the material base) in this study, as discussed in 
the previous chapter. Furthermore, as Thompson (1988:165) remarks, both economic and 
military power concentrations are required together to provide the new systemic leader with 
the underpinnings it needs in order to alter the rules of the system and to promote its new 
world order. 
In conclusion, to tie in with Dehio’s argument that Continental powers tended to be 
absolutist, while insular powers were more representative, Thompson and Rasler (1989:23) 
used a study conducted by Mann (1986) in order to explain why insular powers tended to 
specialise in naval strength, while Continental powers focussed on armies (this is also closely 
linked to Fox’s societal dichotomy as discussed earlier). The conclusion they reached was 
that as military costs spiralled in the sixteenth century, states could either learn to mobilise 
fiscal resources, or manpower, depending on whether they possessed a stable and sizeable 
wealth base or a large and malleable population. Since sea powers tended to generate more 
wealth through trade (which was also relatively easy to tax) they could mobilise their fiscal 
resources to a much greater extent than Continental powers. This would prove decisive, as 
the costs of war continued to spiral upwards, and would lay the foundations for the 
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institutionalised access that these insular powers would have to both short- and long-term 
credit, which helped them to defeat their (often apparently wealthier) opponents (Rasler and 
Thompson, 1989:103). In a very real sense, this leadership in financial capabilities and 
public finance systems was decisive for ensuring victory in increasingly expensive Great 
Power Wars.  Other authors have also discussed this issue in detail, which will be addressed 
below.  
  
2.3.3 The world-economy school 
This brings us to the third and final approach used to investigate the relationship between 
hegemony and warfare, namely the world-economy school. This study can be classified as 
belonging to the world-economy school, and therefore reflects many of its assumptions and 
ideas.  
An important feature of this school is the focus that it places not only on core (advanced 
capitalist) states, but on core-periphery relations, which for the most part constitutes a 
difference between neo-Marxist approaches and traditional Marxism, excepting Lenin 
(1939), who argued that the imperialism of the core capitalist states helped capitalism to 
avoid (or perhaps delay) its ‘final crisis’ of declining profits and returns on investment, the 
impoverishment of the core working classes, and finally revolution (Goldstein, 1988:133). 
This school, as was discussed in the first chapter of this study, approaches the question of war 
and hegemony within the context of the capitalist world-economy. Consequently, a greater 
emphasis is placed on economic processes and features than on political or military ones 
(which, as will be discussed below, has led some critics to accuse World-Systems Analysis of 
economism). Indeed, they are considered to be two parts of a single logic, and it is this very 
nature (capitalist) of the modern world-system that gives rise to hegemonic sequences and 
not to world-empires (Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995:390). 
Since much has already been said in the previous chapter regarding the features of World-
Systems Analysis, which is representative of the world-economy approach, including the 
definition of key concepts such as the world-system, this section will not repeat these details. 
However, a few additional aspects of the world-economy school’s approach to the 
war/hegemony question warrant further discussion, including the most notable criticisms 
which have been directed at World-Systems Analysis, and some of the responses to these. 
 
2.3.3.1 Wallerstein 
For Wallerstein, two dynamics are central to the modern world-system, representing political 
and economic processes (Thompson, 1988:58-59). The first is of course the ‘hegemonic 
sequence’ whereby hegemonic core states rise and fall, and which was discussed in chapter 
one. To summarise, in order for a state to become hegemonic, it must first gain an edge over 
its core rivals in agro-industrial production, followed by an edge in commerce, and finally in 
finance (Wallerstein, 2000a:255). Wallerstein contends that enterprises located within the 
hegemonic state in question achieve their edge in efficiency in this order, and they lose them 
in this order as well (2000a:257). True hegemony is only achieved during the short time that 
the state can maintain its advantage in all three economic domains simultaneously, as seen 
in Figure 2.2. 
Various authors within the world-economy school, including Wallerstein, identify four 
phases in every hegemonic cycle (Shannon, 1989:121). During the first phase – ascending 
hegemony – the old hegemonic power is no longer economically or militarily predominant 
to the extent that it was during its height. Furthermore, violent conflicts erupt during this 
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Figure 2.2. True Hegemony, as a Confluence of Productive, Commercial, and Financial 
Advantages 
 
Source: Thompson (1988:118). Based on Wallerstein (1984:40). 
 
time, as the major (rising) core powers battle out who will be the next hegemon. This is the 
phase of the Great Power War (see Table 2.6).  
 
Table 2.6. The Dating and Constitutive Parts of the Hegemonic Cycle 
 
Source: Hopkins, Wallerstein et al (1979:118). Reprinted in Shannon (1989:121).  
 
The second phase is that of hegemonic victory, when one state emerges with an economic 
and military advantage over all its core rivals (Shannon, 1989:121). By this stage the new 
hegemonic power has supplanted the old. Next follows hegemonic maturity (full hegemony), 
when the newly hegemonic state attains full productive, commercial, and financial 
hegemony over all others. This stage never lasts long though, and is invariably followed by 
hegemonic decline, and although the hegemonic power may still have the largest military 
force, it no longer enjoys the level of economic superiority that it did during the phase of 
hegemonic maturity. As discussed in chapter one, we are in this stage today.  
Unlike Modelski and Gilpin, Wallerstein identifies only three hegemonic states in the 
modern world-system and as a result, only three genuine Great Power Wars (2000a:258). 
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These were World War Alpha (the Thirty Year’s War), World War Beta (the wars of the 
French Revolution and Napoleon), and World War Gamma (traditionally referred to as 
World Wars I and II). The first of these will be investigated in the appropriate section of this 
study, along with the subsequent hegemon.  
 
Table 2.7. World Wars and Hegemons as Identified by Wallerstein5 
 
Source: Thompson (1988:59). Based on information in Wallerstein (1984:37-46). 
 
Table 2.8. Differences between Wallerstein and Modelski Regarding the Identification and 
Timing of Hegemonic Wars, and the Victors of those Wars 
 
Source: Goldstein (1988:138). 
 
However, as Peter Gowan (2004:472) argues, the differences between the schools and 
authors regarding those states that are considered to be hegemonic arise as a result of the 
different understandings of hegemony. The structural realism and long cycle approaches 
subordinate the economic dimension to the issue of military-political capacity, while the 
world-economy approach sees military-political power as supporting the struggle for 
dominance at the level of production. Accordingly, if one emphasises military (specifically 
naval) strength, one would arrive at different conclusions regarding which states can be 
considered to be hegemonic, than if one emphasises productive dominance in capital-
intensive commodities (Gowan, 2004:473). 
Wallerstein (2000a:259) notes that a major restructuring of the interstate system takes 
place at the end of each Great Power War. This closely resembles the arguments of both 
Gilpin and Modelski, in that the interstate system is restructured to reflect the new 
distribution (and reconcentration) of power. Furthermore, Wallerstein argues that, as the 
hegemonic state’s power wanes, two states emerge as contenders (as evident in Table 2.7). 
These pairs of contenders were Britain and France after Dutch hegemony, and Germany and 
the United States after British hegemony. What is clearly noticeable is that, in each instance, 
                                                 
5 Since this table was compiled from research conducted during the 1980s, one may certainly add China, 
India, Brazil, and (a resurgent) Russia to the list of possible succession contenders that may vie for 
hegemony in the twenty-first century. 
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one of these contenders was a major land power, while the other was a major naval power. 
Also, the land powers initiated each conflict, but failed in both cases to obtain victory 
(Dehio’s argument that the naval powers are able to mobilise the support of the outside, or 
non-European, world provides an attractive explanation for this). Hegemony, it seems, always 
passes to the dominant sea power of the time, which joins the winning coalition but never 
initiates the conflict.  
Wallerstein also contends that although Great Power Wars have significant political and 
military consequences, their greatest impact is on the economic sphere (2000a:261). The 
rising hegemon’s lead in the economic domains may not be very significant over that of its 
nearest rival immediately before the War, but the War alters this situation significantly. The 
winning state’s economic edge is strengthened by the War, and this strengthened position is 
then protected by the post-war settlement, which reorganises the interstate system in a 
manner that is favourable to the newly hegemonic state. This strengthening effect of the War 
on the economic domains of the hegemonic state will also be investigated in this study.  
The second dynamic, which is present within the modern world-system, is that of 
economic expansion and stagnation/contraction (Thompson, 1988:60). Whereas the 
hegemonic sequence represents political dynamics within the world-system, this process of 
expansion and stagnation/contraction represents the economic dynamics. Wallerstein 
(1979:74) identifies two different kinds of economic cycles, namely long waves (Kondratieff 
waves) with a length of around fifty years, and ‘logistics’ with a much longer duration of 
between one-hundred and fifty and three-hundred years.  
Essentially, Wallerstein, together with other authors such as Hopkins (1979), argue that 
the inherent contradictions within the capitalist world-economy do not allow a linear pattern 
of growth (Goldstein, 1988:134). Long waves roughly correspond to the hegemonic 
sequence, in that each hegemonic sequence is composed of two pairs of long waves (which is 
similar to both Toynbee and Modelski’s arguments). These pairs of long waves follow an A1-
B1-A2-B2 pattern, whereby the first upswing is followed by the first downswing, and the 
second upswing is followed by the second downswing. 
Shannon (1989:117) explains that these long waves are essentially driven by the creation of 
new economic activities and production techniques. These new activities or techniques 
generate large profits in the early stages when the market is not yet saturated, and spin-off 
benefits are generated for the economy as a whole. This argument is very similar to that of 
the leading sectors identified by Thompson and other authors. Since the market eventually 
becomes saturated, and as competitors emulate the new economic activities, those activities 
or techniques can no longer generate ever-increasing profits, and stagnation sets in. In an 
effort to find new ways in which to off-set the negative consequences of this period of 
stagnation, core capitalists work to increase their exploitation of the periphery via increased 
broadening (incorporation of new areas into the world-system) and deepening (increased 
commodification) (Shannon, 1989:118). 
It is in this B-phase that core states increase their direct control over the periphery, and 
enter into fiercer competition with each other as they scramble to minimise the impact of 
the economic stagnation on their economies (note the link here with Lenin’s argument). 
This coincides with periods of extensive colonisation, such as that experienced in the late 
nineteenth century (Thompson, 1988:60). The influx of cheap resources from the periphery, 
coupled with greater economic concentration, and investments in the periphery, then result 
in a new expansion phase. Furthermore, during the period of economic stagnation (phase 
B), there exists a strong focus on economic innovation, which helps to create the basis for the 
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creation of new economic activities and products that will help drive a next A-phase 
expansion.6 
These long cycles have been linked to the different phases of hegemonic succession, 
mentioned above (Goldstein, 1988:135). The first phase of economic expansion coincides 
with the stage of ascending hegemony, which is marked by increasing levels of conflict 
between the rivals to succession. This is followed by a phase of general economic stagnation, 
during which the new hegemon bypasses the old and achieves hegemonic victory, thanks to 
its new economic activities and techniques (especially in leading sectors). During the next 
expansion phase, the new hegemon achieves its maturity (and holds a simultaneous 
advantage over its core rivals in the three economic domains of agro-industrial production, 
commerce, and finance). Then, as the next phase of stagnation sets in, the now declining 
hegemon is faced with new rivals ready to take its place. However, as Goldstein notes, there 
has been a tendency to detach the hegemonic sequence from that of long waves, as has been 
done in the long cycle school (1988:133). Although they are still seen as related, they are no 
longer as tightly connected (due to the fact that they are not perfectly synchronised). 
As for logistics, Wallerstein argues that these are the cycles which are composed of an 
expansion phase and a stagnation phase (1979:74). The expansion phase of the logistics cycle 
is characterised by growing populations, increasing trade, greater areas of land under 
cultivation, the strengthening of political apparatuses, and the broadening of the world-
system. The stagnation phase is largely characterised by the opposite trends. However, 
Wallerstein (1979:75) makes the point that the effects of the stagnation phase are not the 
same in all areas, and that instead of weakening the obligations of labourers to their lords (in 
the early era of the modern world-system), the B-phase was marked by a strengthening of 
these obligations in the periphery (then Eastern Europe). 
These phases of stagnation are also characterised by increases in the concentration of 
capital in the core, protectionist policies (such as mercantilism), and an increase in the level 
of peripheral control by core states (Wallerstein, 1979:76-77). However, as Shannon notes, 
the dating of these logistics is very ambiguous, especially after the eighteenth century, which 
is why Wallerstein and other authors are willing to consider the disappearance of logistic at 
that time (1989:119).7  Further work is thus required in order to refine the concept of 
logistics. 
 
2.3.3.2 A Critical View of World-Systems Analysis 
At this point, it is useful to investigate and discuss some of the most significant criticisms of 
World-Systems Analysis that have emerged over the years. As Hall (1996:441) contends, 
World-Systems Analysis has, since its inception, been viewed as “highly contentious” by 
many critics, and it certainly lies beyond the scope of this study to provide an exhaustive 
                                                 
6 There exist some differences in the literature on whether the B-phase of the long wave constitutes a 
period of economic stagnation or contraction. For instance, Wallerstein (1979:74) contends that the B-
phase of the long wave is marked by economic contraction, while Thompson (1988:60), Goldstein 
(1988:7), Shannon (1989:116), and Sanderson (2005:182) argue that phase B is a period of stagnation or 
slower growth. This study follows the latter understanding. 
7 Shannon (1989:119-120) further points out that logistics are possibly linked to “periods of generally rising 
(phase A) or falling (phase B) prices,” with the price of grain being the most important in pre-industrial 
Europe. Although logistics may be “quite similar” to Kondratieffs, they are understood as constituting 
“‘deeper’ or more ‘fundamental’ economic fluctuations,” but much progress still needs to be made 
regarding the nature and timing of logistics, and the possible survival thereof after the Industrial 
Revolution. 
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discussion of all the critical debates that have emerged. Although there have been many 
areas of debate and contention, such as the role of luxury trade, the applicability of World-
Systems Analysis to the pre-modern era, the operationalisation of economic cycles (such as 
that of logistics discussed above), long-term trends of underdevelopment, and the role of 
foreign investment therein, for the most part these are irrelevant for the purpose of this study. 
However, four particular criticisms of World-Systems Analysis do warrant closer 
investigation, namely that the theory is teleological, that it engages in reification, that is 
economistic, and that it is too structuralist and does not allow for agency. These four 
problem areas will be explored and discussed in turn below, and in the context of this study 
some responses to these criticisms will be issued. 
When considering these complaints however, it is evident that many of them emerged in 
response to Wallerstein’s first groundbreaking volume of The Modern World-System (1974). 
From the following discussion, it will be seen that Wallerstein has responded to many of the 
concerns raised regarding his first volume in the subsequent second (1980) and third (1988) 
volumes, and in the countless other books and articles that have followed. Indeed, in many 
instances, as Garst (1985:469) notes, Wallerstein’s later work has helped to mitigate some of 
the serious criticisms lodged against his arguments contained in his first volume, but this is 
not to say that all shortcomings have been addressed, or that they should be overlooked. 
However, it is also true that World-Systems Analysis as an approach has evolved considerably 
since its early beginnings, due in no small part to cross-fertilisation with other strands of the 
social sciences, and to the inputs of a multitude of other world-system scholars. 
In the first instance, Wallerstein’s arguments concerning the functioning of the modern 
world-system have been regarded as displaying a teleological (or functionalist, in the words of 
Zolberg {1981:255}) tendency, and the arguments of Skocpol (1994) can be viewed as 
particularly representative of this criticism. Teleology, Neuman (2003:546) reminds, is a 
statement or a line of argument that “appears to be a causal explanation, but it is not, 
because it cannot be tested empirically,” since the independent variable is “an amorphous 
idea, a long-term goal, a future intention or [of particular relevance here] characteristic of an 
entire system.” As such, the ultimate causes of the nature or of the actions of a phenomenon 
can be related to their ends, utility, or function.  
Several related points of contention regarding the charges of teleology in World-Systems 
Analysis can be identified, and all revolve around what Skocpol (1994:58) calls “system-
maintenance arguments” or, as Zolberg (1981:255) elaborates, political configurations that 
arise “when needed by the system, without any other explanation.” First, Skocpol posits that 
Wallerstein (in his 1974 volume) is unable to adequately account for the demise of feudalism 
and the subsequent emergence of the capitalist world-system, and that his arguments 
surrounding these developments are teleological since they maintain that “the crisis [of 
feudalism] ‘had to be solved’ if ‘Europe’ or ‘the system’ were to survive.” In Skocpol’s 
(1994:58) view, related very closely to these arguments concerning the emergence of the 
capitalist world-system, is the argument concerning the stability or self-reinforcing nature of 
the system, whereby Wallerstein appears to posit that “once the system is established, 
everything reinforces everything else,” which “convey[s] a sense of the massive stability of the 
whole.” As such, Skocpol (1994:68) summarises, Wallerstein “repeatedly … argues that 
things at a certain time and place had to be a certain way in order to bring about later states 
or developments that accord (or seem to accord) with what his system model of the world 
capitalist economy requires or predicts.” 
One such example relates to the hierarchical structure of the modern world-system, 
whereby authors such as Sanderson (2005:186) contend that Wallerstein has always 
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maintained from his earliest works that “in order for there to be a rich core there had to be a 
poor periphery subject to superexploitation, and, since such a highly polarized system would 
be unstable, in order to persist it required an intermediate structure, or semiperiphery” 
(emphasis added). Shannon (emphasis added, 1989:150) argues in a similar vein that 
although it has been maintained in World-Systems Analysis that the “exploitation of the 
periphery has been beneficial and necessary for the core,” there is substantial empirical 
grounds to doubt this claim since the core never managed to extract as much surplus from 
the periphery as world-system theorists have argued, and that the core’s development since 
the sixteenth century can be explained more by internal factors than by its exploitation of the 
periphery. 
Skocpol (1994:63-65) and Gourevitch (1978:423-427) also posit that Wallerstein’s 
arguments in the first volume of The Modern World-System concerning patterns of state 
development are “at best unclear, and at worst wrong,” and that his views on the timing, 
nature, and causes of the “second serfdom,” which are closely related to the patterns of state 
development, are deficient and do not match the historical evidence. Here too do charges of 
teleology emerge, as will be seen shortly. To elaborate on the criticisms of Skocpol and 
Gourevitch, their central objections revolve around the links that Wallerstein make between 
state strength and coercive agriculture, and location in the world-system hierarchy. For 
instance, Gourevitch (1978:424) argues that Wallerstein offers “no explanation for the 
variance found not only within zones between strong and weak [states], but also none for the 
variance within each of those categories (different types of strong and different types of 
weak).” Part of the problem, in Gourevitch’s (1978:423) view is that Wallerstein’s arguments 
regarding state strength and location within the world-system hierarchy appear to be circular 
and teleological, since Wallerstein (1974:354-355) argues that: 
 
It cannot be the case that all these entities be equally strong. For if they were, they would be in the 
position of blocking the effective operation of transnational entities whose locus were in another state. It 
would then follow that the world division of labor would be impeded, the world-economy decline, and 
eventually the world-system fall apart. 
 
Zolberg (1981:270) has also contributed to this debate by highlighting what appears to be 
a highly teleological argument embedded in Wallerstein’s work – that it appears “that the 
position of countries in the world economy determines the character of their political 
regimes [related also to the charge of economism] and, concomitantly, that the world 
economy requires, for its maintenance as a system, strong states at the core as well as weak 
political structures in the peripheral areas.” However, Gourevitch (1978:423) and Skocpol 
(1994:64,67) argue that despite Wallerstein’s claim that strong states are to be found in the 
core of the world-system, this does not always appear to be the case, since “some strong states 
were located in the peripheries (Prussia, Austria, Sweden),” and that if, as a result, strong 
states are also to be found in the periphery, “then according to Wallerstein’s own logic [as 
encapsulated in the quote above] the economic division of labor cannot be presumed likely 
to hold together over time as a ‘system’ and the differential flow of surpluses to the core is 
likely to be disrupted.” Wallerstein’s (1974:87) related argument, concerning coerced cash-
crop labour and the “second serfdom” in the periphery of early modern Europe, Gourevitch 
(1978:425-426) argues, not only “does not fit the timing of these developments in Eastern 
Europe,” but also appears contradictory to his views on core state strength, since “strong 
states were needed in the periphery to impose servile controls on labor.” 
At this point, it is useful to regard some of the response to these criticisms issued by 
various scholars, not least of which Wallerstein himself. Regarding issues of historical 
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accuracy and evidence, Shannon (1989:160) contends that “readers of world-system analysis 
must understand that the historical interpretations on which world-systems theory is based 
are selective in their use of the available historical evidence and are often [unavoidably] 
highly controversial.” Meanwhile, Garst (1985:471) argues that Wallerstein’s second volume 
of The Modern World-System (1980) went far to address the “overly simplistic” link between 
state form and location in the world-system hierarchy and “the neglect of institutionalized 
structures of class relationships, which made it impossible for Wallerstein to account for the 
presence of both ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ states in the core and periphery.” Indeed, this second 
volume featured a much more nuanced view of the early world-system than was to be found 
in the first volume, and as such many of the charges of teleology, as sampled above, have 
been deflected. For instance, the primary contribution of the second volume on the modern 
world-system has been summarised as follows by Garst (1985:475), “Wallerstein has 
augmented his focus on the Capitalist World Economy’s structure in the explanation of state 
structures and behavior by examining the dominant class structures and political alliances 
[within states] as well.” In particular, Wallerstein elaborated and refined the understanding 
of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ states, and in so doing, has addressed the most prominent criticisms 
that revolve around charges of teleology, such as those issued by Skocpol and Gourevitch. 
Most prominently, Wallerstein (1980:113) expanded his original arguments surrounding 
state strength in his second volume by positing that “a state’s strength correlates with the 
economic role of the owner-producers of that state in the world-economy; but if these 
assertions are not to be mere tautologies, we must have some independent political measures 
of this strength.” Since Wallerstein’s elaboration on these political measures of state 
strength, and the (internal) dominant class structures and political alliances overlap to a 
large extent with other criticisms to be discussed shortly – especially that of structuralism – 
they will be elaborated upon further later.  
However, before turning to the next major criticism of World-Systems Analysis, the role of 
the exploitation of the periphery by the core should be briefly touched upon, since, as 
mentioned, it has been charged that the evidence supporting the significance of this 
exploitation has been lacking, and that arguments surrounding the necessity of this 
exploitative relationship have been erroneous. In contrast to such a view, this study, much 
like that of Reuveny and Thompson (2008:583), is “hard pressed to deny the evidence for 
exploitation.” Of course, as Reuveny and Thompson also point out, it is very uncertain, and 
in Shannon’s (1989:133) view unproven, that the prosperity of the core has “consistently 
depended” on its exploitation of the periphery’s goods and markets. Rather, the trade, 
investment, and prosperity of the core appear to be largely core-centric.  
Yet these arguments concerning the apparently limited benefits and uncertain nature of 
the exploitation of the periphery to the core can be addressed another way, as Reuveny and 
Thompson (2008:583) hint. In their opinion, “if exploitation was once blatant and 
prominent [and by extension necessary], neglect seems more problematic these days” 
(emphasis added). This caveat alludes to the manner in which the claim generally made by 
World-Systems Analysis – that the exploitation of the periphery is central to the development 
of the core – can be reconciled with the abovementioned criticism that the core appears to 
depend more on itself for development and that “developments in technology have reduced 
the dependence on Southern [peripheral] raw materials” – by reiterating the importance of 
including a historical dimension when considering the role of peripheral exploitation 
(Reuveny and Thompson, 2008:583). Indeed, although it may be generally true today that 
the core is more dependent upon investment and trade relations with other core states, when 
the historical development of the core is considered, the importance of the direct 
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exploitation of peripheral regions by specific core states – such as the exploitation of Central 
and South America in the sixteenth century by Spain and Portugal, and the Indian 
subcontinent in the eighteenth century by Britain – assumes a much greater dimension. In 
fact, the absolute immiseration of these peripheral regions substantially benefitted the core 
states that exploited them. 
As such, this study maintains the conventional emphasis of World-Systems Analysis on the 
importance of peripheral exploitation for core development, although it will be conceded 
that this exploitation has assumed a relatively more minor role since 1945, partly because, as 
was discussed earlier in this chapter, peripheral exploitation is more subtle and indirect 
during periods of hegemony in the world-system. With decolonisation under American 
hegemony, and its championing of global liberalism, it thus stands to reason that intra-core 
trade and investment would eclipse direct peripheral exploitation in apparent importance. 
However, this study cannot agree with the conclusion of Reuveny and Thompson (2008:583) 
that peripheral raw materials are less important to the core today, since the core’s oil 
dependence, and semicore China’s “prowl for resources” in the periphery, clearly reveal the 
centrality of the periphery’s resources, not merely for the development of the core 
economies, but also for their regular functioning (Kurlantzick, 2009:27). 
 
At this point, the second major criticism of World-Systems Analysis will be investigated, 
namely that it engages in reification, which can be condensed as the treatment of something 
abstract as a real and tangible object that is “alien, external, and apart … [with] an 
independent life” from the social processes that created it (Neuman, 2003:543). For scholars 
such as Flint and Shelley (1996:498) and Sanderson (2005:186), the primary concern with 
regards to the charge of reification revolves around the apparent tendency of World-Systems 
Analysis to assign to “the categories of core, periphery, and semiperiphery an independent 
role in explaining social phenomena,” which make it appear as though the world-system 
itself is “an organic type of system” with a “consciousness that tells it how to allocate tasks on 
a global level.” Indeed, as Chirot and Hall (1982:85) point out, and as was mentioned earlier 
in the discussion of teleology, “semiperipheries [seem to serve the function to] deflect the 
anger and revolutionary activity of peripheries, and they serve as good places for capitalist 
investment when well-organised labor forces in core countries cause wages to rise too fast.” 
In such an argument, it would appear as though the category of semi-periphery exists 
because the survival of the world-system depends upon it (teleology again), and that the 
world-system somehow ‘knows’ this and as a consequence has created this middle zone 
between the core and the periphery (reification).  
To address this issue, Sanderson (2005:183) argues that the categories of core, periphery, 
and semi-periphery should be abandoned entirely by World-Systems Analysis, and that these 
concepts should be replaced by a more general discussion of “global inequalities.” To 
support this argument, Sanderson (2005:187) points out that the semi-periphery is an 
especially problematic component of the world-system, since it appears to function as a 
“dumping ground category” that is populated by a vast array of diverse states (the specific 
states differ depending on the author or scholar involved, and on how the semi-periphery is 
defined), and that the inclusion of such a variety and diversity of states within a single 
category prevents it from being a useful concept. 
However, it should be noted that this opinion concerning the abandonment of the core, 
periphery, and semi-periphery as components of the world-system is far from universal, and 
in direct contrast to Sanderson, Babones (2005:29) maintains that the identification of these 
three broad zones in the world-economy is one of the key contributions made by Wallerstein 
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and World-Systems Analysis. Moreover, as Babones (2005:29) points out, various studies 
conducted by a wide array of scholars, ranging from network analysis of patterns of trade and 
network analysis of economic, political, and military relationships, to distributional analyses 
of income levels, have confirmed “the basic validity of the model of a world-economy 
divided into three structural zones,” and that these studies have yielded “roughly similar 
groups of countries for each of the three structural zones.”  
One such study is that of Steiber (1979), in which he blockmodeled the world trade system 
in order to demonstrate a single mode of international exchange in the world-system (as 
opposed to separate capitalist and communist modes) and the unique position of the middle 
level of nations (i.e. the semi-periphery) in that system’s hierarchy. The findings of that study 
revealed that “socialist societies simply do [or rather did] not form a unique middle level of 
world actors,” while the trade matrices produced by Steiber provided “solid support for the 
premises of world systems theory,” and revealed that “the semi-periphery, as defined by 
economic criteria, do form a unique strata in the world system” (and as a consequence does 
not simply exist because the system ‘needs’ it to) (Steiber, 1979:33-34, emphasis added). In 
addition, Babones (2005:47) found in his own study that a “tri-modal distribution of 
countries (weighted by population) in the distribution of national incomes is unmistakable” 
(emphasis added). Moreover, while it is true that there may not be a consensus regarding 
which states fall into which individual category, Taylor (1988:264) argues that “the fluidity of 
regions and outcomes demand flexibility,” and that “one should not be overly concerned to 
produce rigid boundaries” between zones. 
It thus becomes apparent that the criticism of the utility of the concepts of core, periphery, 
and semi-periphery, and the reification of these categories in World-Systems Analysis, is not 
shared by all, and as a consequence, their use will be maintained throughout this study. 
However, as Kick et al. (2000) point out, this does not preclude the further refinement of 
these concepts, especially the semi-periphery, which in their view consists of an upper and a 
lower division, with the former classified as the semicore of the world-system, and the latter 
as the ‘traditional’ semi-periphery. The addition of a semicore to the hierarchy of the world-
system is particularly attractive, and this distinct category could be utilised in future research 
regarding possible hegemonic rivalry in the twenty-first century, since several of those 
potential contenders for hegemony can currently be said to reside in the semicore (most 
notably China). 
Before turning to the charge of economism, Flint and Shelley’s (1996:498) contribution 
with regards to the debate of the reification of the world-system and its hierarchy merits 
attention. They remind that “cores or peripheries [or the world-system in its entirety] cannot 
act,” and that “rather, human activity creates core and periphery processes, which in turn 
create regions within the world-economy” that “interact with each other to form and 
perpetuate a core-periphery hierarchy” (emphasis added). With the requisite caution and 
focus on human activity, which makes allowance for agency (discussed shortly), and with the 
inputs of studies such as those of Babones and Steiber, this study contends that the 
reification of the world-system can be sufficiently guarded against to preserve its utility and 
value for social scientific research. 
 
In the third instance, Wallerstein’s work – again his first volume of The Modern World-
System in particular – has been charged with displaying a reductionist tendency, whereby 
“political processes [are viewed] as epiphenomenal in relation to economic causation,” and 
that it is, as a consequence, economistic (Zolberg, 1981:255). For Zolberg (1981:257-258), 
the main point of contention arises from the apparent manner in which Wallerstein singles 
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out economic activity as representative of “the totality of human existence” since, as Chase-
Dunn and Hall (1994:265) remark, Wallerstein uses modes of production to demarcate 
world-systems and that the resulting defining feature of the modern world-system, as already 
noted throughout this study, is the fact that it encompasses a capitalist world-economy with 
economic linkages between the parts of the world-system being the most decisive. This leads 
Zolberg (1981:258) to conclude that “the theory clearly rests on the proposition that 
economic processes alone determined the genesis of the modern world system and governed 
its operations after it came into being.” Nor is Zolberg alone in reaching this conclusion. 
Indeed, Skocpol (1994:60,68) also maintains that Wallerstein “reduces politics to economic 
conditions” by creating a “model that simultaneously gives a decisive role to international 
political domination … and deprives politics of any independent efficacy, reducing it to the 
vulgar expression of market-class interests,” and that he “reduces politics to economic 
conditions and to the expression of the will of the dominant groups within each national 
arena.” 
Following from this, Zolberg (1981:258) calls Wallerstein to task for failing to take 
account of the political and military relationships between the states of the early modern 
world-system, and the Ottoman world-empire which lay beyond the (economic) boundaries 
of that system, since this interaction worked to “shape relationships among western 
European countries” and, in turn, affected the development of that system – developments 
that cannot be accounted for by relying solely on explanations of processes that were 
exclusively internal to the modern world-system. Hess (1973:60-61,75), in his discussion of 
the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, reaches the conclusion that the 
interactions between the Ottomans and the states of early-modern Western Europe had a 
definite impact on developments in the West since, for instance, the early attempts of the 
Portuguese seafarers to find a sea route to India was partly informed by a desire to occupy a 
strategic position that would enable them to launch an “attack on the Islamic world from the 
rear,” while the Spanish, after attaining their goal of reclaiming Iberia from the Moors in the 
Reconquista, turned their attention to pushing back the frontiers of Islam in North Africa, 
which put them in direct opposition to the Ottomans in the Mediterranean. By the end of 
the fifteenth century, the Ottomans commanded a fleet of sufficient size and strength to 
defeat the Venetian fleet (in 1499), thereby gaining strategic predominance in the eastern 
Mediterranean (Hess, 1973:66). Following its defeat of the Mamluk Empire in 1517, the 
Ottoman Empire then began venturing into the western Mediterranean, while Charles V 
organised “his inheritances [of] large human and material resources … in accordance with 
the universal traditions of the Romano-Christian past,” whereby the “Hapsburg empire 
quickly became the most powerful opponent of the Muslim world” (Hess, 1973:61).  
This Spanish-Ottoman animosity in particular presented opportunities to states such as 
France, itself arrayed against the “geographical monster” of the Hapsburg lands, and in fact, 
the French concluded an alliance with the Ottomans in 1525, whereby they “encouraged the 
sultan to attack the eastern portion of the Habsburg empire” (Hess, 1973:72). As will also be 
seen in the next chapter, this Spanish-Ottoman clash in the Mediterranean also provided a 
strategic opportunity for the Dutch during their struggle for independence (and ascent to 
hegemony), since they had a mutual foe in common with the Ottomans. Without further 
elaborating on the Spanish-Ottoman relationship at this point, it is nevertheless evident that 
as Zolberg (1981:263) argues, the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the affairs of Europe 
“drastically altered the strategic configuration” of the states of the world-system from its 
earliest development. For Zolberg (1981:272-273), these events demonstrate that “the 
boundaries of the world economy were shaped by processes generated at the level of a more 
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comprehensive world system constituted by strategic interactions among a variety of political 
units.” As such, he casts into doubt whether the modern world-system was truly a self-
contained entity during the sixteenth century (Zolberg, 1981:258). 
Zolberg and Skocpol have not been the only scholars to charge Wallerstein and World-
Systems Analysis with being economistic. Indeed, Shannon (1989:138) reveals that 
Wallerstein has also been accused of reducing the struggle for hegemony to economic 
factors, as a result of the argument that “the process of actually achieving hegemony depends 
upon obtaining economic preponderance in production, commercial relations, and 
international finance” – as discussed in the previous chapter. Rather, Shannon (1989:139) 
maintains that “war is not simply part of that economic struggle,” and that “instead, the 
search for military security and territorial expansion represents an independent explanation 
for relationships in the world-system.” Shannon also cites the long cycle school of Modelski 
and others, as discussed earlier in this chapter, as the “most fully elaborated approach that 
emphasises the independent role of geopolitical factors in the struggle for hegemony” 
(emphasis added). 
For Garst (1985:470) however, the majority of the charges of economic reductionism in 
World-Systems Analysis can be ascribed to “a mistaken and oversimplified characterization 
of Wallerstein’s Modern World System.” Rather, Garst maintains, a proper understanding of 
the modern world-system would reveal that it is “an institutional structure that shapes the 
interplay between the political variables associated with the interstate system and the 
economic variables associated with the world-wide capitalist exchange network.” Moreover, 
in line with Wallerstein, who maintains that “the division between political and economic 
analysis simply has no place in world-system theory,” and that “both must be considered 
together in analyzing the system,” Garst contends that the “multiplicity of sovereign states 
and the world-wide system of commodity production … form a complex and historically 
emergent totality whose parts cannot be understood in isolation from one another” 
(Shannon, 1989:139; Garst, 1985:470). Similarly, Hobsbawm (1987:69) argues that “politics 
and economics cannot be separated in a capitalist society, any more than religion and society 
in an Islamic one.” This study consequently echoes this position throughout. 
As such, in relation to the claim of economic reductionism present in the arguments 
concerning the establishment of hegemony, it was argued in the previous chapter that the 
foundation of political/military and cultural strength relies fundamentally upon economic 
strength, and throughout this chapter the opinions of various scholars on this issue are 
illustrated.  Differential rates of economic (and technological) growth, that underlie 
differential rates of military expansion, are considered by several experts to account for cycles 
of hegemonic rivalry, and as such, this study recognises the importance of such economic 
factors, and takes cognisance of Shannon’s (1989:140) comment that the interstate system’s 
survival is intimately tied to the continued existence of a capitalist world-economy. 
Moreover, this study will not be built upon an exclusive reliance on the world-economy 
school, and several elements from the other schools discussed in this chapter will be 
included. Also, Cox’s (1987:357) contribution with regards to “class formation and the 
formation of historical blocs as the crucial factor in the transformation of global political and 
social order” will be investigated later in this chapter, and will help to inform, albeit to a very 
limited extent, the discussions in the subsequent chapters of this study. This, as Cox 
(1987:357) argues, will further help to avoid “reducing states and the state system to the 
world economy.” 
With regards to Zolberg’s arguments concerning Wallerstein’s failure to account for the 
impact of politico-strategic actors outside of the world-system, as embodied in the Ottoman 
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world-empire, on the states within it – such as Spain, France, and the Dutch Republic – this 
study contends that the theoretical body of World-Systems Analysis can indeed benefit from 
further refinement with regards to such interactions between purportedly self-contained 
world-systems and external world-empires. However, it is also recognised that the relationship 
between the Ottoman Empire and the early modern world-system is unique in that no other 
instance of external ‘impingement’ or influence on the functioning of the modern world-
system can be identified. One may certainly speculate that such interactions can only emerge 
in very specific, and limited, instances, such as when the internal structure of the (young) 
world-system is still rather weak and in the process of being consolidated, and when the 
world-empire in the external arena is also proximate to the emerging world-system – which 
the Ottoman Empire certainly was vis-à-vis the Mediterranean world.8 However, this 
nevertheless represents a grey area within World-Systems Analysis that merits further 
attention, and until such time, critics such as Zolberg are fully justified in their complaints 
regarding this matter. Fortunately, this study is not directly impacted by this particular 
concern. 
 
This brings us to the fourth and final major criticism of World-Systems Analysis – that it is 
characterised by structural determinism and lack of agency – whereby the broader structure 
of the modern world-system is seen as determining the characteristics of states, even 
internally, and whereby those states and the populations within them are unable to effect 
changes to the system as a whole, or to their state’s location within it. Clearly, this charge 
shares common features with that of reification, whereby the world-system is viewed as 
external to, and independent from, the workings of the societies it contains. As Bergesen 
(1984:366) points out, the main issue of contention when considering the question of 
structural determinism and lack of agency, can be summarised as the lack of attention paid 
to class relations in Wallerstein’s definition of capitalism in terms of its division of labour, as 
opposed to social relations of production – the latter being the more “traditional” Marxist 
definition. Skocpol (1994:59) too maintains that Wallerstein has ignored “the basic Marxist 
insight that the social relations of production and surplus appropriation [here within states 
in particular] are the sociological key to the functioning and development of any economic 
system.” Bergesen (1984:366-367) further elaborates on the importance on the focus on class 
relations, since changes in those relations “can produce a new mode of production,” and 
Wallerstein’s failure to take adequate stock of the processes of class formation and class 
struggle also accounts for his inability to explain satisfactorily the transition from feudalism 
to capitalism, as was mentioned earlier. 
At this point, it should be noted that these criticisms were again a response to 
Wallerstein’s first volume of The Modern World-System, and as was touched upon in the 
discussion of the charge of teleology, Garst (1985:475) contends that Wallerstein’s second 
volume has gone far to incorporate the internal class structures and political alliances of 
states, which in turn makes allowance for agency within the world-system. As was mentioned 
earlier, Wallerstein has achieved this by producing five independent political measures of 
state strength, which has also served to free World-Systems Analysis from charges that state 
strength is derived solely from location in the division of labour (i.e. structural determinism). 
These five measures of political strength are:  
 
                                                 
8 These insights were shared by Prof. P.J. McGowan in a discussion on the matter of Zolberg’s (1981) 
exception to Wallerstein’s neglect of the politico-military impact of the (external) Ottoman Empire on the 
development of the early modern world-system, and are hereby acknowledged. 
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the degree to which state policy can directly help owner-producers compete in the world market 
(mercantilism); the degree to which states can affect the ability of other states to compete (military 
power); the degree to which states can mobilize their resources to perform these competitive and 
military tasks at costs that do not eat up the profits (public finance); the degree to which states can 
create administrations that will permit the swift carrying out of tactical decisions (an effective 
bureaucracy); and the degree to which the political rules reflect a balance of interests among owner-
producers such that a working ‘hegemonic bloc’ … forms the stable underpinnings of such a state 
(Wallerstein, 1980:113). 
 
In response to his critics, including those mentioned above, Wallerstein (1980:113) 
contends that the last of these five measures, “the politics of the class struggle, is the key to 
the others.” As will be noted later in this chapter, Wallerstein’s conception of a hegemonic 
bloc is very closely related the ‘historic bloc’ utilised by Cox (1987:6), since both stem from 
Gramsci’s (1971) work on class structures and interests that form the underpinnings of states. 
By incorporating an explicit account of such historic or hegemonic blocs within states, Garst 
(1985:475) contends, Wallerstein managed to produce “in Volume II a richer and more 
subtle account of how state structures develop that meets … criticisms of Volume I.” In 
doing so, he redefined what constitutes a ‘strong’ or a ‘weak’ state, by giving thorough 
attention to “the cohesion of its dominant class or extent to which a ‘hegemonic bloc’ 
resided within it,” which in turn determined the ability of the state to provide its owner-
producers with “extramarket” assistance to compete in the world-economy (Garst, 1985:476). 
This line of argument also managed to free World-Systems Analysis from those charges of 
teleology that the world-economy requires strong states to be located in the core, and weak 
states to be in the periphery, in order to perpetuate its function, since state strength can no 
longer be confused with absolutism. For instance, Gourevitch (1978:424) clearly makes this 
connection since he regarded the Dutch Republic as a weak state in the seventeenth century 
due to the absence of an absolute monarchy such as that found in France or Austria. Now, 
given the role of the hegemonic bloc and the other four political measures of state strength, 
Wallerstein (1980:60) clarifies the roots of the Dutch Republic’s strength as stemming from 
the fact that it was “the only state in Europe with enough internal strength such that its need 
for mercantilist policies was minimal.”  
This also further supports Wallerstein (1980:113) position that “ultimately, of course, 
political and economic measures are linked reciprocally because productive efficiency makes 
possible the strengthening of the state and the strengthening of the state further reinforces 
efficiency through extramarket means,” and thereby, as Garst (1985:481) argues, Wallerstein 
demonstrates that state strength “is as much a function of economic as it is of political 
measures,” which in turns also helps to counter those charges of economism as discussed 
earlier. The additional refinements that stem from Wallerstein’s second volume furthermore 
help to meet Bergesen’s (1984:367) complaint that to account for the development of a core 
state, and the underdevelopment of a peripheral state, one must take into consideration the 
unique role played by “the historical evolution of its own class relations.” For instance, as 
Bergesen contends, “to understand seventeenth-century Spain, you have to examine its class 
relations,” and to “understand seventeenth-century colonial Mexico, you have to understand 
its class relations.”  
Having advanced World-Systems Analysis in this particular sense, by giving emphasis to 
the five independent political measures of state strength, Wallerstein has added to what 
Bergesen (1984:367-368) regards as one of its main strengths – that it “rightly emphasize[s] 
the global/periphery relation” since, for instance, “Aztec and Inca [indigenous] class struggle 
did not create plantations, haciendas, mines, large-scale ranches, and all the other 
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infrastructure of underdevelopment.” Rather, as World-System Analysis correctly posits, 
“without understanding relations with Spain or, for the colonial underdeveloped world in 
general, relations with the European core, one cannot understand the class struggle of 
underdevelopment” (emphasis added). Indeed, as Osei-Kwame and Taylor (1984:575) argue 
in their study of Ghanaian politics, “the main lesson to be drawn from the world-system 
approach is that it is futile to attempt to understand social change on a country-by-country 
basis; instead, each country must be analyzed as part of a wider entity, the unfolding world-
system that is the world-economy.” This ability of World-Systems Analysis to “transcend 
state-centric thinking” by taking the historical world-system, “rather than the state/society as 
the unit of scientific enquiry” is, for scholars such as Taylor (1988:259-260) and So and Chiu 
(1996:473), one of the key strengths of World-Systems Analysis. 
In the final instance, in order to further guard against charges of structural determinism 
and lack of agency, this study echoes Flint and Shelley’s (1996:498) belief that “the 
introduction of geographical context as an explanation for a spatial differentiation in the 
outcomes of overarching structures and mechanisms of the world-system alleviate some of 
Skocpol’s [and other critics’] … concerns.” In this way, Flint and Shelley posit that “social 
interaction with large structures is mediated and facilitated by place-specific institutions and 
circumstances.” Regard thus the introduction of the second independent variable of this 
study in chapter one. By including locational factors, forms of social organisation, and the 
level of capitalist economic development of individual states (in short, a material base), this 
study makes additional allowance for endogenous factors to play a larger role in accounting 
for the emergence of hegemony.  
In this discussion of four major criticisms of World-Systems Analysis, the focus has been 
placed not on providing an exhaustive critical discussion of all the possible points of 
contention, but rather, it was attempted to provide an overview of some of the main problem 
areas, while demonstrating that they do not preclude the use of this approach in the 
investigation of large-scale, long-term, social change (such as the ascent to hegemony). 
Indeed, it is apparent that many of the criticisms were aimed at the early work of Wallerstein, 
particularly in reference to his first volume of The Modern World-System. Not only has 
Wallerstein subsequently addressed many of these criticisms in his later work, this effort has 
also been recognised by other scholars, such as Garst, as leading to a substantial 
strengthening of World-Systems Analysis. However, since the debates of Wallerstein’s work, 
and World-Systems Analysis in general, that were sparked by the criticisms of scholars such 
as Skocpol, Gourevitch, Bergesen, Zolberg, and others, are still raging, and as Hall 
(1996:448) contends, “many puzzles [still] need solving,” they merit attention from all who 
would employ this approach.  
Indeed, as Hall (1996:448) argues, there is much “exciting work … [to be] done within a 
world-systems perspective” by any social scientist who, rather than complaining “about what 
world-systems analysis has not yet addressed … join[s] the work and fun of studying them 
from this perspective.” Even those critics such as Skocpol (1994:69) have recognised that 
“even the shortcomings of his [Wallerstein’s] effort … can be far more fruitful for the social 
sciences than many minute successes by others who attempt much less.” There is hardly a 
better way to conclude a discussion of the major criticisms of World-Systems Analysis than 
this. 
 
2.3.4 Other contributions 
Other authors have also made contributions to the understanding of the Great Power 
War/hegemony question, although they cannot be clearly classified as belonging to any 
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specific school or approach. As mentioned earlier, these contributions will be discussed 
separately here. 
 
2.3.4.1 Kennedy 
Paul Kennedy (1988), in his historical study of the rise and fall of the Great Powers over the 
last five centuries, makes several observations that can be applied to the investigation of 
Great Power War and hegemony. Kennedy’s first observation in this regard is that, in order 
to fully understand why some powers rose while others declined, one cannot look exclusively 
at military power (Kennedy, 1988:xv). Another crucial element to account for the success that 
some states have had during times of war is the efficient utilisation of the state’s productive 
economic resources during the conflict. As such, one cannot look at the conflict in isolation, 
and it is necessary to take note of the relative economic growth or decline that the state in 
question experienced before the war.  
Here, Kennedy’s argument overlaps with that of Gilpin (and Thucydides), in that a state’s 
relative strength never remains constant (Kennedy, 1988:xv). Different societies experience 
different rates of growth, and some have experienced more technological and organisational 
breakthroughs than others. The main driving force behind the rise of fall of all powers (since 
1500) can thus be summarised as the uneven rate of capitalist growth (for example economic 
and technological growth) between nations. This fits well with Thompson’s focus on leading 
sectors (and, indeed with Wallerstein), since Kennedy notes that steam power, for instance, 
was not equally beneficial to all states (Kennedy, 1988:xvi). A strong economy is thus needed 
before the conflict (Great Power War) even erupts, in order to carry a state through to victory 
and to sustain its war effort. In turn, a strong military is needed to protect this economic 
foundation. Thus, in Kennedy’s view (and in Wallerstein’s), economic predominance is the 
key to achieving military and political predominance. 
Kennedy (1988:xvi) remarks that, for states such as the Dutch Republic, Great Britain, and 
the United States, there exists a “very significant correlation over the longer term between 
productive and revenue-raising capacities on the one hand and military strength on the 
other.” Kennedy elaborates by arguing that states which could create an advanced system of 
banking and credit had a significant advantage over rivals that lacked an equivalent banking 
and credit system, due to the ever-spiralling costs associated with war (and especially with 
unlimited wars such as Great Power Wars) (Kennedy, 1988:xvii). Once more, the link 
between the arguments of Kennedy and Thompson regarding fiscal institutions is evident, 
while these also tie in well with Wallerstein’s emphasis on finance. 
In addition, Kennedy (1988:xvii) argues that geography (the locational factors mentioned 
in chapter one) also had a large impact on the options available to certain states, especially 
“flank” powers such as Britain and Russia. These states could simultaneously intervene and 
take part in affairs on the European continent, but could also turn their attention outward 
and expand onto the world stage or across Siberia. Naturally, other (Continental) European 
states also expanded globally, as was witnessed by the vast colonial possessions that France, 
for instance, held. However, no Continental state could compete on an equivalent level with 
the expansionary efforts of the British (and Russians – though their expansion into adjacent 
lands is perhaps not comparable to that of the British expansions overseas) and, for instance, 
the French often lost what possessions they had to the British.  
Kennedy’s historical study of the Great Powers thus reveals the extent to which long and 
expensive wars become “a test of the relative capacities of each coalition” (Kennedy, 
1988:xxiv). Thus, to summarise, the state (and the alliance) with the superior productive base 
and economic position wins in the end. It is also important to note that shifts in trade and 
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manufacturing output herald the rise of new Great Powers and the decline of the old, as was 
witnessed with the redistribution in the share of manufacturing output away from Europe 
(towards America) in the late nineteenth century (Kennedy, 1988:xxii). This economic shift 
was followed by a shift in relative military capabilities, which once again, shows the extent to 
which a powerful military rests upon the foundations of a powerful economy. 
 
2.3.4.2 Ropp 
Another historian who wrote about the occurrence of war in the modern world is Theodore 
Ropp (1962). Ropp makes several observations regarding warfare, which correlate with the 
findings of other authors. Firstly, Ropp (1962:13) comments on the increasing importance of 
technology in modern warfare. Due to the rapid pace of technological advancement, its 
impact on warfare, in Ropp’s view, is as important as soldiers or politicians. In fact, as Ropp 
observes, from relatively humble beginnings with the introduction of gunpowder, modern 
warfare has advanced to the point where it threatens to obliterate Western civilization. 
Indeed, as General Arnold, head of the US Army Air Forces during World War II remarked, 
destruction, as a consequence, has become “too cheap and easy” (quoted in Ropp, 1962:14). 
From these observations, it is possible to shed light on another aspect of the leading 
sectors, as identified by Thompson. Leading sectors not only benefit the country in which 
they are concentrated by generating economic growth and spin-offs for the economy as a 
whole, in some cases they actually prove decisive on the battlefield as well. One of these 
leading sectors is the production of motor vehicles. By the First World War, the United 
States was by far the dominant producer of motor vehicles (Thompson, 1988:143). 
Inevitably, the dominance that the US displayed in this leading sector was transferred as an 
advantage on the battlefield, as the US could out-produce its rivals in the construction of 
vehicles (including tanks) for the war (the emergence of assembly line production in the US 
will be discussed shortly). Leading sector dominance thus held direct benefits for the war 
effort of the country in which they were most concentrated. 
Ropp’s second observation regarding developments in warfare in the modern world 
concerns a recurring theme throughout this chapter, namely the command of the sea (Ropp, 
1962:60). As Ropp comments, sea transportation was the cheapest and fastest form of 
transportation in the early modern era, and it was also the only means by which to transport 
large, bulky goods. Those states that specialised in this form of transportation (such as the 
Dutch Republic), thus held a sizable advantage over their rivals, and could reap the 
economic benefits. The next logical step in this early development of the command of the 
sea was the construction of navies to protect these shipping interests, which explains why 
some states had both the means and the incentive to invest heavily in the development and 
construction of large fleets. Ropp, who also built upon the arguments of Alfred Mahan, 
identifies the main objective of this ‘command of the sea’ as the ability to move goods and 
men by sea and to deny this right to the enemy. The command of the sea is thus a marriage 
between commercial and military spheres. It should be noted that other authors have also 
contributed to the understanding of this early development of sea power, such as Hunt and 
Murray (1999) and Lane (1973). These authors reveal how Venice developed a sophisticated 
convoy system to protect especially those ships with valuable cargoes, which was made 
possible by technological innovations in the thirteenth century. This further supports the 
argument that commercial and military interests are intertwined upon the high seas, but 
since these earliest developments predate the emergence of the capitalist world-system, they 
will not be elaborated upon further here. 
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Finally, Ropp (1962:61) argues that only those states with comparatively developed 
political structures could assemble superior navies, since navies in general have a far greater 
dependence on technological development than do armies (since a ship is a machine after 
all), and as a result, navies are more expensive to both construct and maintain. Dehio’s 
argument that Continental powers were both more rigid in social and command structure 
and less open to new advances, compliments this argument, and provides another possible 
explanation as to why Continental powers were never able to compete on an equivalent level 
with insular powers on the high seas. 
  
2.3.4.3 Ormrod 
David Ormrod, in his work on the rise of commercial empires, follows in the tradition of 
Braudel (for instance, 1992) when he highlights the importance of city-states in the pre-
modern era (Ormrod, 2003:4). In this era, before the rise of nation-states, cities were at the 
heart of economic development and technological innovation. Despite the emphasis of some 
authors (such as Wallerstein) on the nation-state or core region (within the context of the 
world-system as a whole) in the modern era, Ormrod (and Braudel) argues that cities 
maintained their central role in the world-economy (Ormrod, 2003:5). However, only a few 
select cities have been able to play a dominant role in the world-economy. For Braudel, 
these cities constituted “high voltage urban economies,” which dominated their hinterlands 
(Ormrod, 2003:5). When tracing the rise and fall of these dominant cities, one makes an 
interesting discovery – they are always situated in the leading core state of the time and, in 
fact, constitute the heart of the hegemonic power. 
A telling pattern emerges when one identifies the succeeding leading cities in the world-
economy. At first, just before the dawn of the modern world at the end of the fifteenth 
century, Bruges and Venice occupied the position of leading cities (Ormrod, 2003:5). At this 
stage then, the early European world-economy had a clear division between a northern and a 
southern pole. However, as the modern world dawned, Antwerp took over this role of leading 
city, and the gravity of the European world-economy shifted to the northern zone. Just before 
the end of the sixteenth century however, this role once more shifted south, for the last time, 
to Genoa, which was unable to keep this position for long. Soon afterwards, the northern city 
of Amsterdam took over the role of leading city, just as the Dutch were beginning to play 
their hegemonic role. Later on, London became the leading city in the world-economy, but 
Braudel comments that by that time the nation-state and national economy were more 
significant (Ormrod, 2003:6).  
 
2.3.4.4 Ruttan 
In his study on the impact of war on economic growth, Vernon Ruttan (2006:vii) argues that 
many general purpose technologies can trace their roots back to defence-related institutions 
and technological development. Ruttan’s argument helps shed light on how war has helped 
certain states to achieve hegemony since, in his view, defence related procurement has had a 
clear impact on commercial technological development (Ruttan, 2006:viii). This reveals a 
further dimension of the leading sectors discussed earlier – in that leading sectors not only 
have implications during wartime, but that the development of defence-related technologies 
later has an impact on the growth of leading sectors. 
In support of his main argument, Ruttan (2006:3) mentions the impact that military 
procurement and weapon-making technology had as a source of knowledge for the industrial 
revolution. As an example, Ruttan cites the machine invented by John Wilkinson to bore 
through cast iron (used in the manufacture of cannons) to later assist in the construction of 
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condenser cylinders for steam engines. Furthermore, Ruttan makes the observation that the 
manufacturing process used in the production of guns in New England (which was known as 
the ‘American System of Manufacturing’) in the nineteenth century, would become the 
precursor to what later became known as the ‘Fordist’ system of mass production.  
As for the reason why military and defence-related procurement is such an important 
source of technological development, Ruttan (2006:16) postulates that war, or the threat of 
war, is necessary to encourage political will to mobilise sufficient resources (scientific, 
technical, and financial) to generate these new technologies. This once again highlights the 
need to investigate technological and other developments within a country before the start of 
the Great Power Wars that will be investigated in this study, since the foundations for 
success were often laid in previous years.  
 
2.3.4.5 Levy and Barbieri 
Although Jack Levy has been classified by Goldstein (1988:145) as belonging mainly to the 
realist tradition (although incorporating some elements from the long cycle school) there is a 
specific aspect of his work (together with Katherine Barbieri) which demands attention here 
– namely the phenomenon of states trading with their enemies during wartime. Levy and 
Barbieri (2000:1) make the point that there have been multiple occasions when states have 
continued trading with their enemies in wartime, which seems to contradict realist and 
liberal expectations that states would place economic considerations in secondary positions 
when compared to issues of security (realist), and that trade promotes peace (liberal). 
While Levy and Barbieri (2000:23) do not reach a satisfactory conclusion as to why this 
phenomenon takes place when established theories say that it should not, their work raises 
questions regarding the implications of trade during wartime, specifically in the context of 
this study, which concerns Great Power Wars. In fact, Levy and Barbieri (2000:2,7) provide 
examples where all three hegemons investigated in this study traded with their enemies, even 
during the very wars that saw them rise to hegemony. Perhaps then, this phenomenon can 
also help offer further insights as to how these states (as exemplified by the Dutch) managed 
to ascend to hegemony in the world-system, while their opponents did not. 
 
2.3.4.6 Cox9 
Although only a fleeting review, at best, can be provided here of the contributions made by 
Cox (1987) to the understanding of the Great Power War/hegemony question, his insights 
are nevertheless considered valuable, especially the manner in which they help to avoid 
concerns over structural determinism and agency, which, as discussed earlier in this chapter, 
have been directed at World-Systems Analysis. Cox (1987:ix,1) approaches the question of 
“power relations in societies and in world politics from the angle of the power relations in 
production” (as opposed to a global division of labour) since, in his view, “production 
generates the capacity to exercise power, but power determines the manner in which 
production takes place.” Production acquires this ability since it forms the basis of class 
differences, which includes differences in power (Cox, 1987:2). Meanwhile, the very nature 
of the state in which these classes operate is “defined by the class structure on which the 
state rests” (Cox, 1987:6).  
This class structure, which defines the tasks and limits of the state, is termed the ‘historic 
bloc’ in the tradition of Gramsci and, importantly, these national historic blocs, and the 
                                                 
9 This study will focus only on the work of Cox insofar as it contributes to the understanding of hegemonic 
ascent, and not for instance, to hegemonic behaviour after hegemony has been achieved. 
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production relations and classes that accompany them, do not operate in isolation, but are 
linked across state boundaries to each other, and to the world order (Cox, 1987:7). For Cox 
(1983:132) a “historic bloc cannot exist without a hegemonic social class,” and the 
consequence of the hegemony of a social class (in this study the capitalist class) is that “the 
state (in Gramsci’s enlarged concept) maintains cohesion and identity within the bloc 
through the propagation of a common culture.” Moreover, the institutions and ideologies 
sprouting from the hegemony of one social class “will not appear as those of a particular 
class, and will give some satisfaction to the subordinate groups while not undermining the 
leadership or vital interests of the hegemonic class” (Cox, 1983:133). 
When regarding the world order created by the links between these national historic blocs, 
Cox (1987:7) concludes that it is either hegemonic or nonhegemonic in structure. For Cox, 
the concept of ‘hegemony’ here is not restricted to the economic or military dominance of 
one core state, but rather, it can be understood as:  
 
dominance of a particular kind where the dominant state creates an order based ideologically on a 
broad measure of consent, functioning according to general principles that in fact ensure the 
continuing supremacy of the leading state or states and leading social classes but at time offer some 
measure or prospect of satisfaction to the less powerful (Cox, 1987:7). 
 
As Cox (1987:7) argues, in a hegemonic world order, not only do the “social classes of the 
dominant country find allies in classes within other countries,” thereby combining these 
historic blocs into global classes, but production itself becomes intertwined via the world 
economy into world systems of production. Cox (1987:7,109) identifies two such hegemonic 
world orders, one under British leadership – called the “coming of the liberal international 
economy” (1789-1873) – and one under American leadership – called the “neoliberal world 
order” (1945-). In contrast, in nonhegemonic world orders – such as the “era of rival 
imperialisms” (1873-1945) – these tendencies toward the establishment of a world society 
under the tutelage of the dominant state, and the internationalisation of states themselves, 
are reversed, and “states advance and protect the interests of particular national social classes 
and production organizations, using all the political, economic, and military means 
[including the waging of Great Power Wars] at their disposal as necessary” (Cox, 1987:7-
8,109). This nonhegemonic world order is thus much more turbulent than a hegemonic one, 
and during this phase “the interstate system reasserted itself so as to subordinate and control 
world-economy influences” (Cox, 1987:108). 
Despite the British and American hegemonic world orders identified by Cox, it will be 
maintained in this study that there was also a Dutch hegemonic world order (though 
perhaps less far-reaching since the world-system had not yet incorporated the majority of the 
globe). Indeed, Cox (1987:7) lists four identifying characteristics of a hegemonic world order: 
firstly, during such an order, “production in particular countries becomes connected 
through the mechanisms of a world economy and linked into world systems of production.” 
This was certainly the case during the height of Dutch hegemony during the seventeenth 
century, and as will be seen in the next chapter, production at the time was certainly 
connected through the mechanisms of a single world-economy, and linked into a world 
system of production, even if the ‘world’ being spoken of was limited primarily to Europe 
and the American periphery at the time. However, from the perspective of World-Systems 
Analysis, this single overarching world-economy has existed, without interruption, from the 
long sixteenth century.  
Secondly, Cox (1987:7) maintains that the “social classes of the dominant country [here 
the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century] find allies in classes within other countries.” 
 54 
Again, as the next chapter will show, particularly during the Thirty Years’ War, there was an 
influx of capital from outside the Dutch Republic given its better developed financial and 
banking systems, and its image as a haven for capital in an era of upheaval and war 
(including civil war in many European states). Indeed, as will be shown, foreign capitalists 
often not only invested their money in enterprises in the Dutch Republic, but moved there 
themselves given religious or other persecution or the ravages of war. In addition, Dutch 
merchants built up an extensive trade network based on partnerships with other merchants 
and traders, be they Italian, French, or from the Baltic territories. Of all states at the time, 
the Dutch had the strongest relationships with capitalists of other states, and this was 
certainly a central ingredient in their ascent.  
Thirdly, Cox (1987:7) argues that the “historic blocs underpinning particular states 
become connected through mutual interests and ideological perspectives of social classes in 
different countries, and global classes begin to form.” Bearing in mind that this was the early 
era of the capitalist world-economy, and later innovations in transport and communication 
were still centuries away, it can indeed be argued that this criterion was also satisfied (at least 
partially) during Dutch hegemony. The connections of mutual interest have been touched 
upon above, so what requires attention here is the formation of a global capitalist class. In 
the core of the world-economy of the time – the Dutch Republic, the Low Countries in 
general, and parts of northern France and England, where the first large-scale capitalists 
(albeit merchant capitalists) emerged, one may indeed speak about an early conception of a 
shared identify if one considers the movement of capital across political borders at the time, 
and the formation of trading relations between merchant capitalists. Although it is too early 
an era to speak of ideological perspectives of social classes, early links between capitalist 
historic blocs were forming, but given the constraints of transportation and communication 
in the seventeenth century, these were necessarily limited in nature.  
Fourthly, Cox (1987:7) posits that in a hegemonic world order, “an incipient world society 
grows up around the interstate system, and states themselves become internationalized in 
that their mechanisms and policies become adjusted to the rhythms of the world order.” 
From a world-systems perspective, the mechanisms and policies of states have necessarily 
been adjusted to the rhythms of the capitalist world-economy ever since its earliest 
emergence. Although it should again be emphasised that the era under investigation in this 
study is one in which the capitalist world-economy was still young, and restricted in its 
geographical scope, there is still clear cause to speak of states and enterprises becoming 
adjusted to the functioning of this world-economy, as the trade in bulk commodities 
discussed in the next chapter will show. For instance, changes in the price of grain produced 
in eastern Europe had far-reaching consequences for the states of the early modern world-
system, and these necessarily had to adjust their policies, since as Chase-Dunn and Grimes 
(1995:389) maintain, the “culturally different societies” of the world-system “are virtually 
linked together through the exchange of food and raw materials.” Although Cox’s 
conception of a hegemonic world order has been discussed only superficially here, the aim 
has been to show that from the perspective of World-Systems Analysis, one can indeed speak 
of a Dutch hegemonic world order, albeit one less pronounced than those of the British or 
Americans in later centuries. 
The main benefit of Cox’s ‘bottom up’ view of the world economy and the interstate 
system is that it avoids assigning disproportionate influence to exogenous, or market, forces 
in the shaping of state forms and structures by “mapping … production systems and historic 
blocs and [it] thereby [also] avoids reification of world systems” (Cox, 1987:358). The 
insights thus garnered, particularly with regards to the formation of historic or hegemonic 
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blocs, can therefore be incorporated into the discussion of the emergence of hegemony, as 
Wallerstein has indeed done in his second volume of The Modern World-System (as 
mentioned earlier), since this helps to recognise the role and importance of domestic 
production and class relations.  
Indeed, it should be recognised that this element of the class struggle has not at all been 
lost in Wallerstein’s work. Particularly, he views a working “hegemonic bloc” – the “degree 
to which the political rules reflect a balance of interests among owner-producers” – as the 
key to the four other political measures of state strength discussed earlier in this chapter, 
namely mercantilism, military power, public finance, and an effective bureaucracy 
(1980:113). These measures, and the role of the hegemonic bloc in advancing a state’s 
position in the world-economy, will certainly feature in the discussion in the next chapter. 
Thus, insofar as Cox’s contributions relate to the study of hegemony and the occurrence of 
Great Power War (and Wallerstein’s hegemonic blocs), they will also be incorporated, 
although a detailed discussion of the relations of production in the historic case study is 
beyond the scope of this study.10  
 
2.3.4.7 University of the West Indies 
The final contribution in this chapter comes from a document issued by the University of 
the West Indies (2002), where the subordination of poor countries to rich ones is discussed. 
The specific point of interest is one that was raised about the ‘brain drain’ that takes place as 
skilled and educated individuals move from poor to rich countries, deepening the 
dependence of the former on the latter. This raises a question of relevance to this study – if 
skilled workers and highly educated individuals migrate from the periphery to the core in 
search of a better quality of life (and of course more money), would such a trend not cause 
these same individuals to migrate more readily to the hegemonic state, since it can reward 
them best? Even skilled workers and intellectuals from other core countries would be 
attracted to the prosperity of the hegemonic state, especially if they face persecution and a 
restrictive intellectual environment at home (as Dehio argued was generally the case in 
Continental states). Such an influx of highly skilled and educated individuals would benefit 
an ascending hegemon by improving the quality of the labour force, and in the generation of 
new innovations. 
In order to best understand how a particular core country managed to ascend to 
hegemony, it thus makes sense to look at the state of its intellectual environment, and 
whether there was a noticeable trend of inward migration. Two points are consequently 
raised here, which beg further study – firstly, what was the general state of the intellectual 
environment within the state (during its ascent to hegemony), and secondly, can a trend of 
inward migration be noticed?  
The importance of the intellectual environment is made clear by Thompson’s argument 
regarding leading sectors within the hegemonic state’s economy. These leading sectors (and 
                                                 
10
 Indeed, the present study places its emphasis on the manner in which Great Power War aids the 
establishment of state hegemony in the world-system, and although it takes account of the existence of 
capitalist historic or hegemonic blocs within states, it does not investigate specifically how capitalist 
hegemonic blocs establish their dominance within states, for example the United Provinces. Although an 
issue of import, this is best ascribed to the purview of future studies. However, in the next chapter it will be 
argued that the presence of such a capitalist hegemonic bloc in the United Provinces, and the absence of 
one in Spain, played an important role in the success of the former in attaining hegemony in the interstate 
system. However, as mentioned, this study aims to primarily investigate the role played by Great Power 
War in creating the necessary conditions for state hegemony to emerge in the modern world-system. 
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the innovation that spawned them) could only have been located in an environment that was 
open and receptive to new ideas, and some scholars, such as Weber (1930), have in turn 
linked such environments to religion. If such a conducive environment was present (and in 
Weber’s view endowed with a ‘Protestant ethic’), it would make sense that more innovations 
would be concentrated within the particular state in question, since there would be a 
generally higher concentration of innovative new ideas and intellectual contributions there 
than in other core states. This in turn would have helped to give the state the edge over its 
rivals, allowing it to eventually ascend to hegemony. In this study, this constitutes an 
additional element to economic and military hegemony, namely intellectual hegemony.  
An example of this is provided by Modelski (1983:67), when he discusses the contributions 
of Hugo Grotius, the Dutch father of international law, to the doctrine of freedom of the 
seas. Several elements of interest to this study can be identified here, which support the 
claim of intellectual hegemony, namely the fact that Grotius’ work (the Mare Liberum) 
appeared in 1608 (just as the Dutch state was becoming hegemonic) and, more significantly, 
since Portugal at the time claimed exclusive rights over all trade routes to the East and over 
all the trade that was carried upon those routes, even though Grotius argued for freedom of 
the seas in European waters, his argument helped to spark an intellectual challenge to 
Portuguese claims, since if freedom of the seas was to be enjoyed in Europe, it could 
certainly be enjoyed further afield. As such, although Portugal was the first European state 
(and the first world leader in Modelski’s view) to establish oceanic trade with the East, its 
claims to exclusive rights over trade routes to the East were progressively questioned and 
eventually undermined, while the era of Dutch dominance on the high seas was being 
ushered in. It is also highly revealing to note that Grotius “had been counsel for the Dutch 
East India Company and had used the sovereignty of Asiatic states as an argument to reject 
Portuguese claims based on papal authority” (Cooper, 1970a:6). This is just one example 
however, and further ones will be discussed in the following chapter. 
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
The framework provided in this chapter has highlighted several elements in the relationship 
between Great Power War and hegemony, which will be investigated in the following 
chapter concerning Dutch ascent. This framework is primarily based upon the contributions 
of Thompson and Goldstein to the classification and organisation of the main debates 
around the issue of war and hegemony.  
From this, three research schools, or approaches, were identified, and the contributions of 
the main authors within each school were discussed. These were Gilpin and Mearsheimer, 
for the structural realism school; Dehio, Modelski, and Thompson, for the long cycle school; 
and Wallerstein for the world-economy school. This was followed by a discussion of the main 
criticisms of World-System Analysis, and a defence of its relevance for this study. Since this 
study can be classified as belonging to the world-economy school, it builds upon this school’s 
(and Wallerstein’s) main assumptions and understanding of hegemony and Great Power 
War, by using insights and ideas from the other two approaches. This is significant, since 
different schools, and different authors, have differing views on hegemony, and identify 
different states as having been hegemonic. Consequently, emphasis is also placed on 
different wars. Finally, the contributions of other authors and institutions that do not fit 
readily within any of the three identified schools were highlighted. 
This chapter consequently lays the foundation for the following case study, since it has 
identified several elements that would be relevant to expanding the understanding of how 
the Dutch state became hegemonic. The following chapter will proceed by providing a brief 
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overview of the history of the state in question (including its overall geopolitical position), 
and its main rival, as well as a general background to the Great Power War that preceded its 
ascent to hegemony. Then, the three economic domains identified by Wallerstein as being 
vital to hegemony, namely agro-industrial production, commerce, and finance, will be used 
as a framework to evaluate the states’ overall positions and the impact of the War. 
Importantly, it is necessary to note that additional elements, including those from the 
structural realism and long cycle schools, will also be incorporated, and placed within the 
framework created by the three economic domains. These include the role of leading sectors, 
intellectual developments, migration, and hegemonic blocs (under agro-industrial 
production), naval concentration (under commerce), and the role of the active zone in the 
World-Economy, leading cities, and public debt (under finance). 
Finally, the position of the states immediately after the War will be evaluated, including 
the way in which the interests of the victor were captured in the post-war settlement. The 
chapter will then conclude with an overview regarding the overall influence of the Great 
Power War on the ascent of the Dutch. Let us thus begin this undertaking by turning to the 
dawn of the modern world, and the roots of the conflict between Habsburg Spain and the 
Dutch Republic. 
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CHAPTER 3  
THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR AND THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The fate of the territories which can be said to comprise the Low Countries on the north-
western edge of the European continent became intertwined with that of the Habsburg 
dynasty, by virtue of marriage, in 1493 when Philip I of Habsburg, son of Mary of Burgundy 
and Maximilian of Austria, became ruler of both Austria and the Low Countries (The New 
Encyclopædia Britannica, 2007c:880). Philip I, together with his wife Joan (of Castile), 
inherited the Spanish crown in 1504, laying the foundation for the century that was to come. 
It was their son, Charles V, who would become master of the largest empire in Europe, when 
he became Duke of Burgundy in 1515, ruler of Spain in 1516, and Holy Roman Emperor 
and ruler of the Austrian Habsburg lands in 1519 (Kennedy, 1988:33). Charles’ territories 
would be complete when, in 1526, he claimed the crowns of both Hungary and Bohemia. 
 
Map 3.1. The Habsburg Lands, Inherited by Charles V in 1519 
 
Source: Kennedy (1988:34). 
 
At this stage, the Low Countries were collectively known as the ‘Seventeen Provinces of 
the Netherlands’11 and comprised the areas known today as Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg and some areas of northern France (Van Gelderen, 1993:ix). The people of this 
                                                 
11 In this study, the terms ‘Netherlands’ and ‘Low Countries’ refer to the entire group of seventeen 
provinces as they were before the revolt against Spain, while the ‘United Provinces’ and ‘Dutch Republic’ 
refer specifically to the seven northern provinces that ultimately gained independence in 1648. 
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“almost forgotten corner of Europe” where seen by some as a “peaceful tribe of fishermen 
and shepherds,” whose livelihoods where intimately tied to the sea (Schiller, 1853:351). Yet 
the Low Countries were relatively affluent when compared to their neighbours, which, as 
will be demonstrated, afforded them considerable freedom. Some even described these Low 
Countries as “one of the richest and most cultured parts of Europe,” although most of the 
affluence was historically concentrated in the southern provinces (Haley, 1972:10). 
The European world-economy had, as was discussed in the previous chapter, two poles 
until the sixteenth century – a southern, centred on Venice, and a northern, centred on 
Bruges (in the southern Netherlands) (Ormrod, 2003:5). With time, the balance shifted to 
the north however, and Antwerp replaced Bruges as the leading economic centre of Europe 
during the sixteenth century. As such, the Netherlands once again benefited from the 
confluence of merchants, who gathered at Antwerp to trade their wares.  
As for the land itself, the Low Countries were extremely poor in natural resources, and 
arable land was scarce and did not particularly support the production of cereals 
(Wallerstein, 1980:41; Haley, 1972:12). Consequently, the production of food was vastly 
insufficient, so much so that the Netherlands could not feed its population without 
supplementing their diet with imported food. This deficiency, and the general lack of 
resources, would however be turned into advantages, which directly contributed to the later 
success of the United Provinces (the northern Netherlands). 
Geographically, it is little wonder that some have labelled the Netherlands (in this 
instance the north) as the “republic of the waters” (Schiller, 1853:354).  The northern 
Netherlands in particular were crisscrossed by numerous rivers, marshes and lakes which, as 
Geyl (1961:16) remarks, would later present “splendid natural advantages for defence and 
offering above all the inestimable advantage of open communication with the sea.” Dehio 
(1962:51) also took note of this, and classified the Dutch as an “amphibious nation,” which 
in no small measure helped to account for their later success against the Spanish (and 
ultimately their ascent to hegemony).  
Furthermore, this “almost forgotten corner” of the European continent was superbly 
located with regards to the Baltic, the English Channel, the North Sea, Scandinavia, and the 
north and west of France (Haley, 1972:16). Additionally, the large rivers, such as the Rhine, 
which flowed through the Netherlands (again, particularly the north) were easily navigable 
and facilitated trade with the hinterland of Germany. As a whole, the Low Countries were 
situated in a prime location with regards to trade, and the inhabitants did not fail to use this 
to their advantage. In fact, trade became the primary driver behind Dutch success in the 
seventeenth century, and will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
While the Netherlands did enjoy prosperity, the sixteenth century undoubtedly belonged 
to Spain which, although not hegemonic, was the dominant land and naval power of its time 
(Wallerstein, 1980:64). Although some authors, particularly those of the long cycle school, 
consider Portugal to be the first world leader as a result of its early trading and exploration 
successes, this trade was primarily focussed on luxuries (such as spices) and not on food and 
raw materials (Goldstein, 1988:296). Since the modern world-system is characterised by 
large-scale and long-distance trade in basic commodities, and since Portugal was 
incorporated into Spain from 1580 until 1640, the focus of this study, and of the world-
economy approach in general, tends to fall on Spain as the first dominant power in the 
modern era (Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995:389; Kennedy, 1988:53). 
The dominant position of Spain in the sixteenth century cannot be separated from that of 
the Habsburg dynasty as a whole, since Spain only formed one part of a much larger empire 
(see Map 3.1 above). However, the size and diversity of the lands under Habsburg rule 
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necessitated, as a matter of practicality, their division into two parts in the 1520s – the west 
(Spain – Castile and Aragon, parts of Italy, and the Netherlands), and the east (Austria, 
Bohemia, and Hungary) (Kennedy, 1988:33). Charles V continued to rule over the west, but 
delegated the sovereignty and administration of the Austrian lands to his brother, Ferdinand. 
Consequently, the focus of this chapter will be restricted to the Spanish division of the 
Habsburg territory. 
The sheer size of the Habsburg lands caused considerable alarm in many parts of Europe, 
not least of all in France, which was now seemingly surrounded by the Habsburgs (Kennedy, 
1988:33). Furthermore, as Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V was viewed with suspicion by 
the German princes, who opposed the expansion of the Emperor’s powers in Germany. Even 
the popes, who ruled the Papal States in central Italy, were concerned by Habsburg 
expansion. These numerous antagonisms would later erupt with the spread of the 
Reformation in Europe, and would lead directly to the Thirty Years’ War. 
However, at this juncture it will suffice to say that Spain had accumulated vast wealth 
during the late fifteenth and much of the sixteenth centuries, primarily from taxes (especially 
in Castile), from its control over the two primary trading areas of Europe (the Netherlands 
and some of the Italian cities), and of course from the bullion flowing in from the mines in 
the Americas (Kennedy, 1988:43). Furthermore, the Spanish military, particularly the 
infantry (the tercio was the most effective unit on the battlefield until the middle of the 
Thirty Years’ War), constituted a formidable fighting force (Kennedy, 1988:44). The Spanish 
infantry was also the first to use guns in large numbers (Ropp, 1962:29). As for the Spanish 
navy, although Spain was never a naval or commercial power, the navy was itself formidable, 
and even after the defeat of the Armada in 1588 it remained stronger than both the English 
and Dutch navies combined, and as was discussed in chapter two, Spain had a monopoly of 
sea power between 1594 and 1597 (Dehio, 1962:30-31; Wallerstein, 1980:64).  
However, it should be noted at this stage that Spain did not consist of a single economic or 
administrative unit, but was rather made up of a “complex of kingdoms and territories: 
Castile, Aragon, Valencia, Catalonia, Navarre, Galicia and [later] Portugal” (Elliott, 
1970:437-438). Of these, Castile was dominant, and as Elliott (1970:438) notes:  
 
Spanish power in the later sixteenth century had primarily been Castilian power. Many of the best 
troops fighting for the king of Spain on foreign battle-fields were Castilian; the officials who governed 
the Spanish Empire were Castilian; the capital of the empire was located in the heart of Castile, and the 
crown’s revenues were provided largely by Castilian taxpayers and by the mines of an America which 
belonged to Castile by right of conquest. 
 
This fact was to have important consequences in the course of the Great Power War, since 
on the Spanish side Castile alone bore the greatest burden in terms of both blood and 
treasure, and this point will be returned to throughout the chapter. However, before 
undertaking an investigation of the Thirty Years’ War, it should be noted that Spain was the 
pre-eminent power in Europe in the sixteenth century, and came dangerously close to 
establishing a “world monarchy” (Kennedy, 1988:35). Given this, it would have been hard, if 
not impossible, to predict the successful rise to hegemony of the comparatively tiny United 
Provinces. 
 
3.2 THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR AS HEGEMONIC WAR 
As stated previously, authors such as Wallerstein (2000a:258) consider the Thirty Years’ War 
(1618-1648) to be the hegemonic (or Great Power) war of the seventeenth century, as it was 
during this conflict that Dutch interests triumphed and the Dutch state became hegemonic. 
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However, as will be argued in this chapter, from the Dutch vantage point the Thirty Years’ 
War merely constituted a subset of a much longer Eighty Years’ War (1568-1648), during 
which the Dutch fought for and achieved independence from Spain. Thus, in order to fully 
understand Dutch ascent, one must take the Eighty Years’ War into account, and attempt to 
place the Thirty Years’ War within this broader framework. 
To understand the roots of the revolt that took place in the then Spanish Netherlands 
during the second half of the sixteenth century, one must take into account the 
particularities of politics in the Low Countries. The Netherlands had historically enjoyed a 
high degree of liberty, due to the protection offered to them by a complex set of privileges, 
including the 1477 Grand Privilege (Van Gelderen, 1993:xiii-xiv). These privileges included 
charters acquired by the various cities, nobility, guilds and so on, within the Netherlands, 
from their various rulers since the end of the Middle Ages. These privileges provided the 
Netherlands with protection from corrupt rule, and granted the inhabitants a voice in 
decision-making processes. Furthermore, the 1477 Grand Privilege contained a clause of 
disobedience, which stated that if the ruling prince violated the privileges assigned to the 
Netherlands, his subjects would have the right to disobey him until he again respected their 
traditions. This clause in particular would have significant ramifications upon the political 
development of the United Provinces, as will be demonstrated below.  
The Netherlands were granted such far-reaching privileges since, as Schiller (1853:384) 
points out, the wealth of the Netherlands meant that they were important contributors to the 
budget of the Holy Roman Empire (of which they formed part). In fact, the Netherlands 
were to contribute “twice as much as an electoral prince; in the case of a Turkish war three 
times as much” (Schiller, 1853:384). In return for this increased contribution the 
Netherlands were to enjoy the protection of the Empire, and the privileges which had been 
granted to them by their rulers were not to be infringed upon in any way. Unfortunately, 
Charles V and his heir, Philip II, did not comply with this stipulation, which directly led to 
the revolt of the Netherlands against Spanish rule. 
Another process which was to have far-reaching consequences was of course the 
Reformation sweeping across Europe during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In the 
Netherlands, this took the form of the spread of Calvinism during the sixteenth century 
(Schiller, 1853:381). Ironically, the wealth of the Netherlands had a hand in this 
phenomenon as well, since Calvinism was first introduced there by Protestant merchants 
gathering at Amsterdam and Antwerp. Schiller (1853:380) argues that, for various reasons, 
Protestantism was able to spread readily in the Low Countries because “the Roman Catholic 
religion will, on the whole, be found more adapted to a nation of artists, the Protestant more 
fitted to a nation of merchants.” This argument was later reflected by Weber (1930) as well, 
and will be touched upon at various points in this chapter. This spread of Calvinism was 
especially rapid in the northern provinces of the Netherlands, and laid the foundation for 
one of the most bitterly contested points in the struggle between the Netherlands and Spain 
– religious freedom. As Schiller (1853:380) contends: “Nothing is more natural, than the 
transition from civil liberty to religious freedom.” The Netherlands already enjoyed 
substantial civil liberties (contained in their privileges), and when Charles V, and especially 
Philip II, tried to root out the ‘heretical’ doctrine of Calvinism, they encountered significant 
resistance (Van Gelderen, 1993:xi).  
In order to understand why the Spanish (and Hapsburg) monarchy so strongly supported 
Catholicism, Schiller (1853:392) suggests that Charles V and Philip II were “zealous for 
religion, because religion promoted [their] objects.” Furthermore, Spanish monarchs had no 
alternative but to adhere to orthodox Catholicism, since any hint of defection would 
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ultimately have cost that monarch the Spanish crown (Schiller, 1853:4). Religion was thus 
set to become one of the core elements of the Eighty and Thirty Years’ Wars, and the lack of 
moderation on both sides would contribute to make the conflict all the more bitter. 
Ultimately, the roots of the Eighty Years’ War can be traced back to the abdication of the 
Habsburg Emperor Charles V, in favour of his son Philip II in October 1555 (Van Gelderen, 
1993:vii). Schiller (1853:367,377,378) argues that Charles tried during his reign to 
undermine the constitution of the Netherlands, by imposing new taxes without the approval 
of the States (the nobility, clergy, and municipalities of the individual provinces), and by 
introducing foreign troops to the Netherlands, and that these infringements awoke “violent 
outbreaks of republican spirit.” Charles also considered introducing the Spanish Inquisition 
to the Netherlands, but even the possibility of this reduced commerce in the Netherlands, 
and particularly in the leading city of the time Antwerp, to a “standstill” (Schiller, 
1853:383). Since Charles V depended upon the wealth generated in the Netherlands, he was 
tempered in these ambitions, and reduced the appointed Inquisitor to the level of Spiritual 
Judge.  
Despite this apparent moderation, it has been estimated that 50,000 inhabitants of the 
Netherlands were executed for religious reasons during the reign of Charles V (Schiller, 
1853:384). It thus becomes understandable that the inhabitants of the Low Countries would 
begin to contemplate rebelling against a monarch who so readily violated their privileges. 
However, Schiller (1853:384-385) asserts that a full rebellion did not break out under the 
rule of Charles, due to the fact that, as part of the Habsburg Empire, the Netherlands 
enjoyed substantial benefits, including commercial advantages. For one, the Netherlands 
were able to trade more widely than ever before, and secured numerous commercial treaties 
with foreign powers in the name of Charles. In addition, Charles had been born in the 
Netherlands, spoke the language, and even followed the local customs in his private life, for 
which he was often viewed with contempt by Spanish hidalgos (noblemen), who proclaimed 
in a popular saying that “I swear to God I am as noble as the king and more so as he is half 
Flemish” (Cooper, 1970a:4). As Schiller (1853:385) summarises, these manners won Charles 
sufficient support in the Netherlands: 
 
He spoke much, and courteously with them; his deportment was engaging, his discourse obliging. These 
simple artifices won for him their love, and while his armies trod down their corn-fields, while his 
rapacious imposts diminished their property, while his governors oppressed, his executioners 
slaughtered, he secured their hearts with a friendly demeanour. 
 
Unfortunately, Charles never managed to transmit this demeanour to his son and heir, 
Philip II. In contrast to his father, Philip was Spanish in upbringing, and possessed a 
“haughty gravity” which led him to despise the privileges of the Netherlands as obstacles to 
his will (Schiller, 1853:386). In many respects, this haughty gravity was symptomatic of a 
deep disdain felt by Spaniards in general to those of other religions and races, such as those 
with Jewish or Moorish blood, and of course the Calvinist Dutchmen, and this attitude was 
expressed in another popular saying of the time, “Let us acknowledge God’s grace in making 
us men, not beasts, Christians, not Moors, Spaniards, not men of another nation” (Cooper, 
1970a:4). Indeed, no sooner had Philip assumed the role of ruler than his troubles with the 
Netherlands began. Van Gelderen (1993:x-xi) argues that there were three main sources of 
conflict between Philip and the States in the Netherlands, namely the levying of new taxes 
without the consent of the States, the reorganisation of the Catholic Church in the Low 
Countries, and the increasingly harsh repression of “Protestant heretics.” 
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As already mentioned, no taxes were to be levied without the consent of the States, who 
maintained that all decisions of note (including those concerning taxation, foreign affairs, 
and legal issues) had to carry their approval (Van Gelderen, 1993:x). Philip however, saw the 
power of the States (and the States General – the assembly of delegates from the provincial 
States) as a direct threat to his authority in the Low Countries.  
Furthermore, with the reorganisation of the Catholic Church, Philip gained the right to 
appoint bishops himself, and since bishops would gain membership in the States, this would 
give him a very direct influence over decision-making there. Lastly, his renewed and harsh 
repression of heretics alienated much of the population of the Low Countries, even 
Catholics, who came to despise the cruelty and inhumanity with which the persecution was 
carried out. This religious persecution inevitably infringed on the autonomy and privileges of 
the States, while it threatened commercial relations with other Protestant powers (Van 
Gelderen, 1993:xii). The reign of Philip II thus witnessed the outbreak of full revolt in the 
Netherlands, which would lead to the Eighty Years’ War, and ultimately, Dutch 
preponderance in Europe. 
One of the key figures on the Dutch side during the rebellion was William of Nassau, 
Prince of Orange, who due to his inheritance of the principality of Orange in 1544, became 
one of the foremost nobles in the Netherlands (Van Gelderen, 1993:xi). Like many of the 
other nobles in the Netherlands, William had his own political ambitions, which were 
increasingly frustrated under the rule of Philip II. The nobles particularly resented Philip’s 
intrusion on their power, and the harsh persecution of Protestants, on legal, political, and 
humanitarian grounds. The renewed vigour with which the Inquisition was imposed upon 
the Low Countries was also considered by the towns as a grave threat to their autonomy, and 
opposition to Spanish rule mounted. Schiller (1853:352) poignantly describes the effect that 
these intrusions had on the population at large: 
 
The severe rod of despotism was held suspended over them; an arbitrary power threatened to tear away 
the foundation of their happiness; the guardian of their laws became their tyrant. … An unparalleled 
tyranny assailed both property and life. The despairing citizens, to whom the choice of death was all 
that was left, chose the nobler on the battle-field. … In a moment, the rage of rebellion seized the most 
distant provinces … 
 
At the same time that Spanish rule became more oppressive, there occurred a 
radicalisation among the Calvinist Protestants, who responded to Spanish rule with riots and 
demonstrations (Van Gelderen, 1993:xii). Concurrently, many of those imprisoned by the 
Spanish for heresy were freed by the Protestant dissenters, and Spanish rule in the Low 
Countries began to break down. In response, Philip II (in 1567) dispatched the Duke of 
Alba to lead the Spanish forces in an attempt to restore order, and the Protestant forces 
suffered numerous defeats. William of Nassau, who had become one of the leaders of the 
rebellion, fled into exile, brining to a close the first phase of the Dutch revolt (Van Gelderen, 
1993:xiii). 
Throughout the revolt, the privileges in general, and the 1477 clause of disobedience in 
particular, were used as justification for the uprising (Van Gelderen, 1993:xv). Although the 
Spanish managed to crush much of the rebellion during this first phase of the conflict, they 
could not manage to eliminate the discontent felt by the populace regarding the violation of 
their laws, and it was not long before William attempted to invade the Netherlands with a 
force of his own, in 1568. This date is also the one traditionally given for the start of the 
Eighty Years’ War, although William suffered repeated setbacks, and his invasion was 
thwarted. The Netherlands revolt was thus considered to be a struggle primarily for liberty, 
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and not religion, although religious sentiments certainly contributed to the revolt (Van 
Gelderen, 1993:xviii). 
The major turning point in the revolt came on April 1, 1572 when the Sea Beggars, the 
‘naval forces’ of Orange, mostly consisting of “corsairs, and a marine collected out of 
piratical vessels” captured the town of Brill in Holland (Van Gelderen, 1993:xviii; Schiller, 
1853:353). Thereafter, the centre of the revolt shifted irrevocably to the provinces of Holland 
and Zeeland, where the rebel forces were able to make a stand, protected by the rivers, lakes, 
dykes, and marshes, and from where they could began to harass the commerce and military 
forces of Spain, such as when the Sea Beggars closed off the Scheldt river to Spanish 
shipping in 1572-3, thereby depriving Antwerp of its access to the sea (Parker, 1975:57). 
Simultaneously, the Duke of Alba’s campaign began to lose its momentum, due to a 
shortage of money (and the subsequent mutinies of Spanish troops), and the increased 
resistance offered by a growing number of towns due to Spanish brutality. 
By 1575 the provinces of Holland and Zeeland began contemplating the possibility of 
renouncing Philip II once and for all, but the death of the Duke of Alba introduced a new 
dynamic to the conflict (Van Gelderen, 1993:xix). Some of the provinces, particularly the 
southern ones, feared the rising power of William and started to press for a settlement, which 
would in essence see a return to the status quo before Philip II began his reign (Van 
Gelderen, 1993:xxi). However, the spirit of rebellion had progressed far enough in the north 
for the desire to arise for complete freedom from both Spain and Catholicism. A division 
thus began to form between the south and the north, which would ultimately lead to the 
break-up of the Netherlands. 
Briefly, what followed after Philip II appointed Alexander Farnese as Governor of the 
Netherlands was the signing of a treaty among southern provinces, known as the Union of 
Arras, whereby these provinces would reaffirm their loyalty to Spain (Van Gelderen, 
1993:xxii). The northern provinces responded in 1579 by concluding the Union of Utrecht 
among themselves, which was to become “the only legal foundation, the constitution, as it 
was termed, of the Republic of the north” (Boogman, quoted in Van Gelderen, 1993:xxii).  
After much campaigning on both sides, and several disastrous attempts by the United 
Provinces to secure for themselves a new monarch (including the Duke of Anjou and the 
Earl of Leicester), the north slowly gained more confidence in their new republican form of 
government, and successfully resisted Spanish encroachment until the signing of the Twelve 
Year Truce in 1609 (Geyl, 1961:13; Van Gelderen, 1993:xxxii). Spain’s strength had been 
divided by its support of Catholic forces in France and Germany, the incorporation of 
Portugal, and the suppression of the revolt of the Moors in Grenada, and consequently the 
Spanish forces in the Low Countries were unable to conquer the rebellious provinces of the 
north (Schiller, 1853:354). In addition, by this stage Spain was utterly exhausted, and despite 
its enormous wealth of the sixteenth century, had suffered repeated bankruptcies, as well as 
declining imports of American gold and silver, and was “unsettled by the expenses of 
grandiose politics, increasingly unstable, as though the system was rotting at the core” 
(Spooner, 1970:79,81).  
Of course, Spain’s decline only formed a part of a much larger shift in the “balance of 
economic affairs” away from the Mediterranean to the “more progressive economies of the 
north” (Spooner, 1970:84). However, for the Dutch the Truce ultimately signalled the 
solidification of the north/south split, and the de facto recognition of their independent 
status (Geyl, 1961:13). This in itself signalled a significant triumph for the rebellious north, 
even though the war with Spain was far from over. However, as Elliott (1970:460-461) argues, 
the crippled finances of Spain and Castile (the Spanish kingdom on which Spanish power, 
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including economic power, predominantly rested), precluded the further waging of vigorous 
warfare against the Dutch and, as will be discussed later, after the Truce expired, “the 
overwhelming problems of war and finance came to dominate every aspect of the [Spanish] 
nation’s life.” 
 
At this point, it becomes necessary to join the struggle of the Dutch with that of the Thirty 
Years’ War and to provide, however briefly, an overview of that conflict. Steinberg (1966:v) 
maintains that the label ‘Thirty Years’ War’ is, in fact, misleading. The reason for this is that 
it presents a “fictitious unity” to the events which took place in Europe, since the conflict 
was never restricted to Germany, and it proliferated rather than escalated. In addition, there 
was no ‘Germany’ to speak of at the time, and the territory today known as Germany 
consisted of numerous independent “patched-up relics of the medieval Empire” (Steinberg, 
1966:19). Although Steinberg (1966:1) admits that the “Thirty Years’ War” label is indeed a 
convenient one, he thus continues to argue that it is but a “figment of retrospective 
imagination.” With this in mind, he attempts to provide a reinterpretation of the nature of 
the war(s) which plagued Europe at the time. 
Traditionally, the Thirty Years’ War is regarded as a largely religious conflict among 
German princes, which commenced with the Bohemian Revolt of 1618, and concluded with 
the peace of Westphalia in 1648 (Steinberg, 1966:1). Furthermore, a central aspect of this 
interpretation of events is the utter devastation which it wrought in Germany, leaving it a 
“depopulated, devastated and impoverished country” (Steinberg, 1966:1). Although it is 
inescapable that religion was intimately tied to the conflict, Steinberg (1966:2) sheds 
additional light on the conflict when he describes it as a “larger struggle for European 
[political] hegemony between Bourbon [France] and Habsburg.” In addition to this larger 
political conflict, which lasted from 1635 to 1659, ideological and religious conflicts took 
place. Furthermore, at various times, the conflict involved other European powers such as 
Sweden, Denmark, Poland, Italy, Russia, Hungary and England (Rabb, 1964:vii). In all, the 
Thirty Years’ War was a complex set of intertwined conflicts, which ravaged some parts of 
Europe, while leaving others relatively untouched.  
Steinberg (1966:2) makes the claim that the Thirty Years’ War was not as devastating as 
often believed, due to the shortages of money and supplies, and the small size of the armies 
involved. Yet, some areas did suffer as a result of the war, especially the open countryside and 
its inhabitants, as well as a few key cities. Furthermore, Steinberg (1966:104-106) asserts that 
much of the change in population figures at the time can also be ascribed to migrations and 
epidemics. In addition, some areas profited directly by the war, including those cities 
producing rifles and small arms, and herein also lies part of the Dutch success in the war. 
With regards to Germany, Steinberg (1966:3) makes the bold assessment that it was neither 
better nor worse off in 1648 than in 1618, and that in essence, it was simply different. 
For the purposes of this study it would therefore not be possible to recount in detail all of 
the features and events of the Thirty Years’ War and, consequently, only a few main points 
will be raised, especially insofar as the Dutch were concerned. Although Rabb (1964:vii) also 
warns against the inadequacy of applying a “German-centred view” to the events taking 
place in Europe in the first half of the seventeenth century, some light should be shed on 
events taking place in Germany. The Reformation had resulted in a great deal of conflict in 
the German part of the Holy Roman Empire, until the Augsburg Diet of 1555 attempted to 
settle the matter by recognising (Lutheran) princes, primarily in the north, and by the 
acceptance of the principle of ‘cuius regio eius religio’ – which allowed the prince of the 
territory in question to “impose his religion on his subjects” (Steinberg, 1966:22-23). 
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However, for various reasons, this settlement proved insufficient, and the antagonisms 
between the German Princes persisted until brought to the fore in the Thirty Years’ War. 
As Steinberg (1966:19) asserts however, it was not only religious considerations which 
fuelled the conflicts in Germany, but also the rivalries between the electoral and lesser 
princes, between the princes and the Emperor, and between the princes and the 
representative Estates. These conflicts were then in turn exacerbated by the religious issues.  
While keeping the numerous conflicts taking place in Europe in mind, the Dutch 
position during the Thirty Years’ War becomes clearer. At the outbreak of the Thirty Years’ 
War in 1618, the Dutch were already fifty years into their war with Spain, although the 
Truce signed in 1609 did present them with some respite and, as Elliott (1970:458-459) 
points out, the Dutch made good use of the cessation in hostilities by making inroads into 
Spanish and Portuguese trade preserves overseas, and Dutch traders did brisk business with 
the Iberian Peninsula as well. However, as Geyl (1961:13) reminds, the Spanish had not 
given up hope of defeating the rebels and recapturing the north. The Truce itself was 
however not welcomed by all in the United Provinces, since it was feared that signing a truce 
would resemble weakness on their part, and that it would interfere with the setting up of the 
Dutch West India Company, which was to raid Spanish shipping and colonies in the West 
Indies (Geyl, 1961:14). In fact, Geyl (1961:13) asserts that the Dutch managed “not only to 
survive against mighty Spain, but to thrive upon war” – the very argument proposed in this 
chapter concerning Dutch agro-industrial, commercial, and financial advantages.  
Once the Twelve Year Truce expired in 1621, the Spanish set for themselves the goal of 
capturing the Rhine, in order to facilitate the movement of its troops, supplies, and money to 
aid the war effort against the Dutch (Wedgwood, 1964:13). One of the biggest challenges 
faced by the Spanish in their war against the Dutch was the long routes by which their troops 
had to travel from Spain (see Map 3.2). Due to the antagonism with the French, the Spanish 
could only move their troops along the ‘Spanish Road’ – by land, over the Alpine passes from 
northern Italy, and then on to the Netherlands. The sea-routes from Spain to the 
Netherlands were endangered by French, English, and of course Dutch ships, which could 
easily intercept and cut off Spanish reinforcements (Steinberg, 1966:12). However, due to 
these logistical problems, and the entrance of other European powers into the conflict, the 
Spanish ultimately faltered in their quest to retake the United Provinces. 
In essence, two blocs can be identified during the Thirty Years’ War – Austria and Spain 
(along with absorbed Portugal) in the Habsburg camp, and the United Provinces, France, 
Sweden, and England in the opposing camp (Goldstein, 1988:309). Although much of the 
fighting took place in Germany, it was certainly not restricted to German lands, and can be 
considered the first truly ‘global’ or world war, with the conflict spreading as far a field as the 
west coast of Africa, the Caribbean and Brazil, the East Indies, and the Indian Ocean (see 
Map 3.3) (Geyl, 1961:188-191; Parker, 1975:57). In these far-flung fields of battle the Dutch 
were able to use their growing naval capabilities to challenge Spanish (and Portuguese) 
positions, especially with regards to the spice trade originating in the east, and the treasure 
fleets coming from the west.  
Within the bloc opposing the Habsburgs during the Thirty Years’ War, the Dutch can be 
considered the leaders (Goldstein, 1988:312). Not only did they subsidise many of their 
allies’ war efforts, they actively sought to expand the anti-Habsburg camp, eventually creating 
the Hague Coalition (1625), consisting of themselves, England, Denmark (later replaced by 
Sweden), Norway, and others. The participation of France which, although a Catholic 
power, was firmly opposed to Spain, also proved crucial (Goldstein, 1988:309).  
 
 67 
Map 3.2. The Movement of Spanish Troops to the Netherlands during the Thirty Years’ War 
 
Source: Parker (1971:51). Reprinted in Goldstein (1988:308). 
 
Map 3.3. The Worldwide Conflicts Taking Place During the Thirty Years’ War 
 
Source: Parker and Smith (1978:5). Reprinted in Goldstein (1988:310). 
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This French participation in the Thirty Years’ War was indeed particularly significant, and 
they made a major contribution to the defeat of the Habsburgs (The New Encyclopædia 
Britannica, 2007b:656). Although the war itself had become a drawn-out affair with each 
bloc witnessing the rise and fall of its fortunes, two key battles – those at Jankov and 
Allerheim (both 1645), managed to cripple the Habsburg side beyond all hope of attaining a 
favourable victory. Negotiations to bring an end to the conflict began as early as 1643, but 
were only concluded with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 (although this did not yet end the 
Franco-Spanish War). Particularly significant was the signing of a peace treaty at Münster, 
on January 30, 1648 between the Spanish and the United Provinces, bringing to a close 
eighty years of fighting. At Münster, the Spanish agreed to recognise the Dutch as an 
independent power, granting permanence to the split between the northern and southern 
Netherlands. The implications of the settlement reached at Westphalia will be discussed 
separately later in this chapter. 
For the Spanish, the result of the war against the Dutch was devastating. As Steinberg 
(1966:10) asserts, by the conclusion of the Eighty Years’ War, “the commercial and maritime 
preponderance of Spain had passed to the Dutch Republic which had also become a leading 
colonial power.” In order to understand how this occurred, the next section will consider the 
advances of the Dutch in agro-industrial production, commerce, and finance during the war, 
juxtaposed with Spanish developments in these spheres. 
 
3.3 DUTCH ASCENT ACCORDING TO THE WORLD-ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE 
As discussed in the previous chapters, intimately tied to the world-economy school’s 
understanding of hegemony are the economic domains of agro-industrial production, 
commerce, and finance (Wallerstein, 2000a:255). For any particular state to be considered 
hegemonic, it must have attained an advantage over its core rivals in each of these domains 
simultaneously. Thus, in order to highlight the ascent of the United Provinces during the 
Eighty Years’ (and by implication, the Thirty Years’) War, each of these domains will be 
investigated in turn. 
 
3.3.1 The agro-industrial domain 
As Wallerstein (2000a:257) argues, the domain of agro-industrial production is the first in 
which the rising hegemon gains its edge. The (leading) industries of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries were primarily those of shipbuilding and textiles, although mineral 
extraction and other industries such as sugar refining were also important (Wallerstein, 
1980:16). These industries can be combined with agriculture and fishing in order to 
represent the most important productive economic activities of the age. Thus, in order to 
locate the United Provinces’ rise in the agro-industrial domain as a whole, it is necessary to 
consider their standing with regards to these economic activities. 
At first, the attainment of predominance in agro-industrial production by the United 
Provinces may seem unlikely, after all Haley (1972:12) remarks that the country was vastly 
deficient in natural resources – a key ingredient required in especially industrial production. 
Yet, in many ways this deficiency paved the way for the true engine of Dutch economic 
growth – overseas trade (Geyl, 1961:158). However, the full scope of Dutch commerce and 
trade will not be discussed here, and will instead be covered separately in the following 
section. 
Appropriately for an ‘amphibious’ nation – as Dehio (1962:51) labels the United 
Provinces – the productive edge of the Dutch began on the water, in what Wallerstein 
(1980:39) calls the “oldest form of food production,” namely gathering. Specifically, the 
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Dutch became adept at the gathering of fish, following the development of a specialised 
fishing boat, called the haringbuis (buss), used in the fishing of herring (Haley, 1972:14). 
The very reason for Dutch fishing boat advances can be reduced to geography. As Haley 
(1972:14) argues, the low-lying land of particularly Holland and Zeeland was intersected by 
numerous waterways, lakes, and marshes. This facilitated travel and trade by boat, since 
many areas were more easily reached on water than by horses on land. The deficiencies in 
agricultural food production were thus most readily ameliorated by fishing. The movement 
of large shoals of herring from the Baltic to the North Sea proved to be a rich source of food 
when suitable methods for salting and curing the fish were developed, along with the busses, 
in the fourteenth century. 
As Wallerstein (1980:39) notes, this herring fishing industry became the “Dutch Gold 
Mine.” The reasons for the enormous advantages of the Dutch in herring fishing lay in the 
design of the busses, which were large, decked ships which carried salt on board (Haley, 
1972:15). The busses would remain at sea for long periods, waiting for the biggest catches, 
and would transfer their cargo of barrelled fish to smaller ships, which would return to port 
while the busses continued to fish. This method of fishing proved to be very efficient and 
conferred to the Dutch a major advantage over their rivals. 
As a consequence of their large-scale fishing operations, the Dutch were not as vulnerable 
as many of their contemporaries to the scourge of famine (Haley, 1972:15-16). This was 
possible despite the lack of large areas of arable land, and generated considerable envy from 
other nations, especially the English, in whose waters the Dutch regularly fished. When 
combined with large-scale whaling operations and cod fishing, these fishing operations were 
said to have been as “lucrative as the mines of Peru” (Haley, 1972:16). Much of the herring 
catch was exported to the Baltic and southern Europe, and was instrumental in the growth of 
Dutch overseas trade. The Dutch also began setting up trade routes to sources of high 
quality salt, such as France and Portugal. The importance of fishing, and the fishing 
industry, to the prosperity of the United Provinces can consequently not be underestimated. 
When turning to agriculture, the Dutch were able to use their comparatively poor soils to 
effectively grow industrial crops, including hops, flax, and hemp, thereby turning what 
initially appeared to be a disadvantage into a strong advantage (Wallerstein, 1980:41). The 
use of tools and heavy fertilization facilitated the intensive cultivation of industrial crops, 
and the fact that the Dutch were able to import cereals such as grain for domestic 
consumption allowed them to specialise further in the production of these crops. The trend 
of urbanisation in the United Provinces during the seventeenth century provided another 
stimulus for the practice of intensive agriculture, while the process of industrial development 
under way provided a strong boost to the development of new agricultural techniques. 
Furthermore, the abundance of capital allowed the Dutch to reinvest in agriculture, and to 
undertake various expensive land reclamation projects, which in turn helped to expand the 
limited area available for cultivation (Kossmann, 1970:368). 
Haley (1972:48) also remarks that Dutch cattle were “among the best in Europe” and that 
dairy products were plentiful. Furthermore, the growing population stimulated what Haley 
calls the “growth of market gardening,” and he makes the claim that the Dutch consumed 
more vegetables than any other population in Europe at the time. In fact, Dutch agriculture 
became so developed that Wallerstein (1980:42) asserts that, “the gap grew wider as the 
Dutch became ever more efficient and most of the rest of Europe stood relatively still in 
agricultural techniques.” 
In contrast to the Dutch Republic, agriculture in the Spanish Netherlands, and in Spain 
itself, did not fare as well. For instance, in the late sixteenth century, Flanders and Brabant, 
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the “ancient heart of the Low Countries,” experienced a precipitous decline in population, 
so that most communities there “lost between a half and two-thirds of its inhabitants” 
(Parker, 1975:50-51). This was primarily the result of the “proximity of heavy fighting” 
between the Spanish and Dutch forces, and the effect on the agriculture of the Spanish 
Netherlands was devastating. Indeed, as Parker (1975:50) points out, only about one percent 
of the farming population of southern Flanders remained by the 1580s, while the area 
around Ghent further north experienced a decline of 92 percent in the area under 
cultivation in the same decade. Elsewhere in the Spanish Netherlands, the picture was 
similar, and Parker (1975:50) points out that “farms were destroyed, crops burned and entire 
families of peasants murdered by the soldiers and freebooters.” Although the agricultural 
produce of the Southern Netherlands might not have been particularly important for Spain, 
the decline in this sphere helped to shift the economic gravity of the Netherlands from the 
south to the north, while the sustenance of Spanish forces in the Southern Netherlands was 
complicated by the decline in food production there. 
As for Spain itself, Elliott (1970:448) remarks that “foreign travellers in seventeenth-
century Castile … saw nothing but desert: a monotonous, boulder-strewn landscape, with 
here and there a half-deserted village.” The Spanish climate was not particularly suited to 
large-scale agriculture, and “the sheep industry was officially favoured [by the authorities] at 
the expense of arable farming, and … the yield of the soil was restricted by [a] lack of 
irrigation schemes and by poor methods of cultivation” (Elliott, 1970:439). As such, not only 
did Spanish agriculture not meet the food needs of the populace, the rural population also 
tended to flow to the towns and cities over time, since the countryside offered so few 
opportunities “for work and sustenance.” The swollen urban population was in turn “terribly 
exposed to disease,” and in 1599 and 1600 famine and plague struck Castile and Andalusia 
particularly hard, claiming as many as half a million victims, and brining the “demographic 
upsurge” of the sixteenth century to a halt in these areas.  
Meanwhile, the production of wool, which Elliott (1970:439) argues was the cornerstone 
of the Castilian economy (and hence the Spanish economy), had declined in the second half 
of the sixteenth century due to a decrease in the number of migratory flocks, and the lack of 
a corresponding increase in sedentary grazing. Moreover, much of the Spanish wool was 
traditionally shipped to northern Europe, and particularly the Netherlands, for processing 
into cloth, and the revolt of the Netherlands and the war which followed crippled this trade 
in wool, and will be touched upon in the next section dealing with commerce (Parker, 
1975:57). However, it will suffice to observe here that “the entire economy of Old Castile, 
which had centred for so long on the wool trade, was seriously dislocated,” and by 1590 this 
region was in full economic decline (Parker, 1975:57). 
It should also be mentioned that all of the Castilian economic activities, including 
agriculture, were hampered by “the love of luxury, the pursuit of idleness, and the diversion 
of the population into economically unproductive occupations” (Elliott, 1970:447). That 
haughty gravity which was mentioned earlier, had found expression not only in disdain for 
those of other races and religions, but also in the widely held view that “manual labour and 
economic enterprise [crucially capitalist enterprise] were at a discount in a society which 
glorified the ideals of church and aristocracy” (Elliott, 1970:451). Indeed, in stark contrast to 
the ‘Protestant ethic’ of the Dutch, there was a “craze for hidalguía, for a title of nobility” in 
Castile, and this crucially impacted and retarded the development of a capitalist economy 
since “anyone who became rich would acquire land, buy a title, found a mayorazgo 
[primogeniture],” instead of reinvesting that wealth to drive innovation and provide capital 
for economic expansion (Elliott, 1970:451-452). It thus comes as no surprise that the 
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proportion of nobles, or hidalgos, was “very high, especially in north Castile,” and 
constituted some ten percent of the population (Elliott, 1970:448,451). These hidalgos were 
further exempt from the servicios, direct taxes voted by the Cortes of Castile, and could 
evade the alcabala and millones taxes as well. In this “predominantly medieval” Castilian 
society the poor were thus disproportionately burdened by financial obligations to the crown, 
and as Elliott (1970:448,452) argues, “this system automatically discriminated against 
agricultural workers and artisans, who found themselves at the tax-collector’s mercy.” 
Significantly, as González de Cellorigo noted in 1600:  
 
Our republic has come to be an extreme contrast of rich and poor, and there is no means of adjusting 
them one to another. Our condition is one in which there are rich who loll at ease and poor who beg, 
and we lack people of the middle sort, whom neither wealth nor poverty prevents from pursuing the 
rightful kind of business enjoyed by Natural Law (quoted in Elliott, 1970:450).  
 
This crucial observation reveals a significant difference between the Castilian/Spanish and 
Dutch experiences of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and will be returned 
to throughout this chapter.  
 
Turning now to industrial production, the Dutch enjoyed the lead there from the late 
sixteenth to middle seventeenth centuries as well (Wallerstein, 1980:42). One of the 
(leading) sectors in which this was particularly notable was that of textiles. Dutch textile 
production was centred on the city of Leiden, and due to the introduction of new techniques 
for producing lighter types of cloth the city experienced a boom in textile production. The 
Dutch also enjoyed an “enormous advantage” in the production of dyes (due to their focus 
on industrial crops) (Wallerstein, 1980:43). 
The earlier Dutch advances in the design of fishing boats helped to place them in a 
favourable position with regards to shipbuilding – the other leading industry of the time 
(Wallerstein, 1980:43). Here the Dutch suffered as a result of their lack of natural resources, 
in this instance good quality timber. However, the Dutch solution was to import the 
required timber from the Baltic, a region which would later provide the “mother trade” 
upon which the United Provinces relied (Haley, 1972:16; Wallerstein, 1980:40,43). The 
Baltic was also the major source of grain, but this will be investigated in greater depth in the 
following section. 
The Dutch shipbuilding industry was marked by a high degree of mechanisation, as well 
as large-scale and standardised production (Haley, 1972:20). This included the use of cranes 
and wind-powered sawmills. The Dutch shipbuilding industry was widely recognised as the 
seventeenth century European leader in quality and technical progress (Haley, 1972:16). The 
Dutch were also able to construct ships at a lower cost than their competitors; due to the 
advanced production techniques they employed (Wallerstein, 1980:55). Their skill in ship 
design and construction allowed the Dutch to dominate in the manufacture of a wide range 
of vessels, including warships, but as Haley (1972:20) asserts, the most significant advances 
were made in the design of trading ships, which would directly lead to Dutch commercial 
dominance. This is thus an example where a productive edge gives rise to a commercial (and 
military) edge as well. 
The Dutch gained an important competitive advantage with the construction of the fluyt 
(fluteship), an economical and efficient trade ship, the construction of which was made 
possible by the large degree of technical skill in ship design (Haley, 1972:19-20). The 
fluteship was the first specialised trading vessel, since trading ships had previously also 
embodied the functions of warships. The reason that the fluteship represented a significant 
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leap forward in trading ship design was because of its shallow draught that enabled it to sail 
without difficulty on both the ocean and inland waterways. Its large cargo capacity made it a 
highly sought-after vessel, and Haley (1972:20) describes the fluyt as “little more than a 
closed hold.” Yet this made the ship simpler to operate than other vessels at the time, and it 
could be manned by a smaller crew. This in turn meant less money was spent on wages and 
provisions, and the lower operating costs allowed the Dutch to offer considerably cheaper 
freight rates than their competitors (Haley, 1972:21). 
The boom in the shipbuilding industry, which was facilitated by the war with Spain, 
which necessitated the expansion of the Dutch fleet, also led to the growth of related 
industries, such as rope yards, biscuit bakeries, and those involved in the production of 
nautical instruments (Wallerstein, 1980:43). However, the textile, and shipbuilding 
industries were not the only ones where the Dutch held an advantage over their rivals. Other 
industries of note included the paper industry, book production, sugar refining, oil and soap 
production, breweries, tobacco curing, glass-blowing, and diamond-cutting (Wallerstein, 
1980:44; Haley, 1972:44). In short, the United Provinces came to represent the industrial 
power-house of the early to middle seventeenth century. 
The production of munitions also contributed to the development of Dutch industry 
(Wallerstein, 1980:44). Spurred on by the needs of war, and by the importation of raw 
materials, the Dutch developed a munitions industry to supply their needs during the 
decades of conflict. However, the Dutch would find other ways of profiting from the 
development of this munitions industry – through trade. However, at this stage it will suffice 
to note that in some areas of production, such as the manufacture of arms and munitions, 
the Dutch were able to profit directly from the war(s) plaguing the continent during the 
seventeenth century. 
As for the Spanish Netherlands, industrial production there suffered a major decline in 
the late sixteenth century, in a similar fashion to agricultural production. As Parker 
(1975:51) notes, “heavy capital equipment was wantonly destroyed by the troops of both 
sides,” and the clothworks of Hondschoote, which was the largest in all the Netherlands, was 
burnt to the ground in 1582. Apart from that instance, the production of textiles in other 
centres in the Spanish Netherlands also declined, and “some of them never recovered.” 
Combining this decline of industrial production with that of agriculture, Parker (1975:51) 
concludes that Flanders and Brabant were “totally ruined” by the Dutch/Spanish war in the 
late sixteenth century. However, in the seventeenth century, particularly after the 
introduction of the Twelve Year Truce, industries in the Spanish Netherlands experienced a 
recovery, which was sustained even after the expiry of the Truce since the intensity of the 
fighting in the region was dampened by the chronic financial troubles of Spain (Parker, 
1975:53). However, although new silk, lace, tapestry, glass-making, jewellery, diamond-
cutting, and printing industries sprouted up in the Spanish Netherlands during this time, 
the economic development of the region was nevertheless retarded by the conflict, so that 
the southern provinces “remained an economic backwater from 1572 until the … industrial 
revolution” (Parker, 1975:54). This contrasts markedly with the economic profile of the 
southern provinces prior to the Dutch Revolt, and also helps to account for their eclipse by 
the northern provinces during the Eighty Years’ War. 
Meanwhile, the Spanish crown’s constant search for sources of funding for war led to the 
issuing of “juros or government bonds yielding a fixed annuity” (Elliott, 1970:449). These, 
along with the censos (mortgages), were then “bought by all those with money to spare or 
save,” and instead of investing their wealth in the development of industries, the wealthy of 
Castile became “a vast rentier class living comfortably off its yearly dues.” Indeed, the 
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general contempt with which manual labour was viewed conspired with the fact that these 
“censos and juros offered better interest rates than those to be gained from investment in 
trade, agriculture or industry, and as long as this continued, there was no hope of reviving 
the Castilian [or the Spanish] economy” (Elliott, 1970:449-450). Moreover, the lack of a 
middle class “with the enterprise and the resources to invest in trade or industry,” prevented 
(or rather significantly delayed) the transformation of Castile into a flourishing capitalist 
economy which was driven by innovation, as was the case in the Dutch Republic.  
Indeed, the crux of the problem for Castile and Spain relates to the absence of a working 
‘hegemonic bloc’ there. To summarise, Wallerstein (1980:113) considers a working 
hegemonic bloc to be the “degree to which the political rules reflect a balance of interests 
among owner-producers” or, as Cox (1983:126) puts it, when “the bourgeoisie had attained a 
hegemonic position of leadership over other classes.” Already, from the above discussion, it is 
clear that no such bourgeois hegemonic bloc existed in Castile or indeed in Spain at large, 
since there was hardly any middle class to speak of, and the wealthy were co-opted into the 
“vast court, a monstrous tumour swelling larger and larger, and relentlessly consuming the 
life of the nation” (Elliott, 1970:447). Indeed, Kossmann (1970:360) ably summarises the 
difference between Spain and the United Provinces in this regard:  
 
The north [United Provinces], a maritime power, governed by a bourgeoisie and its commercial 
interests, looked fundamentally different from the continental south [Spain and the Spanish 
Netherlands] with its Spanish court … its Jesuits, its loyalty to the monarchy, its nobility growing in 
number and social importance. 
 
In stark contrast to the Spanish ‘idleness’ was the capitalist spirit which “imbued the 
inhabitants [of the United Provinces] with self-reliance and optimism and prompted them to 
find their own forms in all the spheres in which they moved” (Kossmann, 1970:365). 
However, it is also undeniable that the economic life of the United Provinces was dominated 
by a “regent class” of town oligarchies, which comprised about 2,000 families (Parker, 
1975:66). Thus, in a similar vein to Castile, there could be found in the United Provinces “a 
semi-noble, aristocratic governing class [of urban plutocrats] not shrinking back from taking 
advantage of government with the same ruthlessness with which former generations had 
enriched themselves in trade” (Kossmann, 1970:369). However, the crucial difference was 
that this governing class in the United Provinces did not revolve around a monarchy, but 
around a “social dictatorship of the upper middle class” (Wallerstein, 1980:63). Indeed, as 
Wallerstein (1974:286) argues, Holland – which was, as Kossmann (1970:365) points out, the 
“mainspring of all Dutch activity whether commercial, industrial or cultural” – produced “a 
nobility that was ‘embourgeoisée’.” This constituted a definite capitalist hegemonic bloc, 
and as Wallerstein (1980:61) points out, there was a clear and close relationship between the 
Dutch state and Dutch capitalists, and the state actively intervened in the economy and in 
trade, as will be seen in the next section. The net result of the emergence of a bourgeois 
hegemonic bloc in the United Provinces following the revolt was that “the Dutch state 
defended the interests of its entrepreneurs and worried little about ideological consistency in 
doing so” (Wallerstein, 1980:61).  
In Spain and Castile on the other hand, the general contemptuous attitude towards 
enterprise and labour bred “a passive, negative regime, incapable of taking decisions, and 
almost unaware of the decisions to be taken.” (Elliott, 1970:457). In fact, Catalonia was 
overrun by bandits between 1600 and 1615, and “drifted towards anarchy,” and yet, as 
Elliott (1970:456-467) argues, “at a time when the apparatus of government appeared to be 
constantly growing, government itself was ceasing to exist.” As such, there was no state 
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support to be found for bourgeois enterprises, if a bourgeoisie could even be found between 
the hidalgos on the one hand and the peasants on the other! Indeed, as a Catalan on a 
mission from Barcelona to Madrid exclaimed, “Here it’s all a matter of gaming, hunting and 
comedies, and no one will be bothered with anything” (Elliott, 1970:457). It is thus hardly a 
surprise that lethargic Spain was unable to compete with the dynamic United Provinces in 
either agricultural or industrial production, or in trade for that matter, and as Elliott 
(1970:451) points out, the treasure flowing in from the Americas had a definite hand in 
generating such lethargy. However, before turning to a discussion of Dutch and Spanish 
commerce, a few additional observations regarding immigration, religious tolerance, and 
innovation should be made. 
One of the additional processes which aided Dutch ascent to hegemony, and benefited its 
society as a whole, was that of immigration. Ever since the Netherlands broke out in revolt 
during the sixteenth century, the United Provinces became a refuge for many, especially 
Protestants, who sought freedom from persecution and better economic opportunities. As 
Schiller (1853:356) remarks, the United Provinces proved to be very attractive to immigrants 
precisely because while “the rest of Europe groaned under a heavy bondage … Amsterdam 
was nearly the only free port for all opinions.” Indeed, Spooner (1970:78) concurs by noting 
that amid the turmoil of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, “there were open 
cities, places of refuge, such as Amsterdam.” One of the main sources of immigrants was the 
southern Netherlands which, as discussed earlier, remained under Spanish control (Schiller, 
1853:355). Since Protestantism was not tolerated at all in these southern provinces, many of 
their inhabitants flocked to the United Provinces to escape persecution. The cities in the 
provinces of Holland and Zeeland, the economic heartland of the United Provinces, grew 
especially rapidly as a result of the immigration of refugees, mainly from the south, and the 
population of Amsterdam increased from 31,000 in 1585 to 120,000 in 1632, and the 
population of Leiden from 13,000 in 1574 to 65,000 in the 1640s (Parker, 1975:59).  
As Parker (1975:59) argues, much of the capital in the United Provinces had come, with 
the refugees, from the Spanish Netherlands, so that “of the 320 largest depositors in the 
Amsterdam Exchange Bank in 1611, over half were southern refugees,” while “one-third of 
the richest Amsterdammers were of southern origin.” Other examples of the boon to the 
Dutch economy brought by immigration include the Amsterdam chamber of the Dutch East 
India Company, where 27 percent of the shareholders were “Walloon or Flemish exiles,” 
providing 40 percent of the company’s capital. This southern input is also reflected in the 
Dutch West India Company, half of whose directors between 1622 and 1636 were southern 
immigrants. For Parker (1975:64) this influx of wealthy individuals constitutes one of the 
primary ways in which the Eighty Years’ (and thus Thirty Years’) War directly benefitted the 
economy of the United Provinces, and he argues that “the towns of Holland … drew 
immense benefit from the influx of men and money from the south.” Indeed, as Parker 
(1975:60) notes, the Magistrate of Amsterdam, one C.P. Hooft, had the opinion that the 
impact of the “war of Liberation” on the Dutch economy was unmistakably positive, and 
commented that “It is known to all the world that whereas it is generally the nature of war to 
ruin the land and people, these countries on the contrary have been notably improved 
thereby.” 
In Spain, the picture was markedly different. Far from enjoying the demographic boom of 
Holland and Zeeland, Castile, as mentioned before, had suffered from both plague and 
famine, which brought with them heavy tolls on the population. In turn, as Elliott 
(1970:439) argues, “the decline in population inevitably affected Castile’s capacity to meet 
the fiscal demands of the crown,” and moreover, Castile experienced an “acute shortage of 
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labour” which drove up the wages there by 30 percent in the years immediately following 
1600. However, as Elliott (1970:449) also points out, even though “rural life had become so 
insecure that many villagers abandoned their homes for the shelter of some town” around 
the seventeenth century, a general lack of “both personal enterprise and capital resources” 
precluded any industrial revival in Castile. Moreover, along with the scourges of famine and 
plague, came the “religious obscurantism which drove the industrious Moriscos [Moors] 
from the Iberian Peninsula” (Elliott, 1970:437). 
Indeed, even though the Reconquista had been accomplished in the fifteenth century, 
“Madrid could never forget that there existed in Spain a community bound by ties of kinship 
and religion to the national enemy, the Turk” (Elliott, 1970:453). Indeed, even though the 
Moriscos had established themselves as small craftsmen, carriers and muleteers, and worked 
upon the estates of the large landowners, they had “become unpopular for working too hard, 
spending too little and breeding too fast,” and all Moriscos of Castile, Valencia, Catalonia, 
and Aragon, were forced to leave following decrees effecting their “total expulsion” in 1609 
and 1610. Although, as Elliott (1970:454-455) remarks, the Moriscos were not very wealthy as 
a group, the departure of around 275,000 people at a time when Iberia was experiencing a 
decline in population growth, “prolonged [and worsened] the labour crisis begun by the 
plague of 1599.” Not only did the income generated by many of the estates slump 
“disastrously” following the departure of the “Morisco vassals,” in Valencia especially, where 
Moriscos had constituted a quarter of the population, the expulsion was an “economic 
disaster” that affected all classes of society (Elliott, 1970:455). Although the Moriscos 
constituted a smaller proportion of the population of Castile, its cities, especially Seville, 
experienced a major setback since “a twelfth of its [Seville’s] population was Morisco and, as 
the great emporium of trade with the New World, it relied heavily on Morisco labour for 
carrying and lading and other essential services” (Elliott, 1970:456). The impact of the 
expulsion of the Moriscos thus further exacerbated the general problems faced by Seville, so 
that by the 1640s there occurred a “dislocation of Spain’s Atlantic trading system.”  
Of course, the impact of Spain’s wars, particularly with the Dutch, on its population 
should also not be underestimated. As Parker (1975:55) points out, in terms of the loss of 
manpower Castile once more bore the brunt of the conflict, sending 42,875 soldiers to Italy 
and the Netherlands between 1567 and 1574, and over 30,000 to Flanders alone between 
1631 and 1639. As Philip III, who took over the reigns of the Spanish monarchy from his 
father in 1598, exclaimed in 1604, the true cost of the conflict was not only in those killed, 
but also in those who returned wounded:  
 
My uncle [the Archduke Albert, ruler of the Netherlands] is well aware of the extent to which my 
kingdoms [of Spain] resent the continuation of such great provisions as he has been sent, seeing that all 
the money which arrives from the Indies goes into them, and that since this does not suffice the people 
of Spain have always to pay extraordinary taxes; these are the fruits of the war that they see, together with 
the absence of their sons, brothers, dependents and relatives, who either die or return wounded, without 
arms, sight or legs, totally useless; and having yielded the promise of their lives there, their parents, 
brothers and relatives have to support them here (quoted in Parker, 1975:54-55). 
 
Returning to the issue of religious intolerance, the persecution suffered in many parts of 
Europe at the time had created a great deal of sympathy for the Dutch Republic, and its 
struggle against Spain. In the words of Schiller (1853:355-356): 
 
All whom the new doctrine had won, all who had already suffered, or had still cause of fear from 
despotism, linked their own fortunes with those of the new Republic. Every injury inflicted by a tyrant, 
gave a right of citizenship in Holland. Men pressed towards a country, where liberty raised her 
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inspiriting banner, where respect and security were ensured to a fugitive religion, and even revenge on 
the oppressors. 
 
However, it is necessary to bear in mind that the United Provinces were not free from 
intolerance either, for Catholic worship was outlawed in each of the seven northern 
provinces (Haley, 1972:86). Catholics were furthermore prohibited from holding any public 
office, or to serve in the professions, but as Haley (1972:91) points out, this was not strictly 
enforced. This highlights the difference in attitudes between the north and the south, since 
Catholics were allowed to pay for the right to worship in the north, while Protestants 
certainly did not enjoy the same leeway in the south (Haley, 1972:93). Furthermore, even 
where ‘illegal’ Catholic places of worship were widely known to exist in the north, the 
authorities were reluctant to act. 
This relaxed attitude to the practice of other religions in their territory can largely be 
ascribed to the opposition that grew to any persecution of “heretical beliefs” (Haley, 
1972:96-97). The inhabitants of the United Provinces remembered their own persecution at 
the hands of Philip II all too well, and the freedom of private conscience was in fact one of 
the founding principles of the young Republic. As a result, a wide variety of religious beliefs 
were to be found in the northern provinces, and especially Amsterdam, which was home to a 
large Jewish community, many of whom had fled from Spain and Portugal. The relatively 
high degree of religious toleration also saw the growth of a number of Protestant groups, like 
the Lutherans, the Annabaptists and the Remonstrants (Haley, 1972:95). 
However, with regards to the Remonstrants, they had become embroiled in a fierce debate 
with the Gomarians (Contra-Remonstrants) regarding the finer points of theology, which 
ultimately led to the imprisonment and execution of some Remonstrants (Wallerstein, 
1980:67-68; Haley, 1972:108). This was due primarily to the addition of political sentiments 
regarding the Twelve Year Truce (the more moderate Remonstrants favoured the Truce, the 
more orthodox Contra-Remonstrants did not), and as Wallerstein (1980:69) remarks, 
“cultural tolerance had its limits, particularly its internal limits [and] could not be allowed 
to sow subversion.” Thus, even though the Dutch state can be considered very tolerant of 
differing religious beliefs for its time, there was a definite limit on what was considered 
acceptable. Although immigrants were thus welcome in general, deviant thinkers (who could 
sow division) were not. 
Yet, as Haley (1972:9-10) remarks, this “ability to attract refugees from the intolerance of 
others could be a positive asset to the national life,” since many of these immigrants brought 
their skills and knowledge (along with their wealth, as discussed above) with them. This was 
particularly the case with immigrants coming from the cities of the southern (Spanish) 
Netherlands, such as Antwerp, many of whom were highly skilled in financial and 
commercial techniques (Haley, 1972:18-19). These immigrants were not only attracted by 
the prospect of freedom from persecution, but also by the greater economic opportunities of 
the northern provinces, which were free from the damages caused by mutinous Spanish 
soldiers, and war in general, as well as from the general stagnation of the south, largely 
brought about by the Eighty Years’ War, as discussed above. For instance, an example 
already mentioned was the closing of the river Scheldt to traffic by the Sea Beggars, which 
cut off Antwerp’s outlet to the sea.  
Furthermore, as Haley (1972:37) contends, social distinctions in the United Provinces 
were not as much of an obstacle to merit as in many other European societies of the time. 
For instance, most of the Dutch admirals were not noblemen, but ordinary sailors with 
humble family backgrounds. This endeared these commanders to their sailors, so much so 
that Tromp and de Ruyter were referred to as ‘Grandad’. Dutch society was thus not as rigid, 
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and offered more opportunities, than more conservative societies at the time, and this 
undoubtedly helped to invigorate the young Republic during its rise. Indeed, as Elliott 
(1970:436) notes, the awareness by the Dutch of the advantages conferred to them by their 
‘Protestant ethic’ was already recorded in the early 1600s, and “as the prosperity of the 
United Provinces came to be attributed in particular to their policy of religious toleration, so 
Englishmen and Dutchmen of the seventeenth century came to regard Roman Catholicism 
as incompatible with commercial success, and seized upon Spain as proof of their thesis.” 
Indeed, Dehio (1962:30) also observed that “to be sure, commerce and industry, in fact the 
whole modern ethic of labor, could not flourish here.” 
Meanwhile, Wallerstein (1980:45) notes that the city of Amsterdam became the “melting 
pot” of the seventeenth century, due not only to the forces of immigration, but also as a 
result of the vast numbers of foreign merchants gathering there. In addition, the higher 
standard of living and better salaries brought intellectuals to the Netherlands from afar 
(Wallerstein, 1980:67). With such an accumulation of both talent and labour, the Dutch 
were favourably positioned to outmanoeuvre their rivals. 
As mentioned, these immigrants brought with them their skills and experience, which in 
turn helped the Dutch in the field of innovation (Kossmann, 1970:365). Innovation, which 
ultimately acts as the basis for new economic activities, is an important ingredient in 
attaining a productive advantage and, although the Dutch were generally not recognised for 
new innovations, they were certainly successful in making more effective and intensive use of 
existing methods (Haley, 1972:40). Schiller (1853:376) offers some insights into this 
phenomenon as well: 
 
The people of the Netherlands united, with the most fertile genius for inventions, a happy talent for 
improving the discoveries of others; there are probably few mechanical arts and manufactures which 
they did not either produce, or at least carry to a higher degree of perfection. 
 
In the field of scientific innovation, the Dutch were making strides in the manufacture of 
pendulum clocks, and the contribution of the spiral balance by Huygens made his clocks 
and watches “more accurate than any previously known” (Haley, 1972:149). The Dutch also 
refined the telescope and microscope (although they did not invent them), and made new 
discoveries in both astronomy and biology. These innovators did not have to face 
interference from the authorities like their counterparts (for example Galileo), and Haley 
(1972:152) summarises it well when he says, “the loose structure of the Republic favoured 
intellectual freedom.” 
On the other hand, the Protestants of the early seventeenth century were quick to point 
out that Spain’s economic decline was largely to blame on the “suppression of free enquiry 
by the Spanish Inquisition” (Elliott, 1970:437). Ironically, many of the Spanish wealthy and 
nobility sent their sons to university, so that these “swarmed with students who saw in a 
university education and in the recommendation of their college the sole hope of future 
employment” – employment which was to be found in the bureaucracy or the church 
(Elliott, 1970:452). Thus, not only did the universities of Spain lose “the intellectual vigour 
which distinguished them in the sixteenth century,” they also produced “too many students, 
too many lawyers, too many clergy.” In stark contrast, as Kossmann (1970:365) reveals, “the 
University of Leiden rapidly acquired international fame and certainly owed much of its 
resilience to the inspiring force of Protestantism and the lack of medieval tradition which 
enabled it to break through the old curriculum.” 
As such, along with the trends of immigration and innovation, and the relatively tolerant 
atmosphere in the United Provinces, the first rate education available to Dutch students 
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helped to stimulate a golden age in intellectual development as well. Not only were there 
skilled (and unskilled) labourers flowing into the Dutch Republic during the late sixteenth 
to middle seventeenth centuries, but many intellectuals and artists also found a home there 
(The New Encyclopædia Britannica, 2007a:567). So, for instance, one found scholars such as 
René Descartes who was not driven out of France, but found it convenient to settle in the 
United Provinces (Haley, 1972:169). Others, including John Locke found a far friendlier 
environment in the Dutch Republic than in his native England, and his stay there impressed 
upon him that religious tolerance could indeed work. 
Other, more distinguished individuals also flocked to the United Provinces, for instance, 
Frederick, Elector Palatinate and King of Bohemia, as well as Charles II of England, and the 
Duke of Monmouth (Haley, 1972:168). What set the United Provinces apart from other 
states at the time however was their willingness to shelter less famous individuals, who 
revelled in the relatively high level of press freedom, and often printed pamphlets offensive 
to some or other ruler. On most occasions when a foreign ambassador tried to press the 
Dutch to arrest and deliver the offending individual, they were frustrated by the Dutch, who 
skilfully used their highly decentralised system of government to effectively block any such 
demands (Haley, 1972:169). 
Thus, it comes as no surprise that Haley (1972:123) claims that there were more books 
printed in the United Provinces than in the rest of Europe combined. Furthermore, the 
Dutch were masters of the art of book printing as well, and could print a book on better 
quality paper, in clearer type, and for a cheaper price than their competitors. Since most of 
the ideas of the time were transmitted via books, this helps to demonstrate the level to which 
ideas were allowed to circulate in the United Provinces. The city of Amsterdam was also the 
prime international book-market of the time, and the regents of the seven provinces came to 
realise that book and pamphlet selling could also provide a boost to their economies (Haley, 
1972:124).  
Some of the authors of the time, such as Grotius (mentioned in the previous chapter), 
made intellectual contributions which aided the Dutch in their rise to hegemony. Grotius’ 
legal arguments, especially those concerning freedom of the sea, proved to “suit the needs of 
Dutch trade,” in that the Dutch were embroiled in a dispute with James I of England 
concerning the raising of tolls on fishing, and that Grotius argued against such a practice 
(Haley, 1972:126). In addition, Grotius’ work provided the Dutch with a strong argument 
with which to deny the exclusive claims of the Portuguese over the East Indies. The growth 
of a rich intellectual environment thus came to benefit the Dutch, and it is interesting to 
note that in the realm of international law for instance, the earlier writers were primarily 
Spanish, such as Suarez and Vittoria, and that Dutch writers (Grotius, and Van 
Bynkershoek) replaced them during the late sixteenth and most of the seventeenth centuries 
(Dugard, 2005:11). This is significant as it hints at the underlying shift in the leadership of 
the world-system, and the rise of the Dutch over the Spanish. 
Of course, it was not only on the field of international law that Dutch influence was 
visible. Dutch literature leaped forward during the seventeenth century, and experienced a 
“spectacular expansion” (The New Encyclopædia Britannica, 2007a:567). The growing 
Dutch economy also fostered the success of Dutch artists, such as Rembrandt, Rubens, and 
Van Dyck (Haley, 1972:186; Geyl, 1961:220). Even in architecture the Dutch were breaking 
ground, fuelled by the rapid expansion of their towns and cities. This boom period had 
much to do with the structure of Dutch society, and as Geyl (1961:223) points out:  
 
In a Europe where the monarchical idea was in the ascendant and States were everywhere conforming 
to a centralised and rationally designed pattern … the bustling and loose-knit middle-class society of 
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Holland was something quite apart … a feeling for directness, for individuality, for unstyled life, made 
the art of Holland into something unique in the period. 
 
In short, the United Provinces led seventeenth-century Europe not only in the production 
of tangible, industrial goods, but also in the production of ideas, innovations, and art. In 
contrast Spain, lacking a sizeable bourgeoisie, a working hegemonic bloc, a spirit of 
innovation, and not only the support of intellectual freedom but even tolerance of it, 
experienced a sharp decline in the sphere of agro-industrial production, failing to keep pace 
with the advances made by the Dutch. Indeed, the Dutch lead in innovation, and in the 
leading sectors of the time, such as shipbuilding, set the stage for their dominance in 
commerce as well. It is to this domain of commerce which will be turned to next. 
 
3.3.2 The commerce domain 
As mentioned earlier, the geographical location of the Low Countries, and the United 
Provinces in particular, was to confer distinct advantages to their commerce (Haley, 
1972:16). Thus, when the Dutch sought to ameliorate their natural resource shortage, they 
turned to trade, particularly with the Baltic (Haley, 1972:26). This trade with the Baltic 
would become the mainstay of the Dutch economy, being referred to as their ‘mother trade’, 
and in no short measure helped the Dutch to ascend to hegemony. 
As Geyl (1961:163) argues, the only ‘true’ Dutch exports were fish, cheese, wool, and 
linen. But with these few exports to begin with, the Dutch rose to dominate world commerce 
at the time, which in turn helped to accumulate a great deal of capital in Dutch hands. In 
the first instance, Wallerstein (1980:40,44) notes that the Dutch were able to make inroads 
in the Baltic thanks to their fishing industry and their textile production. With these two very 
successful industries, the Dutch set up large-scale trade with the Baltic region, in order to 
supply them with their timber requirements, and with grain. This importation of food was 
part of the reason for the reduced vulnerability of the Dutch population to famine and bad 
harvests (Haley, 1972:153). 
Another factor aiding the Dutch in their Baltic trade was their more efficient trading 
ships, the fluyts in particular (Haley, 1972:19). During their war with Spain, Dutch trading 
routes grew rapidly, and as Haley (1972:28) remarks, “it seemed as if the trade-routes, not 
merely of Europe but of all the continents, were being made to meet in the Netherlands.” 
Their technical innovations allowed the Dutch to sail more cheaply than their competitors, 
and by the second half of the seventeenth century their shipping tonnage exceeded English, 
French, Portuguese, Spanish, and German tonnage combined (Wallerstein, 1980:46).  
Dutch traders were more vigorous than their counterparts, and as enemies of Spain, they 
could successfully conduct trade with the Turks in the Mediterranean (Haley, 1972:23). The 
Dutch also saw opportunity in Italy, and traded Baltic grain and timber there (Geyl, 
1961:160). 
After having set up successful trade routes with numerous European ports, Dutch trade 
grew to overwhelm all others in the Baltic (see Figure 3.1), and between 1578 and 1657 
Dutch shipping in the Sound constituted some 60 to 70 percent of all shipping there (Geyl, 
1961:160). Furthermore, the Dutch even began to dominate the ports of their rivals, 
including France, where they were making themselves “masters of her own export trade in 
such commodities as wines and silks” (Geyl, 1961:161). The last point concerning 
commodities is significant in that it represented a break with previous long-distance trade, 
which was largely limited to luxuries, such as spices. Although the Dutch were indeed 
profiting from the spice trade, as Haley (1971:26) notes, this trade fell far short of the Baltic 
trade in basic commodities. Consequently, one can witness evidence of the emergence of the  
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Figure 3.1. Sources of Ships Passing Through the Baltic From 1600-1783 
 
Source: Ormrod (2003:281). 
 
modern world-system, with the Dutch in the early lead. This also explains why the world-
economy school regards the Dutch as the first hegemon (and not Portugal as in the case of 
the long cycle school), since they were the first to conduct large-scale and long-distance trade 
in basic commodities, as opposed to spices. 
Furthermore, Spanish attempts to thwart the growth of Dutch commerce, by closing the 
Iberian ports (and consequently the spice trade) to them, merely motivated the Dutch to set 
up their own trading routes with the East (Haley, 1972:24; Wallerstein, 1980:47). Indeed, as 
Parker (1975:58) argues, the expanding commerce of the United Provinces would eventually 
have put them at odds with the Portuguese traders in the Indian Ocean, but the fact that 
Portugal was incorporated into Spain from 1580 to 1640, “caused the struggle [over trade 
with the East] to break out earlier than it might otherwise have done.” In order to best 
compete with the Portuguese spice trade, the Dutch amalgamated their trading companies 
and formed the Dutch East India Company in 1602, which also completely overshadowed 
their English rivals (the English sent twelve ships to the East during the first nine years of 
their East India Company; the Dutch sent fifty-five within five years of setting up theirs) 
(Haley, 1972:25). After entering the Indian Ocean, the Dutch founded New Batavia in Java, 
and even began trading as far a field as Japan. For Parker (1975:62), this trade with the East 
Indies (and the concomitant trade with the West Indies) is a sector of the Dutch economy 
“which clearly developed from the war with Spain.” Indeed, as a contemporary noted in 
1599, following the return of the ‘second voyage’ to the East Indies, “So long as Holland has 
been Holland, never have such richly laden ships been seen here” (quoted in Parker, 
1970:61). Indeed, on that particular voyage the profit amounted to some 400 percent, and as 
Parker (1975:61-62) argues, “undoubtedly the economic gains from breaking the Spanish 
and Portuguese monopolies on extra-European trade were great,” and “undoubtedly some 
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influential and voluble Amsterdammers were enriched, and undoubtedly Amsterdam 
became able to corner the supply of many exotic products, thus increasing its importance as 
a commercial centre.” Granted, although the Dutch would likely have made inroads into 
these trades at some point, their open war with Spain and Portugal, and the closing of the 
Iberian ports to them, provided the incentive for them to apply their commercial talents to 
this field earlier and more vigorously. Indeed, Figure 3.2 reveals the rapidity with which 
Dutch ships began dominating the trade with the East from about 1590, with the 
concomitant steady decline in Portuguese trade. Moreover, as Figure 3.3 reveals, the 
shareholders of the Dutch East India Company benefitted tremendously from the windfall 
profits generated by trade with the East. Again, the close link between the Dutch East India 
Company and the Dutch state (an expression of the hegemonic bloc within the United 
Provinces) is emphasised by Spooner (1970:68), when he remarks that it “acted under the 
shadow and protection” of the state, and Dutch commercial organisation in general had 
“objectives often indistinguishable from the policies of government.” 
 
Figure 3.2. Dutch and Portuguese Ships Sailing to the East Indies, 1570-1670 
 
Source: Parker (1975:61). 
 
However, it was not only in the East where the Dutch achieved success as traders, but also 
in the West, especially after the founding of the Dutch West India Company in 1621 (Haley, 
1971:34). This company was far more militant in its design, and was set up primarily to 
attack Spanish and Portuguese shipping in the Caribbean. However, as traders the Dutch 
achieved considerable success there as well, for example, even prior to 1621, much of the 
sugar grown in Brazil had made its way to Europe in Dutch ships, to the great frustration of 
the Spanish crown (Haley, 1971:23). Moreover, to the great chagrin of the Spanish, the 
Dutch West India Company’s fleet managed to capture the Spanish treasure fleet off Cuba 
in 1628, which netted some 12 million florins worth of silver and merchandise (Parker, 
1975:62). This single event further helped to accelerate the financial demise of the Spanish 
crown, as will be seen in the next section. However, the “bumper dividend” of 75 percent 
paid to the Dutch West India Company’s shareholders, seemed to prove that every Spanish 
setback was a Dutch gain. As Schiller (1853:356-367) points out, all actions that the Spanish 
took seemed only to benefit their enemies, and in the sixteenth century not even Philip II 
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Figure 3.3. Dividends Paid to Shareholders by the Dutch East India Company, 1602-1649 
 
Source: Parker (1975:60). 
 
could stop his own subjects from trading with the Dutch. Even the Southern Netherlands 
had little choice but to “send and receive their wares by way of the North … for Spain herself 
was unable to keep the rebels’ ships out” (Geyl, 1961:160). Moreover, during the Twelve 
Year Truce, the Spanish found that instead of enjoying the respite they longed for after 
decades of warfare against the Dutch, they were falling yet further behind in the field of 
commerce:  
 
already before the truce they [the Dutch] had broken into the Caribbean and had started to make 
inroads into Portugal’s Far Eastern Empire; and they had long been supplying Spain itself, either legally 
or under cover of Hamburg flags, with manufactures from northern Europe and with grain and naval 
stores from the Baltic. The coming of peace removed the last obstacles from their path. Northern 
products carried in Dutch vessels flooded into Spain, either for home consumption or for export to the 
New World. Since Spain could not offer in exchange sufficient goods to provide a full cargo for the 
return journey, the balance was made up in American silver (Elliott, 1970:446). 
 
Once the Truce expired in 1621, the Spanish found themselves in an even worse position, 
especially with regards to vital naval stores required for the construction and maintenance of 
their navy, since the Dutch merely placed an embargo on trade in naval stores with Spain, 
thereby severing Spain’s access to these resources, which included copper, tar, timber, sail 
cloth, and hemp (Elliott, 1970:459; Modelski and Thompson, 1988:270). Indeed, this 
proved to be a severe blow to the Spanish, since it “crippled the shipbuilding industry in a 
country where wood was scare and where techniques of naval construction had been allowed 
to lag behind those employed in the dockyards of northern Europe” (Elliott, 1970:459). The 
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contrast here with the Dutch shipbuilding industry, which was the leader in technical 
innovation, is clear. 
Returning to the observation by Wallerstein (1980:44) – that the Dutch developed their 
war industry during the Eighty Years’ War – one can also note that they gained a reputation 
for trading indiscriminately with others, even with their enemies during wartime (Haley, 
1972:46). Many contemporaries were taken aback by the lack of government disapproval of 
continued trade with the Spanish for instance, and some used the example to argue that the 
Dutch had an insatiable “greed for gain” (Haley, 1972:45). Since the Dutch were the leading 
capitalists of the era, this ‘greed’ was, of course, none other than the ceaseless capitalist quest 
for the accumulation of profit, and the Dutch traded cannon and gunpowder “with 
complete impartiality to allies, neutrals, and enemies” (Haley, 1972:43). Furthermore, as 
Geyl (1961:166) observes, the Dutch even hired out ships to the Spanish in the 
Mediterranean. The Dutch were in fact so well-known for this practice of trading even 
weapons and ammunition to their enemies, that an eighteenth-century British politician 
remarked that the Dutch “make no scruple of supplying their enemies with their 
commodities, and have been known to sell at night those bullets which were next day to be 
discharged against them” (Pares quoted in Levy and Barbieri, 2000:8). This occurrence 
moreover attests to the extent to which the Dutch government identified “the interests of 
trade with those of the community and the State” (Geyl, 1961:166). 
 
When turning to naval power, the large numbers of hostile ships at sea, and the large 
numbers of Dutch trading vessels plying the waters of Europe and beyond, created a strong 
need for an organised Dutch navy (Haley, 1972:33). The earliest naval forces of the United 
Provinces were, as mentioned, the Sea Beggars, those privateers sailing under the Prince of 
Orange, but although they were successful at menacing the Spanish, they were far from a 
disciplined, organised navy. However, once they had succeeded in 1573 to clear the local 
waters of Spanish forces, the Dutch began in earnest to create a navy to protect their oceanic 
life-lines (Haley, 1972:30). By the time the Spanish dispatched their Armada in 1588, the 
Dutch were able to assist the English in attaining victory, which symbolised the 
establishment of the Dutch as a naval power of note. 
Because of the specialised nature of their trading vessels, the Dutch had to ensure their 
protection by sending along armed convoys (Haley, 1972:33). These fighting ships, and the 
navies they belonged to, were administered by five admiralties, which were set up in each of 
the coastal Provinces of the Dutch Republic – another indication of the decentralised nature 
of Dutch government. The efficiency with which the Dutch were able to construct their 
warships – as Goldstein (1988:315) observes, the “shipyards at Saardam could turn out a 
warship every week at peak production” – backed by the capital flowing in from foreign 
trade, allowed them to make rapid advances, and by 1607 their navy, under van Heemskerck, 
was able to secure a key victory against the Spanish off Gibraltar, and so allow them to make 
inroads into the Mediterranean. Other victories against Spain include the aforementioned 
spectacular capture of the Spanish treasure-fleet in Cuba in 1628 by Piet Heyn of the Dutch 
West India Company, which dealt a great blow to Spain (Cooper, 1970b:229). 
As for Spain itself, Elliott (1970:450) notes that due to the disappearance of the vigorous 
urban class engaged in commerce, which existed in Castilian towns such as Burgos and 
Medina del Campo in the first half of the sixteenth century, “communities of foreign 
merchants [appeared] who dominated the commercial life of a passive society,” so that 
Spanish commerce did not even primarily reside in Spanish hands. Moreover, as Dehio 
(1962:31) remarks, Spain was thoroughly a continental power, and its traits as an 
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“adventurous, warlike nation” did not allow any shift away from its Continental orientation, 
which consequently prevented Spain from developing into a commercial and naval power. 
Instead, Dehio (1962: 51) argues, Spain managed to combine “the old crusading zeal with 
modern ambitions for power,” and while the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon traditionally 
had “significant maritime interests,” particularly vis-à-vis the Mediterranean, Modelski and 
Thompson (1988:267) maintain that “for most of the sixteenth century, Spain was something 
of a major exception, in respect of organisation because while obviously a major actor, she 
did not have a permanent oceanic sailing navy.” Indeed, despite having acquired vast 
holdings in the American periphery by the sixteenth century, and being the foremost naval 
power in Europe in the same century largely by default, there was, much to the detriment of 
the development of an effective navy a “general contempt for sailors and their profession [to 
be] found in both Spain and Portugal” (Cooper, 1970b:228). As Modelski and Thompson 
(1988:268-269) note, despite the importance of the American treasure flowing across the 
Atlantic in the sixteenth century, “Spanish kings evaded the need for a permanent navy 
either by seizing foreign vessels when needed in emergencies or by hiring merchant ships” 
until the 1570s. As such, prior to the assembly of the famed Armada in the 1580s, Spain 
delegated the responsibility of protecting its Atlantic convoys to the armada del mar oceano 
which, founded in 1570, consisted of only eight Spanish ships, with the later addition of “ten 
to twelve royal Portuguese galleons after 1580” (Modelski and Thompson, 1988:268-269). As 
such, Spain not only lacked a strong navy, but also a naval and commercial tradition and, as 
Dehio (1962:55) argues, “Spain’s ocean-going ships had a long record of backwardness.” 
When the construction of the Spanish Armada began, Dehio (1962:55-56) soberly 
concludes that “the design of the ships [could not] fail to show a lack of maritime tradition – 
to say nothing of the seamen.” As for Spanish naval tactics, Modelski and Thompson 
(1988:270) maintain that those Mediterranean tactics of “ramming and boarding and 
fighting what were essentially land battles at sea,” were carried over into the Atlantic, and 
that Spanish ships consequently suffered from major liabilities vis-à-vis their English and 
Dutch opponents, being either “under-gunned or out-ranged.” This fact goes a long way to 
explain the English and Dutch victory of 1588 against the seemingly ‘invincible’ Spanish 
Armada. Although Spain subsequently attempted several times to assemble armadas to 
invade England and the United Provinces in the following decades, it was always hampered 
by a shortage of “capital investment necessary to build and maintain a state fleet,” by the 
restricted supply of naval stores, the short supply of manpower – most men available 
“preferred the higher wages associated with civilian shipping” – and, as with the French in 
the eighteenth century, the lack of a sustained initiative to develop the navy. Thus, Spain was 
only able to field a “competitive, albeit rarely successful, navy for intermittent periods of 
time,” a consequence of a regime that was “under-institutionalised, not too blessed with 
talented monarchs, and subject to the rise and fall of the occasional strong minister” 
(Modelski and Thompson, 1988:270-271). Dehio’s comment, that Spain was thus essentially 
a continental state, thus seems clearly warranted. 
Once the Dutch began to establish their navy in the late sixteenth century, Spain was 
always on the defensive on the oceans, since the “Spanish transatlantic shipping and the rich 
treasure fleets quickly became tempting targets for north-west European attackers,” and to 
guard this life-line, Spanish “resources had to be concentrated on keeping her Atlantic 
communications open for her treasure-fleets and the western Mediterranean safe for the 
transfer of funds and troops to Genoa for Milan, Germany and Flanders” (Modelski and 
Thompson, 1988:269; Cooper, 1970b:228). However, this did not preclude the wearing 
down of these Atlantic communications by the Dutch, especially after the founding of the 
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Dutch West India Company, which allowed the Dutch to launch more organised raids 
against Spanish shipping (Cooper, 1970b:228). Conversely, Spain was much less successful 
in its attempts to harass Dutch shipping, and although destroying Dutch trade was an 
identified goal of the Spanish authorities, “there was no real prospect of establishing an 
effective blockade” (Cooper, 1970b:228).  
Even though the Spanish attempted to enlist allies among the Hanseatic towns to “harry 
Dutch trade there” in the 1620s, the Dutch were already far enough progressed in their 
ascent to hegemony that “none of the Hanseatic towns would entertain the project for fear of 
offending the Dutch” (Cooper, 1970b:228). The only major threat to Dutch shipping in the 
North Sea and Baltic came from the Dunkirkers – Dunkirk having been in Spanish hands 
from 1583 – who “seldom had more than thirty ships at sea at one time,” yet managed to 
capture 1,499 ships (with around two-thirds being Dutch) between 1626 and 1634, while 
sinking another 336 (Cooper, 1970b:229; Parker, 1975:64). The Spanish did however 
manage to take “a number of [Dutch] prizes” in the Mediterranean, which unfortunately for 
them was offset by the Dutch West India Company’s capture or sinking of 547 Spanish ships 
in the Atlantic and Caribbean. Although, as Parker (1975:64) argues, the Dutch did suffer a 
high cost as a result of Spanish efforts due to “higher rates of insurance, in convoy and escort 
charges, and in direct loss,” these actions spurred on the development of the Dutch war fleet 
considerably, and by 1639 the Dutch annihilated the last of the Spanish fleets to challenge 
their sea-power, in the Battle of the Downs (Cooper, 1970b:229). After this landmark victory, 
the Dutch could more effectively divert their naval power to protect their trade, especially in 
the Baltic, since this was the life-line of their economy (Haley, 1972:29,34). This also hints at 
the close cooperation between Dutch business and government interests, which is a vital 
prerequisite for hegemony. As for Spain, after this point, as Modelski and Thompson 
(1988:271) argue, the Spanish navy, although not totally destroyed, was much reduced in 
capability and, as Figure 3.4 reveals, the Spanish naval capability concentration never again 
reached its peak of the 1590s. 
 
Figure 3.4. Spanish Naval Capability Concentration, 1494-1808 
 
Source: Modelski and Thompson (1988:274). 
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The global nature of the Thirty Years’ War was highly visible with regards to maritime 
conflict, and the Dutch were battling the Portuguese in the East Indies, Brazil, and East 
Africa; the Spanish in both the Caribbean and the Pacific; and even the Chinese around 
Macau (Modelski and Thompson, 1988:190). These far-flung battles served as evidence of 
the growth in Dutch global reach capabilities, and the Dutch were able to effectively project 
their power around the world. During the first half of the seventeenth century, the Dutch 
regularly crossed the 50 per cent naval concentration level (see Figure 3.5), and it can be 
argued that these years represented the peak of Dutch hegemony (Modelski and Thompson, 
1988:105). What this meant for Spain was that none of its territories were safe from Dutch 
raids and, as Parker (1975:57) points out, the Dutch fleets regularly organised expeditions of 
“war or piracy to many ports of the Iberian empires overseas,” and even those Spanish 
holdings along the Pacific were not exempt, since “in 1615 the first Dutch fleet entered the 
Pacific and ravaged the west coast of Mexico and Peru before sailing on to attack the 
Philippines.” To the detriment of Spanish finances, which will be discussed in greater depth 
shortly, this “upsurge of hostilities on the high seas around America inevitably led to an 
increase in Spanish defence spending there,” and constituted a definite example, in Parker’s 
(1975:57-58) opinion, of the manner in which Spain’s fortunes, and thus prominence, were 
harmed by its war with the Dutch. Moreover, the loss of major Portuguese overseas 
territories, such as spice islands in the East, holdings in Africa, and (albeit temporarily) 
Brazil, and the associated costs to Portugal, certainly figured into the growing discontent 
with Spanish rule there, culminating in the Portuguese rebellion, and subsequent 
independence, in 1640 (Parker, 1975:58; Elliott, 1970:470). This sentiment is reflected by 
Rasler and Thompson (1989:54), who observe that:  
 
Despite the boost provided by the co-optation of the Portuguese fleet … the Spanish were never able to 
apply their sea power in a way that might be expected to defeat their Dutch and English maritime 
opposition in the late sixteenth century. As a consequence, Spain could not suppress the Dutch revolt, 
and less directly, it could not hold on to the Portuguese empire that broke away in the 1640s. 
 
Figure 3.5. Dutch Naval Capability Concentration From 1579-1810 
 
Source: Modelski and Thompson (1988:194). 
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Linking up to the abovementioned comment of Rasler and Thompson, Spain was indeed 
hampered in the war against the Dutch by the long route its troops had to take overland to 
reach the Low Countries. Part of the reason for this was, as discussed above, the fact that 
Spain could not commit any further naval resources to securing a sea-route to the 
Netherlands, since it was by necessity forced to commit all its maritime resources to 
maintaining the ocean link with its American colonies, and ensuring the safe arrival of the 
treasure fleets (Cooper, 1970b:228). However, as was revealed, this strategy did not always 
pay off, and even the treasure fleets were not always safe from the rebels. 
As mentioned throughout this study, in order for any state to be successful in the modern 
world-system, of which Europe was by the seventeenth century clearly a part, the state must 
identify its own interests with that of its capitalist class – in the Dutch case especially traders 
and merchants – that is to say, a hegemonic bloc must exist. If the capitalist class is afforded 
sufficient space to flourish, and is also afforded the necessary protection by the armed forces 
of the state, it will in turn strengthen the government (and the state as a whole) through the 
accumulation of capital. This was indeed very much the case in the United Provinces, which 
first saw the rise of the independent large-scale capitalist (Geyl, 1961:164). Furthermore, vast 
fortunes were being accumulated by the great merchants in Amsterdam, The Hague, and in 
other Dutch cities, and the regents and the narrow ruling oligarchy of the Dutch Republic 
closely identified their own prosperity, and that of the state, with the new capitalist class 
(Haley, 1972:72,74). This close and harmonious cooperation between government (politics) 
and business (economics) was one of the key ingredients of Dutch prosperity, and hegemony. 
Conversely, as was discussed in the previous section, the lack of such cooperation in Spain, 
not to mention the miniscule bourgeoisie and negative attitudes toward labour and 
enterprise, severely hampered Spanish prosperity and, ultimately, would help to relegate the 
empire of Spain to a weak semi-peripheral position in the world-system. 
 
3.3.3 The finance domain 
The dominance of the Dutch in the domain of commerce brought about their dominance in 
the domain of finance as well. As Geyl (1961:158) argues, “Trade brought accumulation of 
capital, and capital in turn set thousands of hands at work in every variety of business, thus 
promoting further trade.” Overseas trade was indeed the ‘prime motive power’ of the Dutch 
economy, and the success of the Dutch traders brought the north rapid growth and 
prosperity. Here too the geography of the United Provinces seemed to have had a hand, and 
Haley (1972:38) argues that there existed little outlet for the capital accumulating among the 
traders and merchants of the north (save for expensive drainage and land-reclamation 
projects, which were also made possible by the availability of capital). As a consequence, 
there existed a tendency to reinvest capital in new trading or commercial enterprises, which 
in turn helped to make the Dutch even more competitive and successful in their capital 
accumulation. 
As Wallerstein (1980:57) argues, the strength of Dutch finance rested upon their 
productive and commercial strength. This created a basis for sound public finances which, 
when combined with the vast commercial network of the United Provinces, turned 
Amsterdam into the centre of the seventeenth century money market and international 
payments system. The general economic and monetary instability prevalent during the first 
half of the seventeenth century furthermore strengthened Amsterdam’s position, and Dutch 
financial stability appears all the more remarkable when compared with their 
contemporaries, especially the Spanish who, through financial mismanagement, declining 
revenues, and increasing costs of war, suffered from repeated bankruptcies (Kennedy, 
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1988:52; Schiller, 1853:356; Spooner, 1970:68). This financial decline of Spain and other 
Mediterranean economies represented a permanent shift in favour of the northern, Atlantic 
economies, where the Dutch were undoubtedly in the leading position during much of the 
seventeenth century (Spooner, 1970:69). 
Rasler and Thompson (1989:35) make the observation that the pre-eminent sea powers 
tend to be the leading centres of financial dynamism as well. This is understandable since 
long-distance trade is inseparable from sea power, and the rise in the concentration of Dutch 
naval capabilities, especially between 1608 and 1642, was accompanied by their rising 
financial strength as well. So much so in fact, that the year in which the Twelve Year Truce 
was signed (1609), the Dutch founded the famous Wisselbank of Amsterdam, while the 
Spanish were still suffering as a result of their 1607 bankruptcy (Spooner, 1970:68). 
Furthermore, Amsterdam soon saw the appearance of brokers, who “for their own advantage 
[began] playing the market” (Haley, 1972:43). Amsterdam also saw the rise of the trade in 
futures, and the Amsterdam Bourse was established in 1611 (Haley, 1972:41). When 
considering the quality of the exchange and insurance facilities available, it is 
understandable why Amsterdam has been labelled the “Wall Street of the seventeenth 
century” (Goubert, quoted in Wallerstein, 1980:57).  
The Wisselbank played an important role in Dutch financial ascent, since it became the 
pre-eminent centre of European deposit and exchange (Wallerstein, 1980:58). One of the 
reasons for the growth of deposits at the Wisselbank was the large degree of financial 
uncertainty caused by the Thirty Years’ War, and many wealthy individuals saw Amsterdam 
as the safest, and most stable, repository of their fortunes. What became known as the ‘crisis 
of the seventeenth century’ – those “slumps, bankruptcies and shocks of war” – acted in the 
favour of the young Dutch Republic, which managed to escape the devastation of the war 
(most of the northern provinces had been free from invading armies since the 1590s) 
(Spooner, 1970:69; Haley, 1972: 152). By contrast, much of the rest of Europe suffered from 
the turmoil of war, rebellions, or uprisings, including France, England, Russia, and Ireland 
(Goldstein, 1988:309; Geyl, 1961:161, Haley, 1972:152). In this sense, the Dutch were thus 
able to directly profit from the Great Power War and its related instability, and as Geyl 
(1961:161) asserts, except in Germany, this confusion did not diminish the world’s 
purchasing power (and thus their ability to buy goods shipped and refined by the Dutch). Of 
course, one should bear in mind Steinberg’s (1966:3) argument that not even Germany was 
ultimately worse off in 1648 than in 1618. 
When turning to the Dutch currency, here too the United Provinces made their mark on 
world finances since theirs was the preferred currency of world trade (Wallerstein, 1980:59). 
These negotiepeningen were renowned for their stability and quality, and the Dutch 
dominance of world trade helped to increase their popularity. In turn, this flow of finances 
helped the Dutch to maintain lower interest rates than their contemporaries, and as the 
financial hub of Europe, Amsterdam proved attractive to foreign capital. The lower interest 
rates in particular, provided the Dutch state with an “inestimable advantage over its rivals,” 
since the government could borrow money more cheaply than rival governments could, due 
to their higher credit rating and prompt repayment of loans (Kennedy, 1988:69). As Parker 
(1975:59) concurs, the capital accumulated in Amsterdam as a result of trade made it 
possible “to float government loans and finance trade and industry without pushing up 
interest rates,” so that the Dutch government was able to borrow “at 10 per cent in the 
1600s, at 5 per cent in the 1640s and at 4 per cent after 1655.” The Dutch government could 
thus cover the rising costs of war (especially after 1621) by helping to finance their effort 
through public loans (Kennedy, 1988:69). Although the Dutch state saw its debt increase to 
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153 million florins in 1651, its credit system remained secure, underpinned by the economic 
strength of the country and the timely payment of interest. Schiller (1853:356) offers the 
following insights into Spanish financial ruin, and Dutch financial success: 
 
Spain maintained this expensive war with dead, unfructifying gold, that never returned to the hand 
which gave it away, while it raised the price of all necessaries. The treasuries of the Republic were 
industry and commerce. … The field was sown sparingly with choice seed, and it bore fruit, though late, 
yet a hundred-fold; but the tree from which Philip gathered fruit, was a fallen trunk, which never again 
became verdant. 
 
Of course, while the Dutch Republic often subsidised their allies during the Thirty Years’ 
War, those same allies had helped to subsidise the Dutch war effort some decades earlier. In 
particular, England contributed 15 million florins to the Dutch Republic between 1585 and 
1603, while France contributed 12 million florins between 1598 and 1610 (Parker, 1975:50). 
In this manner, Spain’s animosity with numerous European powers, particularly over fears of 
Habsburg domination, contributed financially to the Dutch war effort as well.  
As for Spain, Rasler and Thompson (1989:54) capably summarise the root of the 
difficulties faced there:  
 
Castile-Spain was an organization designed for, and accustomed to, territorial conquest. Only through 
war could a centralized state be created in the middle of the Iberian peninsula. And only a highly 
centralized state could cope with frequent warfare and territorial expansion. However, the centralized 
state that was forcibly created rested on an extremely weak economic foundation. 
 
This foundation, as discussed in an earlier section of this chapter, rested upon “a single 
export commodity” – wool – and the war with the Dutch severely undermined the traditional 
export of this commodity to the Netherlands (Rasler and Thompson, 1989:54). Coupled with 
the fact that Spain was characterised by the absence of a sizable bourgeoisie and by “a 
pronounced coastal-interior economic dualism” which ultimately restricted the “likelihood 
of transforming the agrarian-herding nature of the Spanish political economy,” the problem, 
in Rasler and Thompson’s (1989:55) view, was that “the likelihood of commercially oriented 
elites rising to other than intermittent political influence in this context remained … 
remote.” Again, the stark contrast between the existence of not only a working, but a strong, 
hegemonic bloc in the United Provinces, and the absence of one in Castile/Spain, is clear, 
and helps to account for the fundamental fiscal weakness of the Spanish state.  
Since no well-developed and politically influential capitalist class of merchants, bankers, 
and other industrious individuals existed in Spain, the state did not have recourse to the 
“relatively inexpensive,” efficient, and uninterrupted sources of credit that the Dutch were 
able to avail themselves of (Rasler and Thompson, 1989:91). Rather, Spain developed 
“largely ad hoc practices” that involved the issuing of the aforementioned juros, which were 
funded debts derived from “future specified revenue sources” (and which diverted funds 
from investment in agro-industrial and commercial development into the government’s 
coffers) and asientos, which were unfunded debts with “high interest rates.” In sharp 
contrast to the interest rates paid by the Dutch government, the Spanish juros had rates 
between 5 and 7 percent during the first half of the sixteenth century, while the asientos had 
rates ranging between 17 and 49 percent (Rasler and Thompson, 1989:92). By the 
seventeenth century, the situation was much deteriorated, since Spanish royal credit had 
steadily declined as a result of mounting debt and the increase in the associated interest 
payments (Rasler and Thompson, 1989:93).  
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Indeed, in having failed to maintain “the economic underpinnings of a powerful military 
machine,” the Spanish government had acted so imprudently in the taking out of loans that 
it often had to spend the majority of the budget solely on interest payments, necessitating 
further loans (Kennedy, 1988:54-55). In time, these interest payments could not be 
sustained, and were suspended, since the Spanish crown found “it had no unpledged 
income or that no one was willing to lend additional funds,” leading to the all-too-often 
declarations of bankruptcy (1557, 1575, 1596, 1607, 1627, 1647, 1652, 1656, 1662) (Rasler 
and Thompson, 1989:93). Indeed, a clear trend is visible from the dates of Spanish 
bankruptcies, in that the rate at which they occurred increased rapidly in the seventeenth 
century.  
The roots of Spain’s financial troubles are to be found in several particular features which 
have been touched upon at various points in this chapter. First, as the heart of Spanish 
power, Castile had borne the greatest financial burden by far, and as was mentioned, it 
entered a period of economic decline towards the end of the sixteenth century, brought 
about by the dislocation of its foreign trade, and a decline in its population and productivity 
(Elliott, 1970:440). As Spain’s troubles with the Low Countries mounted in the 1560s, the 
spiralling costs of what would eventually become an eighty-year-long war fell predominantly 
on Castilian taxpayers, despite the fact that the economic foundation of that kingdom was 
slowly eroding. Having mortgaged most of the crown’s traditional supplies “to the bankers in 
perpetuity” as a result of the practice of funding its debts by pledging future revenue sources, 
only three major sources of income remained (Elliott, 1970:441). These were the taxes paid 
by Castile, the dues collected from “ecclesiastics and laymen in the various kingdoms of the 
monarchy by papal authorization” and, of course, the treasure flowing in from the Americas. 
A rough estimate of this income (per annum) is presented in Table 3.1, and is based on 
figures from 1598 to 1607. Although not precise, they provide a good estimate of the Spanish 
crown’s income during those years. 
 
Table 3.1. The Three Main Sources of Income of the Spanish State, Per Annum, Between 
the Years 1598 and 1607 
 
Source: Elliott (1970:441). 
 
As can be observed from the above table, the taxes collected in Castile, constituted the 
Spanish crown’s primary source of income. However, as Elliott (1970:441-442) points out, 
the actual amount received from Castile’s taxpayers was not as great as the figures would 
suggest, since “some of the taxes were already pledged to the bankers two or three years in 
advance.” By 1606, the millones yielded no more than two and a half million ducats, and 
this decrease was symptomatic of the steady financial exhaustion of Castile. Indeed, the 
financial burden was so skewed against Castile that the kingdoms of Aragon and Valencia 
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did not pay the millones or alcabala taxes at all, since their Cortes (subnational assemblies) 
were both stronger vis-à-vis the crown and shielded from “excessive fiscal demands” (Elliott, 
1970:439;442). Meanwhile, in Castile itself, the tax burden, as mentioned previously, fell 
disproportionately on the poorer members of society since the wealthy, most of whom 
clamoured to join the hidalgos, were able to sidestep the taxes to a large extent, while being 
exempt from the servicios altogether (Elliott, 1970:448). This fact meant that for many “it 
was easier, and in the long run no more unprofitable, to live in idleness and trust to native 
wit and the charity of the church” (Elliott, 1970:452). This most certainly contributed to the 
“complete absence of a vigorous urban class actively engaged in commercial and industrial 
enterprises” (Elliott, 1970:450). 
Of course, the role played by the Spanish treasure fleets must not be discounted in 
attempting to account for the absence of the abovementioned vigorous urban class (of 
capitalists), or for the poor judgment of the Spanish crown in its borrowing practices since, 
as Elliott (1970:451) contends, “it was natural to disregard the dictates of financial prudence 
when one could rely upon an annual shower of American silver to replenish the national 
coffers.” However, even this windfall did not manage to ameliorate Spain’s fiscal dilemmas 
in the long run since, from the last years of the sixteenth century, the supplies of American 
silver began to decline, from 3,347,000 ducats in 1598 to 1,800,000 in the 1610s and 
eventually to around 800,000 in the 1620s (Elliott, 1970:442). This trend, no doubt alarming 
for the Spanish crown, was due both to declining production in the mines of America and, 
significantly, to the “withholding of larger sums by the viceroys in America for their own 
needs,” which naturally included defence against Dutch raids. As Parker (1975:58) points 
out, the viceroy of Peru spent 200,000 pesos (a peso being worth slightly more than a ducat) 
on defence in 1624, and a whopping 948,000 by 1643. In Mexico, a similar trend was visible, 
with the government there dispatching 1,500,595 pesos to Spain between 1618 and 1821, 
while simultaneously dispatching 1,653,253 pesos to the Philippines “for the islands’ 
defence.” Dutch raiders had thus succeeded in diverting vast sums of money away from 
Spain as a result of their operations on the seas around the Americas, and this constituted a 
very tangible way in which the Dutch-Spanish war served to diminish the fortunes of Spain, 
and thus its hopes of a successful outcome to the conflict. When the entire Spanish treasure 
fleet of 1628 fell into the hands of the Dutch, it is not difficult to imagine that this event 
contributed to the increasingly rapid collapse of Spanish finances. 
However, it should also be remembered that, alongside the diminishing flow of American 
treasure, “the production of gold and silver like other industrial sectors fell victim to the 
relentless law of diminishing marginal returns and declining profits” (Spooner, 1970:79). As 
such, in the seventeenth century, Spain was experiencing “periods of tight money [which] 
appeared longer and more persistently, precipitating shortages and even failures” (Spooner, 
1970:81). This forced the introduction of copper maravedis by the government to “expand 
the monetary circulation and cull profits and revenue for itself” but, as Spooner (1970:81-82) 
maintains, this “copper currency clogged the circulation, and true to the so-called 
Gresham’s Law, drove out the more valuable silver and gold coins.” Once again, Spain 
found itself in a position completely the opposite of that of the Dutch, this time with regards 
to currency, and until the 1680s Spain experienced a “progressive devaluation” of its 
currency. Here too the Dutch saw opportunity to undermine their main rivals in their 
hegemonic struggle, and the “Dutch and their agents along the Spanish coast [indulged in 
the practice] of introducing counterfeit coins into Castile and taking silver in exchange” 
(Spooner, 1970:82; Elliott, 1970:444). Coupled with this was the declining proportion of 
gold vis-à-vis silver that was brought over from the New World, which led to the appreciation 
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of the price of gold (Spooner, 1970:83). Spain, thus increasingly dependent upon its 
diminishing flow of undervalued silver coming in from its American mines, found itself in a 
particularly precarious position. 
In all, the Spanish crown found that its income was vastly insufficient given the expenses 
of its wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and in this the conflict of the Dutch 
taxed the Spanish economy most heavily. Indeed, Spain experienced two great bouts of 
spending in its war with the Dutch, which unsurprisingly correspond closely with the most 
intense periods of fighting – primarily around the turn of the seventeenth century, and again 
after the expiry of the Truce, as depicted in Figure 3.6. Unfortunately for the Spanish crown, 
it found that the bounty derived from American treasure did not even match the expenses 
incurred in maintaining the army of Flanders, and although the income from the New 
World amounted to 3.9 million ducats between 1571 and 1575, the amount paid to the 
paymaster-general of the army of Flanders totalled an astounding 9 million ducats (Parker, 
1975:55-56). Meanwhile, during the same period, the paymaster general of Mediterranean 
fleet was also granted some 5 million ducats. Nor was this worrying trend temporary – for the 
entire period between 1566 and 1654, the Military Treasury of the Spanish Netherlands 
received no less than 218 million ducats from Castile, while the American treasure netted 
only 121 million! As Phillip II remarked in 1578:  
 
[The war has] consumed the money and substance which has come from the Indies, while the collection 
and raising of revenues in these kingdoms has only been done with great difficulty because of the dearth 
of specie in them (since so much is exported) and because of the damage which this does and causes to 
the commerce and trade on which the yield of our taxes depends (quoted in Parker, 1975:55). 
 
Figure 3.6. Money Received from Castile by the Paymaster-General of the Army of Flanders, 
1566-1650 
 
Source: Parker (1975:56). 
 
Meanwhile, to the great frustration of Castilian taxpayers, the shortfall produced by the 
enormous expenses of the war in the Netherlands was to be made up from their taxes, and 
understandably, a delegate of the Castilian Cortes exclaimed in 1586, “However much 
money comes [from the Indies], this kingdom has less!” (quoted in Parker, 1975:56). Yet 
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despite the glaring problems that were steadily undermining Spain’s ability to finance its 
wars, particularly with the Dutch, the crown’s “inability to curb expenditure prevented any 
reduction of Castile’s taxes, [while] the inadequacy of the existing taxes to meet the annual 
deficit compelled a resort to credit which placed a growing strain on the crown’s bankers” 
(Elliott, 1970:445). For the year 1608, for example, the crown’s available funds, with the 
credit extended by its bankers, amounted to 6,410,104 ducats. However, the expenses until 
October of that year, as depicted in Table 3.2, totalled 7,272,173 ducats. The deficit was 
then added to the “outstanding obligations and general arrears” of the crown, brining that 
sum to more than 7 million ducats. 
 
Table 3.2. Expenses of the Spanish Crown, 1608 
 
Source: Elliott (1970:445). 
 
This, Elliott (1970:446) argues, forced the Spanish crown to admit that there “seemed 
only one way of escape,” and that was to conclude the Twelve Year Truce with United 
Provinces in 1609. The war between the Spanish and the Dutch, which had prompted much 
of the expenses (and deficits) of the Spanish crown, thus brought about its own cessation as 
well, with the crucial difference being that the Dutch ended up in a better position overall 
(and especially vis-à-vis Spain), and with Spain reeling from its spate of bankruptcies. As one 
of the Spanish king’s ministers at the time noted, “The truce in Flanders was considered an 
indispensible measure because of the shortage of money” (quoted in Elliott, 1970:446). 
Despite the opportunities for financial reform brought about by the Truce, these were in 
practice never realised, and as Elliott (1970:457) notes, “although in the reign of Philip III 
there was universal peace, and long-established evils should have been set right, nothing was 
done in the Indies or inside Spain, and the Crown’s finances were given no relief.” Despite 
the issuance of the “most gloomy reports on the crown’s revenues” by the Council of 
Finance, three essential problems prevented any amelioration of Spain’s financial situation, 
even during this period of peace (Elliott, 1970:458). Firstly, royal expenditures and the 
“liberal distribution” of mercedes (royal favours) were not reduced in accordance with the 
dire financial situation; secondly, the realms of Aragon, Valencia, Catalonia, and Navarre 
“devote[d] all their energies to preserving their many privileges” – including their much 
lighter tax burdens; and thirdly, even following the desperate measures including the 
imposition of new taxes on Castile in the 1620s, including taxes on the sale of paper, and on 
salt, and the confiscation of half the yield of all juros held by Spaniards and the entire yield 
held by foreigners, not to mention the revival of “the old feudal obligations of the 
aristocracy” in the 1630s and the exhortation of “nobles and ecclesiastics, town councils and 
cathedral chapters to offer money either in the form of loans, or as ‘voluntary’ gifts or 
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donativos to meet some special emergency,” Castile unsurprisingly yielded less revenue to 
the crown as the years passed, since its taxpayers were steadily being bled dry (Elliott, 
1970:456, 465). Evidence of the precipitous decline in the Castilian tax yield is provided by 
Elliott (1970:465), when he notes that the servicios (which yielded about 400,000 ducats per 
annum between 1598 and 1607 as reported in Table 3.1 on page 99), although raised to two 
million ducats a year by the Cortes in 1626, could only produce around half a million ducats 
from the exhausted Castilian taxpayers. 
After the resumption of war with the Dutch, and the additional strains introduced by the 
Spanish participation in the war in Germany, Spain was never able to escape the “relentless 
pressure of fiscal necessity,” and despite the attempts by Olivares – the favoured minister of 
the new king Philip IV, and the new head of the Spanish government as of 1622 – to affect a 
closer union between the realms of Spain, so as to relieve the burden of long-suffering 
Castile,  these “realms … felt themselves under no obligation to pay for the defence of an 
empire in which they had no share” (Elliott, 1970:443).  
However, animosity was steadily growing between Castile on the one hand, and the other 
realms, particularly Portugal and Catalonia, which were regarded by Olivares (quite 
incorrectly) as being much more prosperous than Castile, and despite this apparent 
prosperity, refused to contribute to the Spanish war effort on the same level as Castile 
(Elliott, 1970:468-469). However, the Spanish kingdoms maintained their “determination to 
resist exploitation by a country with an impoverished economy and a notoriously unstable 
curreny, for the sake of a cause which in no way interested them [sine the most important 
positions in the Spanish Empire were always filled by Castilians]” and, as Elliot (1970:469) 
argues, “they had no wish to suffer the fate of Castile.” This growing animosity between the 
Castilian officials and the constituent kingdoms of Spain culminated in the revolt not only 
of Portugal, but also of Catalonia, in 1640. This internal conflict, plus the involvement in 
not only the war against the Dutch, but also against the French, meant that from 1640 
“Spain and Spain’s international power were visibly crumbling” (Elliott, 1970:470). No 
longer strong enough to return Portugal to the fold, and with all its mounting financial 
problems, including the bankruptcy of 1647 and “the ravages of plague, and … feuds with 
the French,” Spain was once more – this time permanently – forced to conclude peace with 
the Dutch (Elliott, 1970:471). 
While Spain thus suffered from a precipitous decline during the Great Power War, 
especially in the domain of finance (which underpins the ability to wage such a war), the 
United Provinces consolidated its hegemony by dominating the productive, commercial, and 
financial domains of the world-economy simultaneously, aided to a large extent by the 
vacuum left by the Spanish as Castile imploded. As mentioned, the enormous financial 
strain placed upon Spain (but also upon the Dutch, who managed to carry that strain quite 
successfully) by the Great Power War eventually forced it to come to terms with the United 
Provinces, with the latter emerging in a much improved position in the world-system (as 
hegemon). The active zone of the world-economy was moreover clearly located in the seven 
northern provinces of the Netherlands during the first half of the seventeenth century, as 
witnessed by their leadership in shipbuilding, textiles, and innovation. The United Provinces 
also contained the leading city of the age, Amsterdam, which supplied 30% of the Dutch 
Republic’s budget, and which witnessed so great a surplus of capital that commercial 
enterprises and government loans could not provide an outlet for all of it (Wallerstein, 
1980:62; Geyl, 1961:164). Meanwhile, Spain’s core – Castile – which experienced a 
precipitous decline since the late sixteenth century, had dragged the Spanish Empire down 
 95 
with it. Thus, by the conclusion of the Thirty Years’ War the Dutch Republic had well and 
truly arrived as hegemon, while Spain’s former glory faded into memory. 
 
3.4 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR 
Apart from the explosion of bitter religious antagonisms, the devastation wrought in parts of 
Germany and Europe, and the eventual decline of the Habsburg dynasty, the Thirty Years’ 
War brought about lasting changes in Europe (and the world), and saw the birth and rise of 
the first hegemon of the modern world-system.  
With regards to the settlement of the Thirty Years’ War, the Peace of Westphalia (1648) 
resulted in several changes in how the political affairs of Europe, and the world-system as a 
whole, were run. As Spooner (1970:68) argues, the Treaties of Osnabrück and Münster, 
which constituted the Peace of Westphalia, were intended to finally settle the problems 
which earlier treaties and agreements (such as the Diet of Augsburg in 1555) could not, and 
which led to many of the “ferociously disputed” points in the Thirty Years’ War.  
Kennedy (1988:70) alludes to perhaps the best-known consequence of the Peace of 
Westphalia when he observes that in the post-1450 era, the waging of war became 
inseparable from the rise of the sovereign territorial state. As such, Westphalia represents the 
victory of the nation-state over other forms of political organisation, including city-states and 
fiefdoms, and “represents a restructuring of international relations based on the principle of 
balance of power and giving predominance to the northern coalition that had defeated the 
Habsburgs” (Goldstein, 1988:312-313). Indeed, as Spruyt (1994:155) notes, various 
arguments have been made ascribing the victory of the sovereign state over, for instance, city-
states and city-leagues, to the “Darwinian selection by war,” whereby “force is viewed as the 
final arbiter regarding the viability of any institution.” These arguments are rooted in the 
realist view of the interstate system as anarchic and competitive in nature since, “because of 
the predatorial nature of the international realm, all units have to be able to wage war in 
order to survive” (Spruyt, 1994:156). Although Spruyt (1994:157) does not wholly subscribe 
to such a thesis, by positing that “competitive success lies in the particular institutional 
makeup of different forms of [political] organization,” he does concede that “warfare is thus 
an important selective mechanism, but success in warfare is only an indicator which itself 
needs to be explained [at the hand of the institutional makeup of different forms of 
organisation].” Although the particularities of Spruyt’s arguments cannot be discussed here, 
it nevertheless makes sense that the Thirty Years’ War, as the first Great Power or hegemonic 
War of the modern world-system, constituted the ultimate proving ground for the modern, 
sovereign territorial state, and marked the moment of its ascendency over other forms of 
political organisation. 
Westphalia was a clear victory for the Dutch, and other ‘northern’ countries, such as 
England, in that it brought an end to the power of the Habsburgs and, furthermore, it 
represented a permanent departure from the Habsburg model of hereditary lands. In 
addition, the destruction of this “unitary tendency” created the space for the ascension of the 
principle of an “equal right of all to separate existence” (in the words of Albrecht-Carrié, 
1965:40), which was embodied in the nation-state and the states system, and which later 
became imposed on areas outside Europe as the modern world-system incorporated the rest 
of the globe (Goldstein, 1988:313). Goldstein (1988:312) further elaborates by stating that 
the War finalised the shift of military and economic power to the north of Europe, and 
although this was only part of an ongoing trend, as was demonstrated in this chapter, the 
Peace of Westphalia did signal the triumph of the north-west Atlantic states over their 
Mediterranean counterparts.  
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Other consequences of the rise of the nation-state include what Kennedy (1988:70) calls 
the “centralisation of political and military authority … accompanied by increased powers 
and methods of state taxation.” The spiralling costs associated with war in the seventeenth 
century, and particularly the Thirty Years’ War, forced all sides to seek greater sources of 
revenue and, as Goldstein (1988:312) remarks, the Thirty Years’ War, like all major wars 
following in its wake, led to huge increases in the tax burden of the civilian population. The 
Dutch Republic was no different, and as Haley (1972:154) observes, the United Provinces 
had a population one-third the size of England’s, but they paid more in taxation than the 
English. As such, the Dutch could not escape an increase in their tax burden, but their 
relative prosperity and wealth derived from trade allowed them to bear this burden much 
more readily than their rivals. In this sense the Thirty Years’ War established a precedent, in 
that victory in (hegemonic) war would only go to those states which had a financial system 
capable of carrying the burden of ever-growing military expenses, and those states lacking in 
this area were doomed to failure. 
For Rasler and Thompson (1989:89), the failure of the Spanish in their war against the 
Dutch, and conversely the success of the Dutch, can be attributed to the inability of the 
former to “obtain credit inexpensively, to sustain relatively large debts, and generally to 
leverage the initially limited base of their wealth to meet their staggering military expenses.” 
The Thirty Years’ War thus also represented a change in the way in which wars would be 
fought henceforth, in that victory would go to the side which was the most creditworthy, and 
had the greatest ability to raise (and sustain) public loans. Wars thus became instances where 
states would “fight now and pay later,” but only if they could raise the loans in the first place 
(Rasler and Thompson, 1989:89). The Dutch were thus well placed to emerge victoriously in 
the Eighty and Thirty Years’ Wars, since they dominated the domain of finance (and enjoyed 
very low interest rates), while the financial system of Spain ultimately collapsed under the 
burden of war.  
Another lasting consequence of the Thirty Years’ War was the general separation between 
affairs of the state, and religious beliefs (Steinberg, 1966:99). The Thirty Years’ War had 
witnessed the chaos that resulted from the confluence of politics and religion, and as 
Steinberg (1966:99) summarises: 
 
Henceforth religious beliefs, orthodox or heretical, were increasingly confined to the sphere of personal 
conviction and individual choice, whereas public affairs were directed by a raison d’état which no 
longer needed and used supernatural arguments for the pursuit of worldly ends. 
 
One of the consequences of Dutch naval strength, and consequently global reach, was the 
growth of their colonial empire (see Maps 3.4 and 3.5). Although many of their conquests 
were lost again before the end of the seventeenth century, it represents strong evidence in 
support of the argument that the Dutch were indeed hegemonic, since their influence was 
felt as far a field as Japan (Haley, 1972:26). The conquest of Portuguese possessions in the 
Indian Ocean and East Indies, as well as in Brazil, and the harassment of Spanish fleets in 
the Caribbean, not to mention the founding of New Amsterdam in North America and Cape 
Town in southern Africa, all point to the rise in relative global reach capabilities of the 
Dutch vis-à-vis their rivals during the Thirty Years’ War (Haley, 1972:28). 
As for Spain, and the Habsburgs in general, the reason for their failure during the Eighty 
and Thirty Years’ Wars can be reduced to what Kennedy (1988:46) calls the “real weakness of 
the Hapsburg system” – the inability of the Habsburg (and Spanish) financial systems to 
cope with the huge burdens of the wars, rebellions, and uprisings of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries (see Map 3.6). Coupled with this weakness, Kennedy (1988:49) 
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Map 3.4. Dutch Conquests in the Caribbean Region during the Seventeenth Century 
 
Source: Geyl (1961:277). 
 
Map 3.5. Dutch Conquests and Trading Stations in the East Indies and Far East during the 
Seventeenth Century 
 
Source: Geyl (1961:274-275). 
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observes that both the Austrian and Spanish branches of the Habsburg dynasty were 
confronted by simply too many enemies at once, and that the Spanish especially could be 
likened to “a large bear in the pit: more powerful than any of the dogs attacking it, but never 
able to deal with all of its opponents and growing gradually exhausted in the process.” In 
addition, as was witnessed with the Hague Coalition, Spain’s enemies (especially the Dutch) 
were aiding each other against their common foe, to which Spain could ultimately offer no 
answer. The Thirty Years’ War thus witnessed the first instance of what Dehio (1959:17) calls 
the mobilisation of a “grand coalition” under the leadership of an island power, against the 
common foe – the dominant land power making its bid for mastery over the Continent. 
 
Map 3.6. The Mounting Challenges to Spanish Rule 
 
Source: Kennedy (1988:42). 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
The key to Dutch ascent to hegemony during the seventeenth century lay, in part, in the 
observation made by Geyl (1961:161), when he remarks that as a result of the confusion of 
the Thirty Years’ War (and the numerous rebellions and civil wars taking place during that 
time), no rival government was capable of “undertaking or at least carrying through any 
vigorous effort at breaking the hegemony of Holland.” Indeed, the War thus clearly played a 
key role in allowing the United Provinces to ascend to hegemony, not only because their 
existence as an independent state could be traced back to the beginning of the (Eighty 
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Years’) War, but also because they were able to capitalise on opportunities created by the 
War, for instance by attracting investment and by establishing a far-reaching trade network 
on the back of their sea power, and by supplying the needs of other European countries. As 
long as the Thirty Years’ War raged on, no rival could seriously challenge Dutch productive, 
commercial, or financial dominance.  
However, Dutch success can also be attributed to the hegemonic bloc that formed in the 
United Provinces following the rebellion against Spanish rule. Throughout the struggle with 
Spain, the Dutch state, comprised of the bourgeois urban élite, acted in support of Dutch 
merchants, bankers, producers, and companies, particularly by employing the navy in their 
defence. Spain, lacking an urban bourgeois or middle class, and subject to the overwhelming 
dominance of the royal court, which enticed any and all with money at their disposal to seek 
the life of a hidalgo, thus lacked a sizeable and influential group of vigorous individuals who 
devoted themselves to capitalist enterprise. Lacking such an essential foundation, Spain 
could unsurprisingly not compete with the Dutch in the spheres of agro-industrial 
production, commerce, and finance and, being semi-feudal, it found itself ill-suited to the 
challenges generated by the new world-economy of capitalism.  
In contrast, the active zone of the world-economy was located in the United Provinces, 
allowing it to dominate the leading sectors of the world-economy, while the economy of 
Castile – the Spanish heartland – experienced a steady decline since the end of the sixteenth 
century. However, this imbalance by itself did not automatically mean that the United 
Provinces could emerge hegemonic, since the ‘rules’ of the new world-system still primarily 
reflected Spanish and Habsburg interests. The Great Power War, which for the Dutch had 
lasted eighty years, served to correct this fundamental disparity between material power and 
political influence by fatally and thoroughly undermining the weakened Spanish economy, 
while affording the Dutch the opportunity and space to emerge dominant in the early 
European world-economy. This War brought international power back into equilibrium with 
the distribution of military, economic, and technological capabilities (in accordance with 
Gilpin’s arguments discussed in the previous chapter), and at Westphalia this new Dutch-
dominated order was formalised, and accepted by the exhausted Spanish state. 
Thus, to return to the original hypothesis of this study, as set out in the first chapter, it 
does indeed appear valid that Great Power War was an essential ingredient in Dutch ascent, 
yet it was not the only one. Without the ‘material base’ – the dominant capitalist economy, 
hegemonic bloc, geopolitical setting and so forth – as elucidated in chapter one, Dutch 
hegemony could not have been effected by the Great Power War, and they would likely have 
followed the Spanish path of ruin. As such, the inclusion of the two independent variables – 
the material base alongside Great Power Warfare – in the hypothesis of hegemonic ascent 
appears fully justified by the Dutch-Spanish case study. 
Kennedy’s (1988:xv) conception of “relative strengths” certainly figure into this 
understanding of the Dutch rise to hegemony. Had the Dutch become independent by 
peaceful means, in an era of peace, and had their rivals not been preoccupied with the trials 
of war (whether external or internal), the United Provinces would likely have faced much 
tougher competition from other core states, so much so that another state altogether might 
have become hegemon. What set the United Provinces apart however, and allowed them to 
flourish in the seventeenth century, was that they were a relative “oasis of order and peace in 
a troubled century” (Haley, 1972:152).  
In support of this argument, one can witness that as soon as the Thirty Years’ War had 
ended in 1648, the United Province’s rivals began witling away its hegemony. The 
concentration of naval capabilities (refer to Figure 3.5 on page 86) illustrates this particularly 
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well. After 1648 there is a remarkable drop in Dutch naval concentration, revealing that the 
height of Dutch naval preponderance (and consequently hegemony) had passed. Geyl 
(1961:159) also observes that shortly after the end of the Thirty Years’ War, the economic 
preponderance of the Dutch was being challenged by the English, the French, the Swedes, 
and the Portuguese. Although a detailed discussion of this post-Great Power War period, and 
the end of what Ormrod (2003:xiii) calls “pax Neerlandica”, falls outside of the scope of this 
study, it nevertheless demonstrates the extent to which the Thirty Years’ War facilitated the 
rise of Dutch hegemony. 
When turning to Spain, the main military power of the sixteenth century (as was argued 
earlier in this chapter), the impact of relative strength is abundantly clear. While Schiller 
(1853:356) observes that the Dutch were busy building an Empire in the East Indies (and 
elsewhere) during the very war in which they were struggling for their continued existence, 
an anonymous Spanish councillor noted with dismay, “The War in the Netherlands has 
been the total ruin of this monarchy” (quoted in Kennedy, 1988:50). Responsible for this 
difference were the relative productive, commercial, and financial capabilities of these two 
states and their relative capitalist development, as well as their relative positions with regards 
to the other European states of the time. As such, while Spain lost its dignity, its wealth, and 
many of its territories during the Eighty Years’ War, the Dutch gained the formal recognition 
of their independence, which allowed them to join the European community of sovereign 
states as a full member, all the while seated at the head of the table. 
As recounted in this chapter, Dutch prosperity had come from the sea; it provided them 
with both their protection and their life-line. Ultimately however, hegemony would pass to 
another sea power a short distance across the Channel, namely the English/British. 
Eventually, England would overtake the United Provinces as the foremost maritime (and 
capitalist) power in the world, and establish itself as the new hegemonic state in the 
nineteenth century. However, the particulars of that case will not be investigated in the 
present study. 
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CHAPTER 4  
CONCLUSION 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter, which constitutes the final one of this study, will attempt to present a summary 
of the study in its entirety – including what was envisioned, how it was carried out, what 
results were produced, the implications and significance of those results, and possible 
directions for further research. First, the original motives and plan for the conduct of this 
study, including comments on the methodology, will be outlined, so as to ensure that the 
discussion presenting the findings will remain focused and relevant, thus presenting as useful 
an end product as possible. To that end, the background, rationale, objectives, hypothesis 
and scope of this study, as contained in the first chapter, will be briefly revisited.  
Following this, those research questions provided in chapter one will be answered 
individually, thereby shedding light on the role of Great Power War in Dutch hegemonic 
ascent, while permitting the tentative speculation of generalisable data for future 
comparative studies. Once this has been done, a discussion of the theoretical insights and 
significance of the findings will follow. Aspects for further research will then be highlighted, 
after which the chapter, and the study as a whole, will be concluded. 
This study was inspired by the arguments of Wallerstein (2000a:258) – the main 
proponent of World-Systems Analysis – and Goldstein (1988:366), that in the three instances 
of hegemony that can be identified in the modern world-system, the hegemony of each 
individual state was “secured by a thirty-year-long world war.” Consequently, this study has 
attempted to investigate how it can be that such world wars, or Great Power Wars, are able to 
secure the hegemony of one of its participants, when such conflicts are by definition “very 
destructive of land and population.” In order to carry out this investigation, one of the three 
hegemons of the modern world-system was selected, along with its respective Great Power 
War. The first of the hegemons – the United Provinces of the Netherlands – was chosen in a 
conscious effort to bring into clearer focus the historical experience of hegemony in the early 
modern world-system, given the prevailing contemporary focus on American, and to a lesser 
extent, British hegemony. For instance, in chapter two it was mentioned that Cox 
(1987:7,109) has only identified two hegemonic world orders (one British and one 
American), while others, particularly Wallerstein, have maintained that the United Provinces 
had succeeded in achieving hegemony in the seventeenth century. Given the value of the 
longue durée, this study has aimed, through its focus on Dutch hegemonic ascent, to bring 
the history and experiences of this early hegemony closer to the present, and it will be 
maintained in this chapter that this experience is indeed very relevant today, given the 
possibility of renewed hegemonic rivalry in the decades ahead. 
Keeping in mind that, according to Wallerstein (2000a:255), ‘hegemony’ refers to a stage 
“in which the ongoing rivalry between the so-called ‘great powers’ is so unbalanced that one 
power can largely impose its rules and its wishes (at the very least by effective veto power) in 
the economic, political, military, diplomatic, and even cultural areas,” it was necessary to 
identify the underlying foundation of hegemony in the world-system so that it could be 
investigated how Great Power Wars could ‘secure’ that hegemony. Here too, Wallerstein’s 
(2000a:255) comments proved insightful, since he argues that the foundation “of such 
[hegemonic] power lies in the ability of enterprises domiciled in that power [the hegemonic 
state] to operate more efficiently in all three major economic arenas – agro-industrial 
production, commerce, finance” (emphasis added). From this, Wallerstein (2000a:255) 
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proceeds to further clarify the concept of hegemony, by arguing that a given state can be 
regarded as hegemonic when “the edge [of its enterprises in the three economic arenas] is so 
significant that allied major powers are de facto client states and opposed major powers feel 
relatively frustrated and highly defensive vis-à-vis the hegemonic power.”  
As such, the point of departure of this study was that, in order to investigate how Great 
Power War is able to ‘secure’ hegemony, it should be identified how such a War impacts the 
competitiveness of the enterprises of the states in question in the three economic domains of 
agro-industrial production, commerce, and finance. After all, if hegemony consists of an 
edge in these three economic domains, and if “the winner’s economic edge is expanded by 
the very process of the war itself,” then it must hold that a Great Power War positively affects 
the competitiveness of the emerging hegemonic state’s enterprises in the three economic 
domains outlined above (Wallerstein, 2000a:261). At the same time, it must also hold that a 
Great Power War negatively affects the competitiveness of the enterprises of rival core states 
in the three economic domains. 
As such, the hypothesis of this study, as presented in chapter one, maintained that Great 
Power Wars not only facilitate the rise of hegemons in the modern world-system, but they are 
in fact necessary for them to do so, since in the absence of Great Power Wars, hegemony 
cannot, in Wallerstein’s (2000a:258) view, be ‘secured’. In order to test this hypothesis, and 
Wallerstein’s (2000a:258) argument (which does not explicitly specify the causal process that 
leads from the independent variable – Great Power War – associated with the theory to 
variance in the outcomes – hegemony or defeat), a theoretical framework was presented in 
chapter two, after which the case study was introduced, in which the struggle for hegemony 
or systemic leadership between the Dutch Republic and Hapsburg Spain was investigated in 
depth.  
However, in accordance with the method of structured, focused comparison, only specific 
aspects of the case were examined, relating to the general impact of the Great Power War on 
the competitiveness of the enterprises of the hegemon-rival pair (the Dutch Republic and 
Hapsburg Spain) with regards to the three economic domains. As such, the actual period of 
Dutch hegemony (i.e. hegemony itself12) was not investigated, only the way in which the 
Great Power War in question actually facilitated that state’s ascent to hegemony. However, 
in order to present a more complete picture of the impact of the Great Power War, the main 
rival of the Dutch for systemic leadership was also included in the discussion, and the 
impact of the Great Power War upon the enterprises of that rival state, with regards to the 
three economic domains, was also discussed, since it should logically follow that the Great 
Power Wars negatively affected Spain with regards to the economic domains (since it failed 
to emerge victorious – hegemonic or at the head of a system-wide world-empire – at the 
conclusion of the Thirty Years’ War). 
As this (qualitative) study was built around a case study from a past historical era, it 
necessarily follows that it was historical in nature. However, the structured, focused within-
case comparative aspect of the study is yet to be presented. That then is the main 
responsibility of this chapter, and the method of structured, focussed comparison, as 
identified by George and Bennett (2004:67), and introduced in chapter one, will be applied 
to produce the findings presented in the next section. With regards to the detailed historical 
narrative of chapter three, this has been informed by what George and Bennett (2004:211) 
identify as that variant of process-tracing (a method that attempts to identify the intervening 
                                                 
12 This explains the exclusion of sources, such as Cox (1981) and Keohane (1984), which are concerned 
more with the behaviour of the hegemon during its tenure, or with hegemony once already established.  
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causal process between an independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable) 
which “converts a historical narrative into an analytical causal explanation couched in 
explicit theoretical forms [namely World-Systems Analysis].” As such, the explanations 
accompanying the case study were “deliberately selective, focusing on what are thought to be 
particularly important parts of an adequate or parsimonious explanation.” This was visible 
with regards to the emphasis that was placed on the impacts of the Great Power War on the 
three economic domains identified above, of both the rising hegemon and its main rival for 
hegemony or systemic leadership. 
With regards to the structure of the study, chapter one introduced the background, 
rationale, research problem, hypothesis, main variables, objectives, research questions, 
methodology, and central concepts of the study. From the outset, it was argued, in 
accordance with the views of Wallerstein and Goldstein summarised above, that Great Power 
War constitutes the independent variable of the hypothesis, hegemony in the modern world-
system the dependent variable, and the competitiveness of the particular core state’s 
enterprises in the three economic domains the intervening variable. However, it was also 
recognised that locational factors existing prior to any Great Power War, such as natural 
resources, geographical location (including insularity or lack thereof), social organisation 
including a strong state supportive of capitalist enterprise, the extent of capitalist economic 
development, the presence of a capitalist hegemonic bloc, and levels of technology, 
contribute to a state’s success or failure in such a conflict, and as such, the ‘material base’ – 
shorthand for these factors – was also included as an independent variable. These variables 
are outlined in Figure 4.1, and following the presentation of the findings of the study in the 
next section, it will be investigated whether this hypothesis (and the proposed variables) is 
indeed valid, for the case under study. 
 
Figure 4.1. Variables of Hypothesis Presented in this Study 
 
 
The second chapter of this study provided a broad theoretical framework, consisting of a 
discussion of three approaches to structural change (which includes hegemonic ascent) in 
International Relations, namely the structural realism school, the long cycle school, and the 
world-economy school. The main authorities of each of these schools were identified and 
their central arguments briefly discussed. However, the contributions of several authors, as 
they pertain to the understanding of the relationship between Great Power War and 
hegemony, but who could not be readily placed within any of the three approaches, were 
also presented. Later in the current chapter, the findings of the study will be discussed in 
light of their theoretical insights, and as such, some linkages will be made with the second 
chapter. These theoretical insights will also be used to aid the tentative generalisation of the 
data produced by the Dutch case study to the British and American cases, not included here. 
Independent Variable: 
Great Power War 
Intervening Variable: 
Competitiveness of 
enterprises of rising core 
state in economic 
domains of agro-
industrial production, 
commerce, and finance 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Hegemony or defeat 
Independent Variable: 
‘Material base’ 
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The Dutch case study itself was then presented in chapter three, and was structured so that 
a background of the rising hegemonic state and its main rival was provided, followed by a 
discussion of the Great Power War and the involvement of these two states and their main 
allies in that War (the descriptive aspect). Since an attempt was made to generate this study’s 
own historical evidence, the study is necessarily particularly expansive, but production of 
empirically richer findings than would otherwise be the case was thus made possible. After 
this descriptive aspect, the impact of the Great Power War upon the economic domains of 
the two states in question was investigated (the explanatory aspect). In the final instance, the 
main settlement of the Great Power War, which encrusted the hegemony of the victor, and 
which “included a major restructuring of the interstate system,” was discussed (Wallerstein, 
2000a:259).  
Although the case study made use of within-case comparison (between the rising hegemon 
and its main rival), guided by the method of process-tracing, so that “relevant, verifiable 
causal stories resting in differing chains of cause-effect relations [were presented] whose 
efficacy can be demonstrated independently of those stories,” a structured, focused 
comparison of the hegemon and its rival is yet to be presented (Tilly quoted in George and 
Bennett, 2004:205). As stated, this will be the main task of this chapter. 
Moreover, the Dutch case study was selected, since it, like the British and American cases, 
constitutes a ‘most-likely case’, since the independent variable (Great Power War), as 
suggested by Wallerstein and Goldstein, “strongly posit[ed] an outcome,” namely hegemony 
(George and Bennett, 2004:121). In all, this study undertook theory testing, with the goal of 
identifying “whether and how the scope [and] conditions of … [the theory – world-systems 
theory, particularly the part of the theory relating to hegemonic succession] should be 
expanded or narrowed” (George and Bennett, 2004:115). At this point, with the objectives, 
methodology, and structure of the study having been summarised, it is possible to present 
and discuss the main findings. The results of the study, with regards to theory testing (and 
the testing of the hypothesis presented), will also be outlined in the next section. 
 
4.2 MAIN FINDINGS 
In this section, the main findings of the case study will be outlined, by way of a structured, 
focused comparison which, as mentioned, consists of asking several standardised, general 
questions – reflecting the research objective – of each of the states discussed within the case 
study in order to “guide and standardize data collection” (George and Bennett, 2004:67). 
Although these should be general questions, they are “focused” in that they are only 
concerned with specific aspects of the historical case under examination. The questions that 
will be used here were those research questions initially posed in chapter one, and at the end 
of each question, the relevant findings of the case study will be recounted and discussed for 
their possible generalisability. This will facilitate the drawing of “the explanations of each 
case [here the Dutch] of a particular phenomenon into a broader, more complex theory” 
(George and Bennett, 2004:67). At certain points, linkages to the theoretical framework will 
be made, although the theoretical insights presented by the findings will only be discussed in 
greater detail in the next section. Following the research questions, the generalised findings 
will be combined and used to investigate the validity of the purported Great Power 
War/hegemony link and the hypothesis proposed in chapter one. At this stage, the 
standardised, general questions will be posed, and the findings of the case study will be 
presented.  
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4.2.1 What was the eventual hegemon’s position in the world-system prior to the outbreak of 
the Great Power War? 
Initially, the Low Countries (the Seventeen Provinces of the Netherlands in their entirety) 
became the possession of the Habsburg dynasty in the fifteenth century, when Mary of 
Burgundy wed Maximilian of Austria, and their son, Philip I, inherited both the Austrian 
and Burgundian lands (the Low Countries constituted part of the latter). In turn, Philip I 
and his wife, Joan of Castile, passed their holdings on to their son, Charles V, who ruled over 
the vast Habsburg Empire during the sixteenth century, which included all of Spain and the 
Austrian territories (including the Low Countries). However, Charles V delegated the 
sovereignty and administration of the Austrian Habsburg lands to his brother, while he 
continued to personally rule over Spain, parts of Italy, and the Low Countries. Although 
poor in natural resources, the Low Countries nevertheless constituted one of the wealthiest 
and most cultured parts of the Habsburg lands, largely as a result of the concentration of 
trade and economic activities around Bruges and Antwerp, the leading economic centres of 
the emerging world-system during the sixteenth century. 
From this, the important observation emerges that the territory that would later be known 
as the United Provinces of the Netherlands constituted a relatively small part of the 
Habsburg Empire during the sixteenth century, and although it lacked independence, it was 
already the leading site of economic dynamism (and thus the emerging lead capitalist 
economy) of the time. As a result of their wealth (and thus their importance to the 
Burgundian and Habsburg political units), the Low Countries had been granted a measure 
of internal autonomy since the fifteenth century, including the right of the inhabitants to 
have a voice in decision-making processes, protection from corrupt rule, and the right to 
disobey their sovereign if s/he refused to respect their traditions. When the Reformation 
swept across Europe during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Calvinist Protestantism, 
largely spread by traders congregating in the Low Countries, took root in the northern 
provinces of the Netherlands in particular. When the orthodox Catholic Habsburgs (Charles 
V and in particular his son Philip II) attempted to root out this ‘heretical’ Calvinist doctrine 
by, for instance, introducing the Inquisition, and to undermine the authority of the States 
and States-General of the Netherlands by imposing taxes and appointing Bishops without 
consulting these bodies – actions that were in direct contravention of the substantial civil 
liberties of the Low Countries – they sparked the revolt in the Netherlands that was to lead 
to the Eighty Years’ War of Dutch Independence (1568-1648). This would later merge into 
the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), which revolved around the profound religious 
antagonism between German Protestants and Catholics, and which was to broaden into a 
general European war. As such, in order to fully account for the hegemonic ascent of the 
Dutch Republic, the Thirty Years’ War must be placed within the broader framework of the 
Eighty Years’ War. 
 
From the above, five points in particular can be identified as potentially generalisable as they 
pertain to this particular question. First, it becomes apparent that the eventual hegemon was 
a core, capitalist state (the most advanced of the time), and the leading site of economic 
dynamism in the world-economy prior to the Great Power War. Second, it possessed a strong 
capitalist hegemonic bloc and, as a consequence, was a ‘strong’ state in the sense that 
coherent, sustained policies supportive of capitalist owner-producers and capitalist enterprise 
were pursued, often with the backing of the military power. Third, the eventual hegemon 
was an insular power, although given Dehio’s argume
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amphibious than truly insular, it can be posited that the later hegemons were insular to an 
even greater extent.  
Fourth, the eventual hegemon was already engaged in warfare and direct, open conflict 
with its main rival for systemic leadership well before the Great Power War erupted. Fifth, 
those features of the eventual hegemon that would aid its victory in the Great Power War 
had already taken shape prior to that War, for instance the Dutch resistance to Spain and the 
emphasis of the Dutch on their navy as constituting an integral part of their defensive and 
offensive military strength. 
 
4.2.2 Which state was the eventual hegemon’s main rival during the War, and what was the 
position of that rival in the world-system prior to the outbreak of the War? 
The main rival of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, not only during the Thirty Years’ 
War, but also during their Eighty Years’ War of Independence, was Habsburg Spain. 
Importantly, Spain was not comprised of a single political or economic unit, but was made 
up of various realms, including Castile, Navarre, Galicia, Catalonia, Portugal (since 1580) 
and Valencia. However, of these, Castile was the dominant, in that the officials of the 
Spanish Empire were Castilian, the mines of America belonged to Castile, the Spanish 
monarchy and capital were located in Castile, and Castilian finances underpinned and 
sustained the Spanish government and crown. However, this fractionated nature of the 
Spanish Empire resulted in tensions between the constituent realms, with Castile resenting 
its uneven financial and human burden in maintaining the Spanish Empire, while the other 
realms, considering themselves to be marginalised and lacking a true stake in the larger 
Empire, resented and resisted Castilian efforts to pass a larger share of the burden onto 
them. 
Although Spain was the dominant power when the modern, capitalist, world-system came 
into being, possessing both the most powerful and advanced army and the largest navy, its 
Castilian economic foundations had begun to erode by the second half of the sixteenth 
century, and despite the Spanish navy and Armada, Spain was never a true maritime or 
commercial power. Instead, Orthodox Catholic Spain remained fundamentally Continental 
in orientation, and had succeeded in transplanting its military tradition of conquest and 
crusade (born of the long struggle against the Moors on the Iberian Peninsula and the 
Ottomans in the Mediterranean) to the New World. However, it was ill-suited to compete 
economically with the emerging capitalist regions of north-west Europe, and particularly the 
Netherlands. 
Although Spain had accumulated vast wealth, not only from the bullion flowing in from 
its American mines, but also from taxes (generated primarily in Castile), and from its control 
over the two primary trading areas of Europe (the Netherlands and several Italian cities), in 
the sixteenth century there did not (yet) emerge within Spain itself an entrepreneurial urban 
bourgeoisie preoccupied with capitalist enterprise. Rather, wealthy individuals were co-opted 
into the aristocratic upper stratum of Spanish society known as the hidalgos, since manual 
labour and commerce were considered unfitting occupations, while nobility and luxury 
constituted a dominant social aspiration of the inhabitants of Castile. This, combined with 
the ready wealth flowing across the Atlantic in Spanish treasure ships, precluded the 
emergence of an influential class of industrious producers, merchants, and other individuals 
who could invest in and develop agriculture, industry, commerce, and financial institutions. 
Indeed, the large proportion of hidalgos in Castilian society, and the virtual absence of a 
bourgeoisie, meant that no capitalist hegemonic bloc could be established in Castile or 
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Spain, which would critically undermine Spain’s ability to keep pace with Dutch advances 
during the Eighty Years’ War. 
Moreover, Spain was regarded with suspicion and distrust by its neighbours, particularly 
France, but also by the Papal States and some German princes, who feared that the 
Habsburgs were steadily encircling them on the way to establishing a ‘world monarchy’. As 
such, during the Great Power (Thirty Years’) War, Spain would not find itself lacking 
opponents and enemies who, like Catholic France, would readily side themselves with the 
Protestant United Provinces. Faced with so many enemies, Spain’s military pre-eminence 
and economic foundation would gradually be worn down, thereby allowing the Dutch 
Republic considerable ‘breathing space’ during its eighty-year-long war with Spain.  
 
With regards to the main rival of the eventual hegemon, five generalised findings suggest 
themselves. First, the continental challenger for systemic leadership was to a large extent 
politically and economically fractionated, thus requiring a strong (i.e. absolutist) state to 
bind the country together as a political and economic unit. Second, this state certainly did 
not encompass a capitalist hegemonic bloc that represented the capitalist class in its totality, 
as Castile did not even possess any significant bourgeoisie to speak of.  
Third, as a result of the absence of a working capitalist hegemonic bloc, and the 
fractionated nature of the economic and political spheres of the continental challenger, it 
was not the leading site of economic dynamism in the world-economy. Other factors, such as 
political, religious, or racial oppression, diverted many individuals, and their talents and 
capital, away to states that could offer more conducive intellectual environments. This was 
particularly apparent in the discussion concerning the industrial domain.  
Fourth, this challenger was a Continental European state, and could not expand militarily 
or alter the international status quo without immediately and directly impinging upon the 
interests of its Continental neighbours (here France is particularly important). When it did 
launch its bid for systemic leadership (and world-empire), it automatically faced several foes 
simultaneously, and was thereby exposed to attack from multiple directions, forcing great 
military commitments on the Continent, in turn resulting in a much weaker ability than 
would ultimately have been necessary to overcome the strategic advantage enjoyed by the 
insular power (the Dutch). Fifth, this meant that the challenger was necessarily more 
oriented towards the development of its army than to its navy, and since it lacked the 
strategical concentration of the eventual hegemon, it could never manage to overcome its 
insularity, backed by sea power. 
 
4.2.3 How did the Great Power War impact the economic domain of agricultural 
production (and thus the position of the enterprises operating in that domain) of both the 
eventual hegemon and its main rival? 
Given the fact that arable land was scarce in the Dutch Republic, and that its soils were not 
particularly suited to the production of cereals, thus meaning that the production of food 
from the land was vastly insufficient, the Dutch had supplemented their diet with imported 
food, and by fishing, since early times. Since the Dutch lands were intersected by waterways, 
lakes, and marshes, thus facilitating the use of water transportation, the Dutch found it 
relatively easy to extend their ‘amphibious’ lifestyle into the North Sea, where they were able 
make use of the large herring shoals moving between the Baltic and the North Sea. With this 
fishing industry becoming a veritable gold mine for the Dutch Republic, refined techniques 
and equipment were steadily introduced, such as the large, decked ships known as busses, 
which remained at sea for extended periods. As a result of their refinements, the Dutch 
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fishers had an edge over their competitors, and they often generated envy and contempt from 
other nations, particularly the English, in whose waters they regularly fished.  
Meanwhile, the Dutch had harnessed their limited soils, which were well suited to the 
growing of industrial crops, to produce hops, flax, and hemp in particular. Coupled with 
further advances and refinements, such as the use of tools and heavy fertilisation, the Dutch 
were able to make intensive use of their limited arable land, to lead Europe in the 
production of crops needed by industry (particularly textiles), and while Dutch agriculture 
became more efficient, the agricultural techniques of their competitors (including the 
Spanish) stagnated. As such, the Dutch held the lead in agricultural production from the 
late sixteenth century, which meant that while other European states were often vulnerable 
to famine, especially during the Thirty Years’ War, the Dutch not only produced enough 
food and industrial crops for their own consumption and industries, but could in fact export 
large quantities of both to the rest of Europe. Moreover, the Dutch also specialised in the 
reclamation of land from the sea, funded by an abundance of capital, generated primarily by 
commerce, which helped to expand the limited area available for agriculture.  
In all, as Wallerstein (1980:40-41) argues, Dutch fishing and agriculture reached new 
heights by the early seventeenth century, since both were driven by necessity as a result of the 
long war with Spain, and since the state actively supported capitalist entrepreneurs given the 
existence of a strong Dutch capitalist hegemonic bloc. Even Dutch poldering reached a 
highpoint between 1600 and 1625. The argument can thus be summarised in the following 
manner – while the Dutch had steadily advanced both their fishing industry and their 
agriculture centred around industrial crops before the outbreak of their war of 
independence, that war (and thus the Great Power War) nevertheless stimulated further, 
rapid advances in Dutch fishing and agriculture, driven by the necessity to provide food 
security to the Dutch during a tumultuous period that eventually included general 
European warfare. 
In contrast, the Castilian climate was ill-suited to large-scale agriculture, but was 
particularly accommodating to the raising of sheep. Indeed, the production of wool was the 
central agricultural activity in Castile, but this activity was hard hit by a decline in migratory 
sheep flocks and the lack of a corresponding increase in sedentary grazing in the second half 
of the sixteenth century. Moreover, most of the wool was shipped to north-west Europe, 
particularly the Netherlands, to supply the textile industry there, and this trade was severely 
undermined by the revolt of the Dutch and the war that followed. Lacking the capital and 
the capitalist stimulant to introduce significant agricultural innovation (wealth was more 
readily directed to acquire a title of nobility), the foundation of the Castilian, and 
consequently the Spanish, economy steadily declined. Indeed, manual labour on farms and 
estates was viewed as unsuitable activities for Castilians, while the Morisco (Moor) 
inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula, many of whom laboured on such farms and estates, 
were expelled in the frenzy and fervour of the early 1600s. 
In addition, Castilian and Spanish agriculture never managed to meet the food needs of 
the populace, and with the concentration of much of the population in towns and cities, 
driven by the search of better economic opportunities, Spain was particularly vulnerable to 
famine and plague. A particularly severe case of both struck Castile and Andalusia in 1599 
and 1600, bringing about a decline in population and a general labour shortage, and this 
exacerbated the economic decline of Castile in particular. 
Thus, Spain, but also most of the Great Powers of Europe, which were involved in the 
Great Power War at one stage or another, experienced a general stagnation in their 
agricultural techniques, and the War arguably disrupted agricultural production on a large 
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scale, including Spain, given the presence of French armies in the north, while the multiple 
domestic revolts taking place at the time arguably disrupted its economic activities in 
general. However, as will be seen with the next question, and the ones that follow, the Dutch 
advances in fishing and agriculture set in motion a “circular reinforcement of advantage,” 
either leading to, or supporting, further advances in industrial production, commerce, and 
finance (Wallerstein, 1980:40). 
 
Four generalised findings may be identified as emerging from the case study. First, the 
eventual hegemon was a leader in agricultural innovation and in the investment of capital in 
agricultural production. Second, the intensive cultivation of crops made possible by 
capitalist investment and cutting edge implements and techniques, not to mention strong 
state support of capitalist enterprise, meant that the eventual hegemon possessed relatively 
high levels of food security, to the extent that it could export agricultural produce to sustain 
its allies during the Great Power War. Also, given its insularity, its farmland and 
infrastructure were never plundered or otherwise directly subjected to the devastation 
wrought by the Great Power War.  
Third, the agricultural production of the continental hegemonic challenger suffered 
greatly as a result of the War, and for Spain, was dubious to begin with. Not only were men 
and money diverted away from the land during wartime, but the political support for 
capitalist production or processes (virtually nonexistent) fell away as more of the economy 
was channelled into the war effort. Additionally, this challenger was subject to the 
destructive effects of the Great Power War on its soil (notably the French invasion and 
regional uprisings in Spain). This necessarily had a negative impact on its agricultural 
production and on its economic infrastructure in general. Indeed, Spain also suffered the 
scourge of famine, which took its toll both on the civilian population and the army. Fourth, 
the eventual hegemon received a boost to its agricultural production during the Great Power 
War, through increased demand and additional political will mobilised through the wartime 
emergency. It also experienced greater agricultural demand, and thus profits, induced by the 
War. 
 
4.2.4 How did the Great Power War impact the economic domain of industrial production 
(and thus the position of the enterprises operating in that domain) of both the eventual 
hegemon and its main rival, and what was the role of the leading sectors of the epoch? 
During the period spanning the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the leading 
sectors of the world-economy were textile production and shipbuilding, although other 
industries, such as sugar refining, brewing, and munitions manufacturing were also 
important. With regards to textiles, the Dutch benefited from their production of industrial 
crops, and along with the introduction of new techniques for producing lighter types of 
cloth, there was a boom in Dutch textile production, while they also enjoyed an enormous 
advantage in the production of dyes. Meanwhile, the advances in Dutch fishing boat design 
and construction provided the foundation of the Dutch lead in the shipbuilding industry, 
and by employing a high degree of mechanisation, alongside large-scale and standardised 
production techniques, the Dutch shipbuilders were widely recognised as being the 
seventeenth-century European leaders in quality and technical progress. They not only 
managed to produce new ships at a lower cost than their competitors, as a result of 
mechanisation which included the use of cranes and wind-powered sawmills, they also 
pioneered the construction of an economical and efficient class of trade ship, known as the 
fluyt (fluteship).  
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Apart from textile production and shipbuilding, the Dutch also held advantages over their 
rivals in other industries, particularly in the paper industry, in book production, sugar 
refining, oil and soap production, brewing, tobacco curing, glass-blowing, and in diamond 
cutting. Given their long struggle for independence, the Dutch also developed an advanced 
munitions industry. During the Thirty Years’ War, they would be able to profit from this 
industry by selling weapons to other European states, particularly (but not only) powers 
fighting in the Protestant camp.  
Apart from their lead in industrial production, the Dutch also benefitted from the influx 
of Protestant refugees from other parts of Europe (particularly the Spanish or Southern 
Netherlands), and these refugees brought their skills, experience, and capital with them, 
allowing Dutch industry to advance even further. As for scientific innovation, the Dutch 
often took existing designs and methods and refined them to new and unmatched levels, so 
that, for instance, the Dutch made the most advanced clocks and watches of the time. Also, 
Dutch scientists made new discoveries in astronomy and biology, spurred on by the relative 
intellectual freedom afforded them by the Dutch Republic. During its long war with Spain, 
the literature and art of the Dutch Republic also experienced a golden age, like Dutch 
society as a whole, amid the turmoil in which the rest of Europe languished.  
In all, the Dutch lead in industrial production aided their war effort, since they were able 
to design and construct not only trading vessels, as mentioned above, but also warships, with 
which they managed to gain control of the Dutch coast, helping to safeguard the United 
Provinces against Spanish attack from the sea. Gradually, the Dutch were able to compete 
more successfully at sea with the Spanish navies, until they emerged as a naval power of note 
(eventually the naval power). Moreover, the advanced Dutch munitions industry also aided 
the war effort, and that of their allies.  
In turn, the long war with Spain, of which the Great Power War formed a smaller part, 
provided a substantial stimulus for Dutch industry, as the young republic not only fought for 
its independence from Spain while aiding its Protestant allies against the Catholic powers, 
but was indeed also able to take advantage of the market gaps created by the turmoil existing 
in the wake of the conflicts sweeping Europe. It should be noted however, that the 
hegemonic bloc existing within the United Provinces contributed to a large extent to its 
success, not only in industry, but also in commerce and finance. Since the plutocracy of the 
Dutch Republic was built not around a monarchy or aristocracy, but around the upper 
middle class urban élite that established itself after the collapse of Spanish rule in the 
United Provinces, and many of whom were directly involved, and profited from, the 
capitalist industrial and commercial ventures of the Republic, this wealthy class of capitalists 
was able to exert its influence through the apparatus of government, brought about by their 
(domestic) hegemony over other classes, to aid the enterprises of the producers, merchants, 
and financiers of the Republic.  
In contrast, Spain’s leadership was constructed around its monarchy and aristocracy, and 
traditional outlooks and habits, which diverted much of the funds that potentially could 
have driven industrial expansion and advances into the hands of the Spanish crown, either 
through the sale of titles of nobility, or though the sale of juros that allowed the wealthy to 
live off the fixed annuity they provided instead of investing in business or industry. Moreover, 
the absence of a vigorous urban middle class served to relegate Castile and greater Spain to a 
relatively backward economic condition characterised by the lack of incentive to drive 
innovation and economic improvement, while the conservative Catholic milieu and the 
consequences of the Inquisition constricted the freedom to innovate or to launch open 
scientific inquiry, and the ability to attract immigrants from other core states with skills or 
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capital (indeed, non-Spaniards and non-Castilians such as the Moriscos were expelled from 
the Iberian Peninsula altogether). As such, rather than constituting the hub of capitalist 
activity in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries like the Dutch Republic, Castile and 
Spain remained locked in a state of semi-feudal economic backwardness. In an era of 
capitalism, this proved fatal to the Spanish Empire’s chances to check the economic and 
naval expansion of the Dutch Republic, despite the comparatively tiny size of the latter, or to 
bring them back into the Habsburg fold. 
 
With regards to the impact of the Great Power War on the domain of industrial production, 
seven generalised findings emerge. First, the eventual hegemon occupied the dominant 
position in the leading sectors of the era before the Great Power War erupted. Second, the 
eventual hegemon displayed high levels of state support for industry as a result of the 
hegemonic bloc existing within it, which meant that the state often interfered in the market 
in favour of its domestic producers, or to eliminate or impair its foreign rivals. Meanwhile, 
the continental challenger lacked similar levels of unified, concerted state support of 
capitalist enterprise. 
Third, the eventual hegemon was the leader in technical progress and scientific 
innovation before the Great Power War. Fourth, it also experienced immigration before and 
during the Great Power War, often as a result of persecution and the tumults of war abroad, 
and many of these immigrants brought skills and capital with them, contributing to the 
development of industry and innovation. Also, the eventual hegemon had relatively high 
levels of political, social, religious, economic, and intellectual tolerance for its time, which 
not only attracted immigrants and refugees from the more absolutist states, but also proved 
conducive to innovation due to tolerance of open, scientific enquiry.  
Fifth, the eventual hegemon experienced rapid industrial growth during the Great Power 
War, since it was free from enemy plundering and escaped the destruction of infrastructure 
and physical capital (particularly in the core province of Holland) as a result of its insularity, 
and since the Great Power War itself forced the full mobilisation of the productive economic 
strength of the state to overcome the military challenge posed by the rival state and coalition. 
Also, in the wake of the turmoil that spread because of the War, and the damages and 
disruptions caused to the industrial productivity of other core states located within the 
conflict zone, the insular core power was able to direct its increased productive capacity to 
take advantage of market gaps created by the declining productivity of other core states. 
Sixth, the insular power directed its sea power to sever or impair its continental rival’s 
access to the raw materials of the extra-European periphery of the world-system, and to the 
markets not immediately accessible by land. The continental challenger and its productive 
industrial economy were hampered by the loss or disruption of this extra-European link. For 
instance, Spain lost easy access to naval stores, and especially timber, which hampered ship 
repairs and construction. 
Seventh, the continental rival suffered damage and disruption to its infrastructure and 
productive, physical capital, and thus emerged from the Great Power War (and domestic 
insurrections) with a reduced, and less competitive, productive capacity.  
 
4.2.5 How did the Great Power War impact the economic domain of commerce (and thus 
the position of the enterprises operating in that domain) of both the eventual hegemon and 
its main rival, and how did sea power factor into the conflict? 
In a continuation of the circular reinforcement of advantage, the Dutch efforts to secure 
timber supplies for their shipbuilding industries, mainly in the Baltic, led to the 
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establishment of what became known as their ‘mother trade’. In exchange for timber, the 
Dutch traders sold their fish and textiles, thereby setting up the large-scale and lucrative 
trade in bulk goods with the Baltic. Along with timber, they also imported grain, further 
adding to their food security, while supplementing the Dutch diet.  
Since the Dutch shipbuilders were able to design and construct trading ships (the 
fluteships) that had low operating costs and large holds compared to the trading vessels of 
their rivals, they were able to rapidly expand their efficient trading operations along the 
coasts of Europe, and even further afield. Indeed, the low construction and operating costs of 
Dutch trading ships enabled Dutch shipping tonnage to exceed English, French, 
Portuguese, Spanish, and German tonnage combined, by the second half of the seventeenth 
century. Additionally, when Spain closed its ports to Dutch traders, the Dutch compensated 
by establishing their own trade routes with the East, thereby procuring their own spices. 
Meanwhile, given the presence of hostile (primarily Spanish) ships at sea, the Dutch 
expanded their navy to protect their oceanic life-lines, helping the English to defeat the 
Spanish Armada in 1588. With the capital flowing in from their trading operations, the 
Dutch further invested in their shipbuilding industry, allowing their navy to make rapid 
advances, and by 1607 they secured a key victory against the Spanish off Gibraltar, allowing 
them to expand their trade routes into the Mediterranean.  
In contrast, although Spain was the pre-eminent naval power before the Dutch surpassed 
them, it was never a naval and commercial power. Rather, it was a Continental power 
lacking a sustained commitment to the development of the navy, with a popular absolute 
monarchy infused with archaic elements, while the colonies of Spain in the American 
periphery merely represented an extension of its “adventurous, warlike” Continental 
tendencies, and did not further the development of Spain’s naval and commercial power. 
Indeed, for much of the sixteenth century Spain did not even have an organised Atlantic 
navy, but when it established one in 1570, it simply continued its medieval Mediterranean 
tactics of ramming, boarding, and defeating its opponents in what were essentially land 
battles at sea. In contrast, the developing Dutch and English navies employed superior 
tactics and longer range cannons, allowing them to outmanoeuvre and out-class the Spanish 
navy.  
When the Dutch began to harass the Spanish at sea in the last decades of the sixteenth 
century, the Spanish were forced to commit all their maritime resources to maintaining the 
ocean link with their American colonies, and to protect their treasure fleets. However, even 
here the Dutch made inroads, and they not only attacked Spanish and Portuguese shipping 
in the western hemisphere, but traded with the colonies there as well (much to the ire of the 
European rulers of those colonies). As a further consequence of their growing naval power, 
the Dutch also captured the colonies of other European powers (particularly Portugal), or 
established their own (such as Cape Town), in the periphery of the world-system, and by the 
end of their long struggle with Spain, they had been transformed into the world’s leading 
colonial power. Their growing global reach further enabled them throughout the Eighty 
Years’ War to raid and harass Spanish territories in the Americas and even in the Pacific, 
thereby diverting precious resources away from Spain to improve the defences of these 
outlying territories.  
Part of the reason for the success of the Dutch merchants was, again, the existence of a 
bourgeois hegemonic bloc, whereby the state (or more accurately the ruling class) identified 
its own interests with that of its capitalist class. Since the narrow ruling oligarchy of the 
Dutch Republic indeed closely identified its own prosperity with that of the Dutch capitalist 
class (of which it formed part), particularly the merchants, the state afforded the capitalists 
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sufficient space to flourish and necessary protection by the armed forces, particularly the 
navy, in light of the dangers presented by the Habsburgs. Dutch traders were also on the 
whole more vigorous (inflamed by the ‘Protestant ethic’) than their counterparts in rival 
European states, while the War itself afforded Dutch traders the opportunity to do business 
with the enemies of Spain, such as the Ottomans in the Mediterranean. Again, a similar 
hegemonic bloc did not exist in Castile or in Spain, and commerce in general was regarded 
as an unfitting occupation or enterprise. As such, the Spanish state never managed to accord 
its merchants the necessary support or protection to compete against the Dutch in particular, 
and in fact, foreign merchants dominated the commercial life of Spain. The war with the 
Dutch also harmed Spanish naval power by depriving Spain of vital naval stores, primarily of 
Baltic origin, without which Spanish shipbuilding was severely hampered. 
In short, through the course of the Eighty Years’ War, the rapidly expanding trade of the 
United Provinces became the foundation of the Dutch economy, resulting in the brisk 
accumulation of capital, allowing the Dutch to further enhance their industries and to 
establish even more trade routes, while the Spanish navy, gradually worn down by the attacks 
of the growing Dutch (and English) navies, was forced to concentrate its main forces on the 
defence of its maritime communications with the Americas. This naturally also complicated 
the Spanish military offensive against the United Provinces, since all troops and supplies had 
to travel by a circuitous land route across Europe, and along the French border, to reach 
Flanders. Once France entered the war against Spain, the conflict shifted from one fought 
along a distant frontier, to one fought along Spain’s own borders, adding further pressure 
which Spain, ultimately, was unable to withstand. 
 
Five central points emerge from the above discussion with regards to the impact of Great 
Power War on commerce, and the role of sea power in such a conflict. First, the eventual 
hegemon could, by virtue of insularity, focus primarily on the development of its navy, and 
did not face the challenge of having to establish and maintain both a first class navy and a 
first class army. As such, and as a result of its manufacturing strength, the eventual hegemon 
possessed a lead in sea power over its rivals. Indeed, due to domestic natural resource 
shortages, the Dutch Republic established early commercial links with the periphery, which 
necessitated a strong merchant marine and navy. In contrast, the continental rival for 
systemic leadership lacked a naval or commercial tradition, not to mention sustained state 
support to develop its navy due to the often more immediate utility of the army and its 
centrality in the state’s defence. For instance, despite having the largest naval capability 
concentration in the sixteenth century, Spain’s navy used outdated tactics and the state was 
more continental than maritime in orientation. 
Second, the insular power acquired major colonial interests (for the time) in the extra-
European world, often to serve as sources of colonial produce and raw materials or markets, 
and it was the core state with the largest share in the wealth (natural resources and markets) 
of the periphery (of course, Spain had vast holdings in the periphery, but due to its weaker 
sea power faced disruptions in its colonial trade while the Dutch navy was preponderant). 
That wealth could then be channelled into the war efforts of the insular power and its allies. 
Also, during the Great Power War itself the damaging of rival merchant marines and navies, 
increased mobilisation of productive strength (particularly in shipbuilding), and resource 
needs, meant that the eventual hegemon expanded its commercial interests and sea power 
during the War. Meanwhile, the insular power also employed its preponderant sea power to 
impair the peripheral access of its continental rival or to rob it of its colonies (Brazil is a 
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notable example, recall that Portugal and Spain were unified at the time), as mentioned 
above.  
Third, the eventual hegemon used its sea power to protect its merchant marine and 
advance its interests, while during the Great Power War it attacked the merchant marines of 
its rivals. This again contributed to the relative shift in the commercial and sea power 
balance in the world-system in favour of the insular power. Fourth, due to its preponderant 
sea power, the eventual hegemon was relatively safe from enemy attack, particularly invasion, 
while its rivals were not. Fifth, due to its preponderant naval power, and the virtual 
elimination of many of the weaker navies and merchant marines of its rivals, the eventual 
hegemon emerged with a monopoly on sea power at the conclusion of the Great Power War. 
Since sea (and more recently air) power is required for global reach, this meant that the 
victor was able to project its power across the world to a far greater extent than any other core 
power at the time. 
 
4.2.6 How did the Great Power War impact the economic domain of finance (and thus the 
position of the enterprises operating in that domain) of both the eventual hegemon and its 
main rival? 
As a result of the rapid expansion of the trading routes, and profits, of the Dutch merchants, 
the Dutch were able to accumulate capital more successfully than any other nation in 
Europe at the time, which was then reinvested in industry and trade, helping to further 
enhance the competitiveness of the United Provinces, and to accelerate their accumulation 
of capital. Since the Dutch were the foremost traders, it was natural that their currency also 
came to be preferred for world trade.  
With the capital accumulating in the United provinces, the Dutch were able (and 
necessitated) to establish a sophisticated banking system, turning Amsterdam into the 
dominant financial centre of the world-economy of the seventeenth century. Meanwhile, the 
general instability brought about by the Thirty Years’ War in Europe led many investors to 
direct their finances to the Dutch Republic for safekeeping, since it was regarded a relative 
haven of safety and stability in an age of tumults and economic shocks induced by War. 
Given the flow of finances centred on Amsterdam, and the establishment of a secure credit 
system, the Dutch government also found that it could borrow money for its war effort at 
comparatively low rates of interest. Thus, even though the expenses of an eighty-year-long 
conflict, and the subsidies granted by the Dutch to their allies, led to a rapidly growing 
government debt, the crucial difference between this debt, and that of other powers such as 
Spain, was that it remained affordable due to the government’s high credit rating and the 
soundness of the Dutch financial system. 
In contrast, the Great Power War truly undermined the Spanish in the domain of finance, 
more than any other, since Spain was not only the victim of a permanent economic shift in 
favour of the Atlantic economies, but it also failed to maintain sound economic 
underpinnings with which it could continue its military campaigns – campaigns often 
sparked by the traditional emphasis of Castile and Spain on conquest, particularly vis-à-vis 
the Moriscos and the Ottomans.  However, the largely ad hoc financial practices of the 
Spanish crown, the diminishing flow of silver and particularly gold from the American 
mines, the financial exhaustion of the Castilian taxpayers, the resistance of realms such as 
Catalonia to increased taxation, and excessive borrowing, all meant that Spanish finances 
were unable to sustain the heavy costs of eighty years of conflict with the United Provinces 
and other Protestant territories, not to mention France.  
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Indeed, its less developed financial system and poor credit rating meant that the Spanish 
crown paid higher rates of interest on loans – loans it took out so often that it ended up 
spending the majority of its budget on interest payments, often defaulting on its debt 
obligations. This in turn increased the risk of lending money to the Spanish crown, driving 
up the rates of interest, making future repayment of loans even more difficult, while these 
difficulties were exacerbated by the fact that future revenues were already pledged to bankers 
years in advance. When this financial weakness is coupled with the fact that Spain simply 
faced too many enemies during the Thirty Years’ War, not to mention rebellions and 
uprisings within its own borders, it becomes evident that despite initial appearances, Spanish 
power was far too tenuous to succeed in saving its war effort with the Dutch. In contrast 
however, the Dutch economy, based on its innovative and dynamic capitalist producers, 
merchants, and bankers proved too vigorous to compete with, meaning that the enterprises 
of the seven provinces of the Dutch Republic came, through the course of the War, to 
eclipse the formerly pre-eminent Spanish Empire not only in the economic spheres of agro-
industrial production and commerce but, ultimately, in finance as well. 
 
Six generalised findings can be identified here. First, the eventual hegemon had within its 
borders the leading city of the world-economy and thus the leading financial centre, before 
the outbreak of the Great Power War. Indeed, it possessed the most developed financial 
sector in the world at the time. This had much to do with its primacy in international trade 
and commerce which, as argued throughout this study, is achieved before primacy in 
finance. Indeed, it was clear that the world-economy’s financial centre of gravity had shifted 
before the Great Power War to the state that was to emerge hegemonic after the War. The 
eventual hegemon also benefitted from an influx of capital, often being brought into the 
country by refugees and immigrants, prior to and during the Great Power War, since it was 
viewed as a haven of safety and stability due to its insularity and better developed banking 
and financial system. 
Second, the availability of capital, and this better developed banking and financial system 
meant that the eventual hegemon was able to borrow money more cheaply than its 
continental rival, whose banking and financial system was underdeveloped and often 
haphazard by comparison, and which, by necessity, had to borrow large amounts of money at 
higher rates of interest often just to keep afloat, or to fund preparations for, and waging of, 
war. Since the waging of Great Power War is by its very definition extremely expensive, the 
difference between a stable financial system and relatively cheap loans, and a haphazard, 
inefficient, over-strained financial system and more costly loans, can mean the difference 
between victory and defeat. Moreover, since the continental rival lacked similar recourse to 
higher direct taxes to that of the insular power – especially on the wealthy, who were often 
exempt from taxation or used their political influence to evade taxes – it could not avoid 
taking out more expensive loans, even though it had to devote a large portion of its yearly 
income to interest repayments. 
Third, with its access to relatively cheaper loans and a larger tax base, the eventual 
hegemon could not only afford to fund its own war effort with less strain than its rival, it 
could also afford to offer loans and subsidies to its allies, whose war efforts would either have 
been less fruitful or entirely absent without this source of financing. Fourth, in a circular 
reinforcement of advantage, the eventual hegemon could reinvest its capital, thus further 
improving its agro-industrial and commercial competitiveness.  
Fifth, the use of plunder or taxation of occupied territories by the continental rival meant 
that those regions (especially the Southern Netherlands), often including core areas, were 
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left relatively impoverished by the Great Power War. This also applies to the rival itself, 
which exhausted its economy in its failed bid for hegemony and eventually world-empire. 
Sixth, the commercial and financial preponderance of the eventual hegemon meant that its 
currency steadily became the preferred and leading monetary unit in the world-economy. 
During its hegemonic tenure, this would further extend its influence over its competitors in 
the core.  
 
4.2.7 How did the material base – i.e. locational factors (geopolitical setting and natural 
resources), and the relative strength of the capitalist economy and state – of the eventual 
hegemon compare to its main rival, and what effects did these have upon the War efforts of 
each? 
With regards to Dutch geopolitics, there can be no doubt that the presence of numerous 
waterways conferred a splendid natural advantage in terms of defence against the Spanish 
onslaughts. Although the Dutch Republic was, and is, strictly speaking, a Continental 
European state, the fact that large portions of its territory, particularly the provinces of 
Holland and Zeeland, were more accessible by sea than by land, offered it many of the 
advantages of insularity enjoyed by full island states. Once the Dutch managed to gain 
control over the local seas, they were able to prevent the Spanish from attacking them along 
their coast, while their numerous waterways made it exceedingly difficult for Spanish troops 
to make rapid advances on land, allowing the Dutch to fortify their position, and then to 
strike at the Spanish advancing along the inland waterways. 
Although the Dutch never invaded the Iberian peninsula, Spain nevertheless eventually 
had to contend with a hostile France along its northern border, while the Habsburg Empire 
as a whole, with holdings scattered all over Europe, including Austria, Italy, and the Spanish 
(southern) Netherlands, was exposed to attack from multiple directions, forcing great 
military commitments purely for defensive purposes, resulting in the availability of a much 
smaller offensive force than would ultimately have been necessary to overcome the strategic 
advantage enjoyed by the Dutch Republic. Moreover, with so many military commitments 
necessitated by considerations of defence, not to mention Hapsburg participation in the 
Thirty Years’ War in Germany, it is little wonder that Spanish finances, and for that matter 
ordinary Spanish citizens, were taxed beyond their limits, ultimately undermining the ability 
of Spain to defeat the recalcitrant northern Dutch provinces which, in direct contrast, 
proved remarkably successful at accumulating capital, and establishing a thriving capitalist 
economy (and in fact the leading capitalist economy) during eighty years of warfare with an 
initially much more powerful foe. As discussed before, much of this success in the 
accumulation of capital was the result of a bourgeois hegemonic bloc, which was dominated 
by the upper middle class urban élite, and which meant that state support was forthcoming 
to Dutch ventures, especially when threatened by Spain. Spain, on the other hand, lacked 
such a capitalist hegemonic bloc, and the concomitant state support of (nearly nonexistent) 
capitalist enterprises. 
It should also be mentioned however, that the lack of abundant natural resources did not 
hamper the economic development of the Dutch Republic but rather, poor resources 
spurred innovation to compensate and generate wealth with which to wage war. Central to 
this effort was the Dutch Republic’s location along the Atlantic coast of north-western 
Europe, and its proximity to the Baltic, the English Channel, the North Sea, Scandinavia, 
and the north and west of France, not to mention the presence of navigable rivers leading 
into the hinterland of Germany, which all meant that the Dutch Republic was ideally 
situated for it to become the centre of international trade networks, allowing it to obviate its 
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own resource shortages via imports of raw materials, while it could export manufactures, 
particularly textiles, but also other goods, including refined sugar, armaments, and even 
ships, to its trading partners.  
Spain on the other hand found that the naval activities of its numerous enemies, including 
the Dutch, French, and Ottomans meant that its maritime communications were much 
more vulnerable than it could cope with, which resulted in the deployment of the bulk of its 
navy along the trading routes with its American colonies, since its poor financial state meant 
that it was highly dependent upon the continued importation of bullion from the western 
hemisphere. However, as the Dutch navy grew in strength and confidence, it started 
harassing the Spanish along this vital life-line, even managing to capture the Spanish 
treasure fleet in 1628 in a spectacular coup against Spain. The abundance of Spanish and 
Portuguese territories to raid, harass, and capture also provided the Dutch with 
opportunities to divert much of the wealth of these territories away from Spain, and into 
local defence.  
In short, while the Spanish and the wider Hapsburg Empire were increasingly vulnerable 
as the Thirty Years’ War proliferated and as numerous allies, including Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway, and England joined the Dutch camp, and while its economy was straining under 
the burdens of the War, the Dutch occupied a much more favourable and strategically 
defensible geopolitical setting, while their vast trade network, their thriving capitalist 
economy and vigorous capitalists, along with their rapid accumulation of capital, meant that 
the Dutch Republic, unbound by tradition, not only survived, but indeed thrived upon the 
Great Power War of the seventeenth century. 
 
Four particular points emerge that constitute the generalised findings relating to the 
material base independent variable of the hypothesis proposed in this study. First, the 
contender that emerged hegemonic from the Great Power War was, by virtue of geography, 
(primarily) insular and could afford to focus on the development of a first-rate navy without 
hampering its defence. It could also use this sea power to defend its commerce, and access 
the resources of the periphery, while restricting the access of its more continentally oriented 
rival. Since it was also physically separated from the fighting, it was also able to escape direct 
damage and disruption to its economy. Second, the hegemonic contender that eventually 
lost during the Great Power War was a continental state, that is, it was by virtue of geography 
more preoccupied with matters in or around its own border regions and it was thus far more 
vulnerable to attack during wartime (and less able to suppress domestic insurgents).  
Third, the continental rival could not attempt to alter or maintain the prevailing hierarchy 
of prestige (the international political status quo) in its favour given the new hierarchy of 
economic and military power resulting from the rise of the Dutch as a hegemonic contender, 
and any efforts on the part of Spain to make alterations to the hierarchy of prestige directly 
impinged upon its neighbours (often militarily powerful in themselves, such as France), 
thereby eliciting their resistance to the continental state’s attempt to change the status quo 
(which often favoured the militarily powerful neighbours). In contrast, given the insularity 
and sea power of the eventual hegemon, it could expand onto the world stage without 
impinging upon the direct interests and survival of the other core and semi-peripheral 
powers, although this is not to say that colonial wars did not occur. However, the threat 
posed by the expansion abroad of the insular power was less immediate than that posed by 
the expansion of the continental power, since the latter mainly occurred at the direct 
expense of the other core and semi-peripheral powers of the world-system. 
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Fourth, and as mentioned elsewhere as well, the eventual hegemon was the leading 
capitalist economy already before the outbreak of the Great Power War, and had a strong 
state in the sense that coherent, sustained support was extended to capitalist owner-producers 
in general, often at the cost of rival foreign owner-producers. Meanwhile, the defeated 
hegemonic contender had a strong state in the sense that it was absolutist and authoritarian, 
a development necessitated by the fractionated economic and political character of the 
country. However, this absolutist state often operated against, or implemented policies 
unfavourable to, capitalist owner-producers in general, since those actions and policies were 
directed at maintaining the internal cohesion of the country at all costs. The strongest and 
most dynamic capitalist economy was therefore to be found in the insular power. 
 
4.2.8 What were the major consequences of the Great Power War, and how did the hegemon 
restructure the interstate system at the conclusion of the conflict, in other words, how did it 
secure its hegemony, and what was the settlement through which it do so? 
Apart from the explosion of religious antagonisms, the devastation and turmoil wrought in 
large parts of Europe, and the eventual decline of the Habsburg dynasty, the Thirty Years’ 
War brought about lasting changes in the world-system, by way of the Peace of Westphalia of 
1648. For instance, the settlement of the Thirty Years’ War formalised the victory of the 
sovereign territorial state over other forms of political organisation, while at the same time, it 
represented a permanent departure from the Habsburg model of hereditary lands. Moreover, 
Westphalia restructured international relations on the principle of a balance of power, since 
the establishment of a Habsburg ‘world monarchy’ had, for a time, appeared to be a distinct 
possibility, so that henceforth, this threat of world monarchies or world-empires would be 
countered by an attempt to rebalance power in the international system through a coalition 
of states, should another single state become disproportionately preponderant and threaten 
the existence of all others (as happened twice subsequently). This is the root of what Dehio 
(1962) calls “the precarious balance” – the balance between the creation of a world 
monarchy or world-empire, and the preservation of the international system of states.  
Additionally, Westphalia represented the victory of the coalition of northern, Atlantic 
states which defeated the Habsburgs, and thus helped to solidify the shift in the world-
economy away from their Mediterranean counterparts. The rise of the sovereign state as the 
accepted form of political organisation also witnessed the centralisation of political and 
military authority within those states, along with increased governmental powers and 
methods of state taxation. With the costs of wars, and particularly Great Power Wars, 
continuing to spiral upward as the centuries passed, the ability of states to secure greater 
sources of revenue became a decisive factor in the outcome of such conflicts, as the financial 
(and thus military) failure of Habsburg Spain had demonstrated. With the Peace of 
Westphalia, the trend was also set into motion whereby affairs of state and religion would 
increasingly become separated (at least in the core), with the emergence of a distinct raison 
d’état, no longer dominated by religious concerns.  
In all, the Thirty Years’ War, and the Peace of Westphalia, had set the interstate system 
upon its modern course, while the Dutch managed to secure their hegemony not only 
through Spain’s recognition of their independence, but also through the triumph of their 
form of political organisation – not only had they broken away from their status as a territory 
that was passed on between ruling families, they also established themselves as a modern 
republic – and of their Atlantic, commercial orientation. In the process, the Dutch had 
become the preeminent colonial power, and could thus derive the most benefit from the 
exploitation of the periphery of the world-system at the time. Spain, on the other hand, was 
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set upon a course of steady decline, until it eventually bore only the slightest semblance of 
the global power it once was.  
 
With regards to the settlements and consequences of the Great Power War, three main 
generalised findings emerge. First, the state that emerged victorious from the struggle for 
systemic leadership restructured the interstate system at the conclusion of the Great Power 
War. That restructuring was advantageous to the new hegemon, and reflected its interests. 
For instance, the sovereign territorial state became the dominant and accepted form of 
political organisation, while the Habsburg model of hereditary lands was steadily 
undermined.  
Second, the contender for systemic leadership that lost the Great Power War was 
enfeebled as a result of the conflict, although for Spain this enfeeblement was less the result 
of formal impositions by the Dutch, and more a case of domestic revolt, such as the secession 
of Portugal (which could not be countered while Spain was facing several foreign opponents 
simultaneously). As such, one of the two rivals for systemic leadership emerged from the 
Great Power War defeated and unable to economically or militarily challenge the hegemony 
of the victor, which thus enjoyed preponderance in the world-system, at least until the core 
as a whole could recover from the War (and related tumults, such as civil wars) and diminish 
the lead of the hegemonic state’s enterprises in agro-industrial production, commerce, and 
finance. 
Third, at the end of the Great Power War, the victor ensured that its enterprises and their 
products would have unimpeded access to foreign markets and thus became a proponent of 
free(r) trade. This was evident in the termination of the Spanish embargo on Dutch imports 
for instance. Of course, this removal of barriers to the free flow of goods and capital perfectly 
suited the hegemonic power since its enterprises were the most competitive, even in the 
markets of other core states. 
 
4.2.9 Summary of findings 
In the various sections above, it was attempted to summarise the findings of the case study 
undertaken in the previous chapter, in light of eight general questions that probe specific 
aspects of the relationship between Great Power War and hegemonic ascent. This was done 
so that each question might illuminate the manner in which Great Power War affected the 
two main contenders for hegemony at the time, possibly revealing general features common 
to all instances of hegemonic ascent in the modern world-system, which can in future be 
amalgamated into a theory or ‘covering law’ that helps to specify the causal relation between 
the variables proposed in chapter one of this study, and summarised earlier in this chapter. 
This section is tasked with this amalgamation of the findings, so that the causal process 
between the independent variables and the dependent variable can be clarified. Once this 
has been done, it will be possible to scrutinise the validity of the proposed hypothesis, and to 
ultimately revisit the claim presented by scholars such as Wallerstein, that hegemony can 
only come about, or be secured, through a Great Power War. 
From the generalised findings presented in the sections above, a number of general 
observations can be made concerning the two main contenders for hegemony before, during, 
and after the Great Power War of this early era of the modern world-system. These can be 
listed as follows: 
 
1. The main contenders for systemic leadership were the leading capitalist core 
state of the world-system and the leading military power. 
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2. One of these main contenders for systemic leadership was to some extent an 
‘island’ or insular state, physically separated by geographical features (primarily 
rivers) from the remainder of the core and semi-periphery, and any fighting taking 
place there. 
3. The other main contender for systemic leadership (primarily via a world-
empire), was a continental state sharing long boundaries with other core or semi-
peripheral states. Also, in one of its main oceanic areas of operation, the 
Mediterranean, it faced the opposition of the Ottomans. 
4. The ‘island’ or insular contender achieved internal economic and political 
cohesion long before the Great Power War with its main rival broke out (although 
the United Provinces was not yet recognised as independent by Spain). This was 
facilitated by a relatively small geographical size and the presence of interior 
waterways binding the national economy and political unit together. For instance, 
the United Provinces were geographically miniscule compared to the major western 
European states at the time, and had the benefit of an extensive network of internal 
waterways facilitating transport and communications. 
5. The insular contender had a (relatively) representative regime (for the middle 
and upper capitalist classes), in which the capitalist class was internally dominant or 
hegemonic, using the state to implement policies favourable to capitalist enterprise 
(often mercantilist policies) and to intervene in the market in favour of domestic 
owner-producers. This also often meant employing the state’s military power to 
protect the interests of domestic capitalists and/or to harm the ability of foreign 
capitalists to compete and the ability of their governments to interfere in the market 
in their favour. Meanwhile, the state would benefit from the support it extended to 
capitalist enterprise since a growing and dynamic economy meant that more financial 
resources (through taxation for instance) would be available for the state to expand its 
power (particularly military power) vis-à-vis other states. Thus, within the insular 
contender there was a close and reciprocal relationship between the state (which was 
‘strong’ in its support of capitalist enterprise) and business. The insular contender 
thus possessed the most dynamic and thriving capitalist economy at the time, with all 
the concomitant capitalist advantages. 
6. The continental contender was politically, socially, and economically 
fragmented or fractionated to some extent due to its heterogeneous geography and it 
experienced difficulties in its process of territorial consolidation. Indeed, in the 
continental contender, the outlying regions were only incorporated and bound to the 
political unit through a strong, i.e. absolutist, government. Although these outlying 
regions were politically incorporated into the state, they maintained divergent 
economic vectors, often vigorously defending these in the face of demands emanating 
from the political centre. Also, in the continental contender these outlying regions 
faced some sort of political discrimination or exclusion, while the centre – Castile – 
maintained some sort of political and economic privilege. 
7. This meant that the continental contender maintained an absolutist and 
exclusionary regime, which served to maintain the dominance of the centre over the 
outlying regions. As part of this system of government, powerful groups (often the 
traditional agrarian aristocracy) serving the interests of the centre, and indeed 
influencing the policies of the state, were afforded some sort of social privilege, such 
as exemption from direct taxation. This meant that even though these powerful 
groups might have aided capitalist enterprise, they used their influence to create state 
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policies perpetuating their socially privileged status, often against the interests of the 
wider capitalist class. Thus, the capitalist class as a whole cannot be considered to 
have been dominant or hegemonic within the continental contender, and coupled 
with the lack of a more representative government, the support that this state 
extended to its (very few) capitalist owner-producers was neither consistent nor as 
extensive as in the insular contender. Accordingly, capitalist enterprises in the 
continental contender were comparatively less competitive in the market, while the 
state had access to a reduced tax base, and thus less solid financial underpinnings (in 
spite of, or rather partly because of, the gold and silver windfall of the American 
mines). 
8. The insular and continental rivals for systemic leadership were already in 
open political or economic conflict well before the Great Power War itself erupted. 
Indeed, this conflict already erupted into war (or a series of wars) before the decisive 
Great Power War began. As such, it was clear who the two main contenders for 
hegemony or systemic leadership were well before the Great Power War erupted, and 
the growing antagonism between them came to be a dominant force in international 
relations at the time. 
9. The continental contender for systemic leadership, as a result of its 
geographical features, automatically impinged upon the interests of the other core or 
major semi-peripheral states as it attempted to expand its political and military 
power. The continental contender thus aroused the suspicions and fears of its 
neighbours, since it had attempted at various times before the Great Power War to 
expand its territory through conquest and inheritance. As such, France, the Papal 
States, and many of the German princes were particularly distrustful and wary of 
Spain. This meant that during a general or Great Power War, the continental 
contender would face an array of enemies, who could be enticed by the subsidies or 
loans of the less threatening insular power, and the continental contender would thus 
automatically be much more strategically vulnerable. Its numerous foes also meant 
that the military and economic resources of this contender would be divided and 
stretched during the conflict, thus diminishing its ability to overcome the strategic 
advantage enjoyed by insular power. 
10. As a result of other states being drawn into the fight against the continental 
contender, its war effort was unavoidably converted into an overt quest for world-
empire rather than hegemony in the course of the Great Power War. This explains 
fears of Hapsburg ‘universal monarchy’ that were so widespread at the time. 
11. Given the fact that the insular contender was separated by water barriers from 
the other core states and from the majority of the semi-periphery and periphery of the 
world-system, it was necessarily oriented more towards maritime or sea power, and it 
could and did use sea power as its primary means of defence, and its transportation 
and communications links with the core, semi-periphery, and periphery were 
necessarily maritime in nature. As such, this contender could afford to neglect its 
army in favour of the development of a first-rate navy, and was thus afforded by 
geography the luxury of strategical concentration. 
12. In contrast, the continental contender necessarily awarded pride of place to 
the development of its army, since it was instrumental in establishing and 
maintaining internal political cohesion, and to expand territorially at the expense of 
neighbouring states. These armies were also the only defence against the advances of 
neighbouring core and semi-peripheral states. This meant that the continental 
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contender lacked a true maritime and commercial orientation, even though this did 
not preclude it from intermittently attempting to establish a powerful navy. However, 
since it was never in a position to establish a first-rate army and a first-rate navy, its 
government oscillated between the two, and thus was unable to foster the skilled 
manpower needed for a first-rate navy to function. Given the more immediate utility 
of the army and its role in the defence of the state, its development always trumped 
that of the navy. 
13. The sustained drive on the part of the insular contender to develop a first-rate 
navy meant that this state could acquire a major share in the political and economic 
control of the periphery, and could threaten and disrupt the control of its enemies, 
thus having access to its resources and markets. During wartime however, the insular 
state could use its navy to sever (or at least weaken) the more tenuous maritime links 
of the continental contender with the extra-European world-system, and not only 
expand there at continental state’s expense, but also deprive it of resource (or bullion) 
imports. This would particularly impact the commercial domain, but agriculture and 
industry would also suffer, since the continental state had reliable recourse only to 
resources and markets that were located nearby and could be reached by land. Given 
the destruction and diversion of productive industrial capacity away from 
shipbuilding during the Great Power War, not only in the continental contender but 
also in those core and semi-peripheral states directly affected by the conflict, the 
insular power emerged from the War with overwhelming naval preponderance, 
amounting to a near monopoly of sea power. This then allowed it to exercise the 
global reach required by hegemony and systemic leadership while it continued to 
advance its commercial interests. 
14. The insular contender for hegemony was a leader in agricultural production 
before the Great Power War, with large amounts of capital invested in agricultural 
production, allowing the use of new labour saving implements. The insular 
contender also made use of intensive cultivation of crops, and supplemented the 
national diet with fish, and it consequently had relatively high levels of food security. 
Its continental rival was hampered by a lesser degree of state support of capitalist 
agricultural producers, while the Spanish terrain was generally unsuitable for large-
scale crop cultivation. During the Great Power War, the continental contender 
further experienced a decline in its agricultural competitiveness, by diverting men 
and money to the war effort, and importantly, by experiencing the destructive effects 
of the War (and the insurrections it fanned) on its soil. This would devastate crops 
and infrastructure, in addition to the disruption of the normal functioning of the 
economy by the War, thus leading to a decline of agricultural competitiveness vis-à-
vis the insular contender. This would also lead to food shortages and famine, thus 
weakening the morale and health of the civilian and military populations alike. 
However, given the dominant sea power of the insular contender, the continental 
contender could not import large amounts of food from overseas producers to make 
up for the domestic shortfall. Importantly, all core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral 
states experiencing significant fighting on their soil during the Great Power War 
would also be vulnerable to a similar decline in agricultural competitiveness and 
food security (such as the Southern Netherlands), and as such, the insular contender 
would not only be able to better feed its population and troops, but would thus also 
emerge from the War with its agricultural producers dominant over their foreign 
competitors. 
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15. The insular contender had a dominant share in the leading sectors of the era 
before the Great Power War broke out, and it was thus the leading industrial power 
of the core. The support of the state was crucial in attaining this dominant share in 
leading sectors, as was access to the requisite industrial resources either at home or 
abroad. Spain in contrast not only lacked a sizable modern industrial sector, but its 
few industrial owner-producers did not enjoy the same level of state support as their 
insular counterparts. During the Great Power War, by severing or disrupting access to 
extra-European resources, particularly bullion with which the Spanish financed their 
war effort, the insular contender could damage the industrial economies of its rival, 
while the fighting taking place within the borders of this rival damaged and 
diminished their productive industrial capacities. Meanwhile, the industrial 
production of the insular power was fully mobilised during its war effort, and wholly 
escaped the destructive effects of the Great Power War raging further afield. 
Moreover, since the insular contender had a relatively representative regime (and was 
relatively tolerant and open for its time), and was removed from fighting in the core 
(before and during the Great Power War), it attracted immigrants and refugees not 
only from the semi-periphery and periphery, but also the core, and these latter 
immigrants often brought capital or skills with them which further augmented the 
industrial growth of the insular contender. The insular contender was also a leader in 
scientific innovation and technical progress, due to its receptive intellectual, spiritual 
(especially in terms of the ‘Protestant ethic’), economic, and political environment, 
and supportive state policies. In all, the insular contender emerged from the Great 
Power War with enlarged shares in the leading sectors of the time, and with more 
competitive and dynamic industrial sectors vis-à-vis the rest of the core. 
16. Given the absence of large groups enjoying tax exemption, the capital flowing 
in from its commercial endeavours, foreign investment, its outward economic 
orientation, and the public confidence elicited by its representative regime, the 
insular contender possessed better developed financial and banking sectors than its 
continental rival before the Great Power War. Its continental rival, given the 
exemption of large groups of wealthy individuals from taxation, was more inclined to 
borrow money at higher rates of interest and to mortgage future sources of income to 
meet the extraordinary financial demands of warfare, and especially Great Power 
Warfare, while the insular contender successfully leveraged more funds from the 
public while having recourse to loans with lower interest rates due to the public 
confidence in its better developed financial sectors and state financial practices. This 
meant that the financial foundations of the war effort of the continental contender 
were far more precarious than those of its insular rival, often necessitating plundering 
and predatory warfare to supplement its funds (here the plundering of the peripheral 
American colonies is an excellent example). However, this was never sufficient, and 
the Great Power War as a whole thus served to relatively impoverish the continental 
contender and the states directly affected by occupation and conquest (particularly 
the Southern Netherlands), thereby facilitating the financial dominance of the 
insular state after the War. The insular contender could also more readily afford to 
supplement its allies’ war chests with subsidies or loans, or to entice new allies to join 
the fight against the continental conqueror. Its financial infrastructure and the reach 
and dominance of its trading networks also meant that the currency of the insular 
contender came to be preferred above all others, and came to dominate the financial 
markets of the world-economy after the Great Power War.  
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17. By way of the settlement of the Great Power War, the victorious insular 
contender encrusted its new dominance in the interstate system through the creation 
of policies and institutions reflecting its interest. For instance, it supported the 
creation of some sort of balance of power mechanism at the conclusion of the Great 
Power War, which served to maintain the balance existing in the core at the moment 
of the hegemon’s victory. However, that balance did not apply to the economic or 
extra-core spheres, where the new hegemon could expand its interests and influence 
at leisure. Apart from its reduced economic competitiveness, the losing contender 
was also enfeebled, primarily through internal divisions (such as the secession of 
Portugal). The defeat of its primary rival for hegemony, the exhaustion and 
devastation of much of the core and semi-periphery, and the full mobilisation of its 
productive economic strength during the conflict meant that the insular contender 
enjoyed unrivalled preponderance in the three economic domains, and in 
international relations and military affairs. In short, by way of the Great Power War, 
it had become hegemonic. 
 
The seventeen points above, representing the generalised findings of this study, 
unequivocally support those claims of Wallerstein (2000a:258) and Goldstein (1988:366) – 
which inspired this study – that Great Power War plays a central and fundamental role in 
the creation of hegemonic power in the modern world-system, at least in terms of the Dutch 
case. Moreover, the findings of the case study conducted in chapter three strongly validate 
the hypothesis and variables suggested in chapter one. Indeed, even though the eventual 
hegemon was a core state with the leading capitalist economy of its time, which was 
established through strong and consistently favourable government support of capitalist 
owner-producers based on the domestic hegemony of the capitalist class, it was the Great 
Power War and the military actions taken during that War that finally and decisively 
increased the lead of the insular contender to hegemonic proportions, through the full 
mobilisation of its economy and the concomitant economic and military weakening of rival 
core states, particularly (but not only) the main continental contender for hegemony.  
As such, in terms of tentative generalisations,13 the findings suggest that those states are 
most likely to emerge hegemonic from a Great Power War where: (1) the capitalist class as a 
whole is dominant over the other classes; (2) the state is unequivocally and consistently 
willing to interfere in the market in favour of its capitalist owner-producers; (3) the 
economic, political, and social spheres of the state are not significantly fragmented, which 
would require an absolutist regime to ensure the cohesion of the state; (4) significant groups, 
such as the aristocracy, are not exempt from taxation or enjoy social and political privileges 
that are at odds with capitalist development and that they use their political influence to 
preserve; (5) the development of the tools of global reach, notably the navy and air force, is 
favoured above that of the army; (6) the state has relatively secure and uninterrupted access 
to food imports and those raw materials needed by domestic industry that are located in the 
semi-periphery and periphery; (7) agricultural production is capital intensive and highly 
modernised, and there is a large degree of food security; (8) the state has a dominant share in 
the leading sectors of the time; (9) the state has a well-developed financial system and 
recourse to comparatively cheaper loans than its rivals; and (10) importantly, the state is 
separated by a physical barrier from the greatest concentration of core and semi-peripheral 
                                                 
13
 Tentative until a single study can comparatively investigate the role played by Great Power War in 
hegemonic ascent in the modern world-system. 
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states where the boundary between the two coalitions is likely to lie, and where the fighting 
in any Great Power War is likely to be fiercest.  
Although all the above are important ingredients in the creation of hegemony in the 
modern world-system, the last is particularly significant, since a highly developed capitalist 
economy is less effective and less competitive when disturbed and damaged by total warfare 
on the scale of a Great Power War.14 However, continued access to semi-peripheral and 
peripheral resources is also important, since no capitalist economy can fully function during 
wartime without the necessary resources. From the above, it also follows that the hegemonic 
contenders without these features are most likely to be defeated during a Great Power War. 
Although these findings strictly only pertain to the Dutch case in this study, I have argued 
elsewhere15 that they are also valid in the British and American cases. The findings presented 
here should nevertheless be sufficiently generalisable to provide future researchers with a 
starting point when attempting to investigate possible hegemonic rivalry in the current 
century. 
Based on this, the following understanding of the causal process between Great Power 
War and hegemony can be arrived at: first comes a thriving capitalist economy, then a Great 
Power War provides the opportunity to consolidate that capitalist economy and to establish 
its dominance over the capitalist economies of rival states, by forcing its full mobilisation 
during the conflict and by damaging and weakening the capitalist economies of rival core 
states. However, a strong, even thriving, capitalist economy does not ensure victory during a 
Great Power War, hence the state must also possess the requisite ‘material base’, which 
includes favourable geographical features, most notably a barrier to the movement of 
belligerent armies across its territory, the domestic hegemony of the capitalist class and the 
presence of a strong (i.e. supportive) state, a relatively open environment conducive to 
scientific enquiry and innovation, an ethic of hard work and the taking of personal initiative 
and risk (whether such an ethic be religious or not), unimpeded access to strategic resources, 
and a dominant share in those capitalist advantages and leading sectors that will directly 
impact upon the waging of warfare (such as shipbuilding). Indeed, this causal sequence is 
reminiscent of Sun Tzu’s (1988:91) maxim, recorded more than 2,000 years ago, that “a 
victorious army first wins and then seeks battle; a defeated army first battles and then seeks 
victory.” Another of Sun Tzu’s observations is also relevant, particularly in reference to the 
fate of the continental hegemonic contenders identified in this study: 
 
When you do battle, even if you are winning, if you continue for a long time it will dull your forces and 
blunt your edge; if you besiege a citadel, your strength will be exhausted. If you keep your armies out in 
the field for a long time, your supplies will be insufficient. … When your forces are dulled, your edge is 
blunted, your strength is exhausted, and your supplies are gone, then others will take advantage of your 
debility and rise up. Then even if you have wise advisers you cannot make things turn out well in the 
end (1988:57-58). 
 
The causal sequence suggested above thus reveals the necessity of including both 
independent variables (Great Power War, and the requisite ‘material base’) in the hypothesis 
proposed in this study. Indeed, both these independent variables are needed to set the causal 
chain that culminates in hegemony in motion, and both have high causal power since the 
                                                 
14
 Of course, the contemporary existence of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction make it 
doubtful that one can still speak of insularity, unless more effective means are developed to counter at least 
the bulk of these weapons during wartime, such as space-based anti-missile defences. 
15 Again, the reader may access my work on British and American hegemonic ascent at 
http://andresiebrits.weebly.com/works1.html 
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material base, particularly a physical barrier between one contender for hegemony and the 
major battlefields, plus strong, concerted, committed, and sustained state support of 
economic enterprises, provides the initial foundation of hegemonic ascent, while Great 
Power War provides the final edge to those economic enterprises, primarily by way of 
damaging and disrupting the economies of the majority of participating core and semi-
peripheral states, except that of the insular contender.  This latter point is supported by the 
observation that hegemony was only possible while other core states were economically and 
competitively hampered and preoccupied with post-War reconstruction, and were thus not 
actively striving to catch up with, and undermine, the hegemon’s lead in the agro-industrial, 
commercial, and financial domains, or its dominance in sea power.  
Having thus presented the findings of the study, which validate the proposed hypothesis 
that Great Power War plays a necessary and central role, in concert with an advantageous 
‘material base’, in establishing hegemony in the modern world-system (in the context of the 
Dutch case) the significance and theoretical insights of these findings can be discussed. This 
will be done in the following section, after which possible directions for future research will 
be provided, and the study as a whole concluded. 
 
4.3 SIGNIFICANCE AND THEORETICAL INSIGHTS OF FINDINGS 
In this section, the significance of the findings discussed in the previous section will be 
highlighted, and where noteworthy theoretical insights result from links between the 
findings and the literature utilised in this study, as expounded in chapter two, these will be 
revealed. Also, the existing literature on the subject of war and hegemony will help to further 
reveal how the findings presented above can be tentatively generalised, despite the absence 
of a comparative discussion of British and American hegemonic ascent. 
Firstly, in broad terms, the findings of this study demonstrate the significance of utilising a 
unidisciplinary historical social scientific approach in investigating large-scale and long-term 
social change, as advocated by Wallerstein (2000b). Since it is highly unlikely that a complex 
phenomenon such as the relationship between Great Power War and hegemony can be fully 
understood from a narrow, ahistorical perspective on International Relations, particularly if 
that perspective is limited to Political Science alone, any social scientist attempting to arrive 
at a more comprehensive conception of this relationship is necessarily required to undertake 
research that explicitly includes an awareness of the longue durée, and that eschews those 
artificial boundaries between social scientific ‘disciplines’. Indeed, even though such 
research is likely to produce a particularly expansive study, as has been the case here, it is 
also more likely to produce not only empirically richer findings, but also findings that lend 
themselves more readily to open scrutiny. In this, the groundbreaking three volumes of 
Wallerstein’s The Modern World-System may serve as worthy models for emulation by 
serious social scientists from all ‘disciplines’. 
Secondly, by not relying exclusively on the contributions of the world-economy school to 
the understanding of the Great Power War/hegemony link, and by explicitly seeking to 
incorporate insights from a variety of scholars, not only from the structural realism and long 
cycle schools, but from more disparate orientations, it was attempted to produce findings 
that may advance the knowledge of this specific question in more general terms, and also to 
guard against over-reliance on one perspective or scholars from a specific academic 
background. This is also in keeping with the goal of undertaking unidisciplinary research 
that builds upon the insights and contributions of social scientists from a variety of 
‘disciplines’. With regards to the general advancement of knowledge, relating to the topic of 
this study, it is possible to (briefly) relate the findings of this study to the literature presented 
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in chapter two by regarding some of the main arguments of each of the authors that relate to 
the Great Power War/hegemony question, in turn.  
Beginning with the structural realism school and with Gilpin in particular, the findings of 
this study reflect the argument that the interstate system, as an institution, reflects the 
interests of its most powerful members. This was particularly evident in the manner in which 
the new Dutch hegemon encrusted its dominant position in the interstate system by way of 
the settlement to the Thirty Years’ War. Gilpin’s argument that hegemonic wars sprout from 
the disequilibrium between the growing power of some states, and the declining power of 
others (whose interests the interstate system still reflect), also appears valid and has been 
observed in terms of the Dutch historical case study. This is also one of the most pertinent 
points that one can tentatively speculate is also true in the British and American cases, and 
even today, with the growing economic and military power of states such as China, India, 
and Brazil, while the composition of the interstate system and major Intergovernmental 
Organisations still reflect the vested interests of the United States in particular. Based on 
Gilpin’s argument, one can posit that unless the hierarchy of prestige existing today is 
rapidly brought into alignment with the new and changing underlying hierarchy of power, 
the risk and threat of hegemonic or Great Power War may indeed grow in the coming 
decades. However, as happened in the past, the unwillingness of the main beneficiaries of 
the current (Western-oriented) hierarchy of prestige to surrender their privileged position in 
terms of systemic leadership may well be a strong contributing factor to a future Great Power 
War. 
It can also be argued, given the historical time-period investigated in this study, that the 
fundamental nature of international relations has remained more or less constant, since the 
modern world-economy of capitalism has not been altered in any significant way, and that 
states have been, and arguably continue to be, engaged in an age-old struggle for wealth and 
power. However, it should be noted that this study differs from Gilpin’s arguments since it 
was only concerned with Great Power War in the modern – that is capitalist – era, while 
Gilpin considers much earlier conflicts, such as the Peloponnesian War, to be hegemonic 
wars. Of course, this is a predominantly Realist view of the interstate system, and increased 
cooperation and the establishment and strengthening of international regimes, in Keohane’s 
(2005) view, may well prove to be the surest way to avoid another Great Power War. 
However, as Keohane (2005:9,245) himself argues, it is often more valuable to build on 
Realist insights since there is less danger of making naïve assumptions about cooperation, 
and “since its taut logical structure and its pessimistic assumptions about individual and 
state behavior serve as barriers against wishful thinking.” However, this is only a starting 
point, and more research concerning the fostering of conceptions of shared interests and of 
global or communal security as opposed to national security is urgently necessary, 
particularly in light of contemporary threats of terrorism and environmental and climactic 
degradation and change. 
With regards to Mearsheimer’s insights – that hegemony is the ultimate guarantee of a 
state’s survival, and that conflict in the interstate system sprouts from the ever-present 
disproportionality in the military power of states, and the lack of a central rule-making 
authority to enforce cooperation in the interstate system – these relate to those of Gilpin 
discussed above, and are again by definition Realist in orientation. However, for the period 
under study in chapter three, one can certainly speak of hegemony as a means of ensuring 
state survival, but in the present era, given the high and frankly unaffordable costs of 
establishing such hegemony through the waging of a Great Power War, one may argue, as 
does Chomsky (2004, emphasis added), that it has now become an issue of “hegemony or 
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survival.” As such, more research must be done to establish how hegemony may in future be 
peacefully established (though it would likely not be as long-lasting or penetrating in scope if 
it is peacefully established, perhaps becoming a sort of ‘quasi-hegemony’) or how the world 
may decide issues of systemic leadership in the absence of hegemony, in the vein of Keohane 
(2005). 
In addition, Mearsheimer’s argument that regional hegemony is the highest pinnacle that 
may be attained in the interstate system also appears unfounded, since hegemony has been 
conceived in this study not only in terms of military strength, but crucially also in capitalist 
economic preponderance. While it is indeed unlikely that no single state can achieve global 
military conquest, it can be so disproportionately competitive in capitalist enterprise that it 
may achieve dominance in the markets of other core states, to say nothing of the semi-
periphery and the periphery.  
With regards to the long cycle school, and the insights of Dehio, although he was not 
writing from the perspective of World-Systems Analysis, his conception of the island/insular 
and continental rivalry for dominance in the interstate system, and the recurrence of this 
duality, has been central to this study, and the findings of the Dutch/Spanish case study 
validate the argument that it was a continental state that made a military bid for dominance, 
only to be thwarted by an economically dominant insular power at the head of a ‘grand 
coalition’. Naturally, this argument required fleshing out in terms of the features of the 
capitalist world-economy, yet the basic observation remains valid. However, Dehio 
(1962:281) questions the value of using the term ‘insularity’ in the contemporary era, as was 
indeed discussed above, but despite this, it could still conceivably be argued that insularity 
continues to merit consideration in any investigation of future hegemonic rivalry, although 
in an expanded sense that includes air superiority, and advanced anti-missile weaponry. With 
regards to generalisability, Dehio’s insular/continental duality suggests that in both the 
British and American cases there was a similar dynamic at work with one main contender for 
hegemonic succession being insular and maritime in orientation, and with the other being 
continental and oriented to land power. A future study that can comparatively investigate the 
Dutch, British, and American cases can shed further light on this. 
Turning to Modelski, his focus on the role of sea power has been particularly important, 
not only in terms of global reach, but also in commercial links between the core and the 
periphery. The importance of containing the continental contender for hegemony and 
world-empire by way of sea power has been demonstrated in the Dutch case, and the close 
link between the period of high Dutch naval capability concentration and hegemony 
corroborate the importance of sea power in the exercise of global reach. One can speculate 
that a similar link between naval capability concentration and hegemony exists in the British 
and American cases, further necessitating the production of a comparative study into the role 
played by Great Power War in the ascent of all three historical hegemons. Returning to 
Modelski’s list of hegemonic powers (which includes Portugal in the fifteenth and Britain in 
the eighteenth century and again in the nineteenth century), this was rejected in favour of 
Wallerstein’s, given the role and importance of bulk commodity trade in the functioning of 
the capitalist world-economy, and the strong challenge posed by France until its defeat at the 
end of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon. 
As for Thompson, an investigation into leading sectors, in the context of capitalist 
economic competitiveness, has helped to shed light on how Great Power War facilitated the 
ascent of the Dutch Republic in the domain of industrial production over its Spanish 
competitor in particular. Since many of the leading sectors, such as shipbuilding, have 
directly affected the ability of states to wage Great Power War, Thompson’s arguments have 
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been insightful. However, until a study can be produced that compares the ascent of all three 
historical hegemons, one can only speculate that leading sectors were important in the 
British and American cases as well. 
Regarding the world-economy school and Wallerstein, this study has been built upon 
World-Systems Analysis and has proceeded from its assumptions. Based upon the Dutch case 
study and its findings, a Political Economy approach in the investigation of the Great Power 
War/hegemony relationship appears to be far more beneficial than exclusively relying on a 
narrow political and military/security approach. This is because no state can successfully 
compete militarily in a Great Power War unless it has economic and financial 
underpinnings that can support such a total military struggle. Moreover, since capitalism has 
been one of the defining features of the modern world-system, no state can achieve 
hegemony unless it has the dominant capitalist economy. Constructing an understanding of 
hegemony predominantly on capitalist economic foundations thus appears far sounder than 
placing an exclusive focus on the military or political aspects of hegemony, as Realists are 
wont to do. This is not to say that these military or political aspects are not important, on the 
contrary, state support of capitalist enterprise has been shown to be one of the most 
indispensable ingredients in hegemonic ascent. However, if sound economic and financial 
underpinnings are not maintained, no military attempt to secure hegemony can succeed, as 
the failed bid of Spain revealed. 
Kennedy has also demonstrated the importance of economic factors, in addition to his 
arguments that no state’s relative strength ever remains constant, and that geopolitical factors 
are inescapable when attempting to account for the rise and fall of Great Powers in the 
modern world-system. As for Ropp, his contributions to the Great Power War/hegemony 
question have primarily revolved around military considerations, yet he too revealed the 
importance of sea power and productive economic underpinnings in military contests. 
Ormrod’s insights primarily revolve around the importance of the leading cities in the world-
economy, and it was seen in chapter three of this study that the economically and financially 
dominant city was located in the state that emerged victorious from the hegemonic contests, 
and again this has much to do with the capitalist economic and financial foundations of 
hegemony the modern world-system. It would indeed be revealing to compare the position of 
London and New York in the British and American cases, and possibly Hong Kong and 
Shanghai today.  
Although Levi and Barbieri’s work concerning the continuation of trade between enemies 
during wartime did not constitute a central aspect of this study, at certain points in the 
Dutch case study, this helped to reveal the dominant profit motive of commercial 
enterprises, even if it meant trading weapons and ammunition produced in domestic 
factories to foreign enemies.  
As for Cox, his contributions regarding the formation and characteristics of capitalist 
hegemonic blocs were useful, and highlighted the importance of a strong, supportive, state 
in fostering capitalist economic competitiveness, and on this point his views correlate closely 
with those of Wallerstein. It was also argued in chapter two that the era of Dutch hegemony 
constituted a hegemonic world order, albeit less pronounced than the British and American 
hegemonic world orders that followed in later centuries. However, it should again be 
emphasised that this study has not sought to investigate how the Dutch hegemonic bloc 
became established, but rather how Great Power War facilitated the hegemonic ascent of the 
Dutch state in the world-system.  
Finally, the document issued by the University of the West Indies, concerning the ‘brain 
drain’ phenomenon, contributed to the discussions in chapter three concerning the role of 
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immigration and the importance of the influx of skills and capital along with those 
immigrants in fostering economic competitiveness. Particularly in the fields of technical 
progress and scientific innovation, the more open, tolerant atmosphere of the insular 
hegemonic contender brought thinkers from afar whose contributions had an impact during 
wartime.  
Having thus established that the findings of this study, for the most part, pertain directly to 
the literature consulted, while many of the contributions of scholars to the Great Power 
War/hegemony question from a variety of academic backgrounds help to tentatively 
generalise the findings produced in this study, it can again be emphasised that only through 
undertaking unidisciplinary historical social scientific research, that is inclusive of a 
multitude of scholars and ‘disciplines’, can a more complete understanding emerge of those 
IR questions concerning large-scale and long-term social change. 
In more specific terms, this study and its findings, insofar as the Dutch case is concerned, 
have been significant since they have helped to elaborate and refine the causal process 
between Great Power War and hegemony, which has not enjoyed sufficiently intensive 
examination in existing literature, even though only one case study could be employed given 
practical space considerations. The findings have also validated the utility of the conception, 
as employed by World-Systems Analysis, of hegemony as sprouting from economic 
preponderance, and with regards to theory testing, those claims made by Wallerstein and 
other authors – that Great Power Wars play an integral role in hegemonic ascent – appear 
validated, again when viewed in the context of the Dutch case.  
 
4.4 ASPECTS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION 
The present study, which is now nearing its end, cannot be concluded without offering 
suggestions for future research directions, since it is impossible to address all matters of 
import within the scope of a single study. First, and arguably most important, is the need to 
produce a single study that comparatively investigates the role played by Great Power War in 
hegemonic ascent (and which includes the Dutch, British, and American cases), and which 
then applies those insights to an investigation of and speculation about hegemonic rivalry in 
the twenty-first century. Such a study, while relying on much the same methodology as the 
present study, would rely more heavily on cross-case comparison, and on speculation about 
how present and future trends in questions of systemic leadership are influenced and shaped 
by historical processes. This is an endeavour that I personally aim to undertake, given the 
need for further research on the establishment of systemic leadership in the wake of US 
hegemonic decline. 
Second, the call can be issued for urgent research on how to allow for peaceful hegemonic 
succession and closer international cooperation in the absence of hegemony, in a similar 
vein to research undertaken by Keohane (2005). Given the potential dangers posed by 
renewed hegemonic rivalry and Great Power War, this task cannot be postponed, and must 
be taken up with all possible alacrity, not only in social science circles, but also in those of 
politics and society at large. Although social scientists such as Goldstein (1988), Modelski 
and Thompson (1988), and Chase-Dunn and Podobnik (1995), along with many, many 
others, have long been writing about the dangers of nuclear war, and the unacceptably high 
possibility of its occurrence, for too long this has remained an academic exercise, while the 
practice of power politics has continued. Despite moves towards disarmament, the nations of 
the world, both nuclear and not, continue to search for deadlier weapons and more effective 
means of killing – now not only soldiers on the battlefield, but entire populations. A 
fundamental shift of mindset must therefore occur at some point in the future, and better for 
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it to occur in time than after a nuclear apocalypse – if there should still be some semblance 
of humanity remaining. Research on how to best facilitate this shift of values is thus also 
urgent, but it must be said that given the long and sordid history of humanity it is unlikely 
that we have seen the last of major, devastating interstate wars, be they Great Power Wars or 
not. Even once a new historical system comes to replace the capitalist world-economy, as in 
time it must, warfare is likely to persist in some form or another, while the knowledge to 
make weapons of mass destruction will remain.  
Third, another possible direction for future research is to investigate the role of Great 
Power Wars in the decline of hegemons. For instance, it can be investigated how the Dutch 
Republic’s hegemony declined as a result of English and French efforts, which included 
warfare, with the Dutch Republic finally succumbing to France during the Revolutionary 
Wars. As for Britain, although Germany never succeeded in occupying her, the fortunes of 
the erstwhile hegemon nevertheless declined as a result of having waged war beyond its 
means between 1914 and 1945. Much research could be done here, especially the manner in 
which those Great Power Wars harmed the competitiveness of the Dutch and British in the 
three economic spheres of agro-industrial production, commerce, and finance. Perhaps it 
will also be that the US will finally be eclipsed as a result of some future war, although the 
likely use of nuclear weapons will eclipse much else besides! 
Fourth, it is up to future researchers to investigate which two states are likely to be the 
main hegemonic contenders of the twenty-first century, if hegemonic rivalry should return to 
the world again. Perhaps such studies can make use of the findings presented here, given the 
features of the two rivals for hegemony in the early era of the modern world-system, and 
those eventually produced by a complete, comparative study on the matter. Indeed, the 
space for future research is there. 
Fifth, the call should be issued to future searchers to take account of the longue durée, as 
Wallerstein (2000b:34) argues, and as was attempted here. Unfortunately, the observation of 
Winston Churchill (quoted in Langworth, 2008:564), made in 1929, still rings true, perhaps 
now more so than ever, and this is certainly something that future researchers can work on: 
“How strange it is that the past is so little understood and so quickly forgotten. We live in the 
most thoughtless of ages. Every day headlines and short views. I have tried to drag history up 
a little nearer to our own times in case it should be helpful as a guide in present difficulties.” 
The value of such an enterprise has hopefully been emphasised in this study, for as 
Santayana (1905:284) argued, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to 
repeat it.” 
So then concludes this chapter – which presented the main findings of the historical case 
study and their significance – and this study – investigating the role of Great Power War in 
the rise of hegemons. As a concluding remark, in light of potential hegemonic rivalry in the 
current century, consider another of Churchill’s comments (quoted in Langworth, 2008:10), 
recorded in 1954 as the Cold War gathered momentum: 
 
Nothing is final. Change is unceasing and it is likely that mankind has a lot to learn before it comes to 
its journey’s end … We might even find ourselves in a few years moving along a smooth causeway of 
peace and plenty instead of roaming around the rim of Hell. For myself I am an optimist – it does not 
seem to be much use being anything else – and I cannot believe that the human race will not find its 
way through the problems that confront it, although they are separated by a measureless gulf from any 
they have known before … Thus we may by patience, courage, and in orderly progression reach the 
shelter of a calmer and kindlier age. 
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It is indeed up to social scientists of all persuasions to contribute to making such a vision 
of the future a reality, and although only to small degree, it is hoped that this study has taken 
a step in the right direction. 
 
FINIS 
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